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HowTo: React on Check Point Information Disclosure

Every now and then auditors reviewing and penetrating Check Point firewalls are often criticizing a http web portal being accessible on tcp-port 18264 of the firewall's external interface providing a so called Internal_CA for download.
Don't be fooled, this is not the Internal CA Management Tool, which runs on tcp-port 18265 on your SmartCenter once you enabled it. See:

What's it then?

Your Check Point Firewall just allows obtaining CRLs via an HTTP request on ICA port 18264/tcp.
See: sk32682, sk99076

Check Point writes:

Is this a vulnerability? No. All CAs have to do this.
This is a security feature, not a security problem. Without publishing the CRL, you lose security.

Auditors also like to criticize port 264 TCP being open disclosing the firewall's hostname and ICA name.

This can simply be verified on your own with the one-liner below (replace x.x.x.x with the IP of your Check Point).

printf '\x51\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x21\x00\x00\x00\x0bsecuremote\x00' | nc -q 1 x.x.x.x 264 | grep -a CN | cut -c 2-

Check Point considers this public information (sk69360).

Also read this interesting thread about the hostname disclosure.

You can still improve security!

Option 1: Exclude FW1_ica_services on port 18264 (sk35292) from the implied rules and explicitly define a rule allowing access to this port from specific IP addresses. This only works if RemoteAccess VPN users don't connect from dynamic IPs.

Option 2: Detect and prevent port scans via IPS and/or SmartEvent.

Option 3: Block known scanners, such as, and others. Check Point has an IPS protection for this.

32 Replies

Hi @Ethan_Schorer,

thanks for clarifying. I was honestly a bit confused if I was explaining my point clearly enough, since the discussion always seemed to gravitate towards the CRL distribution point (see Val's first comment from yesterday, for example).

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I am also not sure about exploitation. ICA is out there for ages, and I do not recall a single case of it is being abused or exploited. Would you please specify a particular scenario of such exploitation? 

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Hi @Bjoern_K ,

That is what I meant, that the HTTP server at the port is there mainly for the CRL.

Of course there will be a way to completely disable it, the problem today is that this is required for CRL and so it cannot be disabled.


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