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Alex-
Leader Leader
Leader
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Blast-RADIUS - CVE-2024-3596

https://www.blastradius.fail/

 

Blast-RADIUS is a vulnerability that affects the RADIUS protocol. RADIUS is a very common protocol used for authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) for networked devices on enterprise and telecommunication networks.

What can the attacker do?

The Blast-RADIUS attack allows a man-in-the-middle attacker between the RADIUS client and server to forge a valid protocol accept message in response to a failed authentication request. This forgery could give the attacker access to network devices and services without the attacker guessing or brute forcing passwords or shared secrets. The attacker does not learn user credentials.

Who is affected?

Blast-RADIUS is a protocol vulnerability, and thus affects all RADIUS implementations using non-EAP authentication methods over UDP.

System administrators of networks using RADIUS should check with vendors for a patch against this vulnerability, and follow best practices for RADIUS configuration as discussed below. There is nothing that end users can do on their own to protect against this attack.

RADIUS is used in a wide variety of applications, including in enterprise networks to authenticate access to switches and other routing infrastructure, for VPN access, by ISPs for DSL and FTTH (Fiber to the Home), in 802.1X and Wi-Fi authentication, 2G and 3G cellular roaming and 5G DNN (Data Network Name) authentication, mobile Wi-Fi offload with SIM card-based authentication, private APN authentication, to authenticate access to critical infrastructure, and in the Eduroam and OpenRoaming wifi consortia.

What is the vulnerability?

The RADIUS protocol predates modern cryptographic guarantees and is typically unencrypted and unauthenticated. However, the protocol does attempt to authenticate server responses using an ad hoc construction based on the MD5 hash function and a fixed shared secret between a client and server.

Our attack combines a novel protocol vulnerability with an MD5 chosen-prefix collision attack and several new speed and space improvements. The attacker injects a malicious attribute into a request that causes a collision between the authentication information in the valid server response and the attacker’s desired forgery. This allows the attacker to turn a reject into an accept, and add arbitrary protocol attributes.

84 Replies
Matt_Taber
Contributor

I found a guide for setting up DUO for Infinity Portal administration, but struggling to find a doc for SmartConsole access.  Assumption would be to create a new IDP (which is a new option that I don't recall seeing before in SmartConsole.)

I'll do some digging, thank you for this suggestion.

 
 

 

 

0 Kudos
Duane_Toler
Advisor

You'll setup a new Identity Provider object in SmartConsole, and choose the radio button "Managing administrator access".  Setup the matching SAML application in Azure/Entra AD, enter those Entity ID and Reply URLs, download the metadata file from Azure, upload to the IdP object.

Edit, or create, a management user, change authentication type to Identity Provider, select the IdP for management access, publish, then test it.

Open SmartConsole, and change the login type to Identity Provider.

 

 

 

 

0 Kudos
the_rock
Legend
Legend

You got it:)

Andy

 

Screenshot_1.png

0 Kudos
PhoneBoy
Admin
Admin

There's now an official SK on this: https://support.checkpoint.com/results/sk/sk182516
Basically:

  • Exploiting this CVE requires MITM between the gateway and the RADIUS Server.
  • If you have to use RADIUS instead of changing to a different authentication method, ensure your RADIUS server is deployed on an isolated network with anti-spoofing enabled.
  • We plan fixes for the CVE in upcoming Jumbo Hotfixes.
Duane_Toler
Advisor

Ahhh! That's right, SmartConsole now has option for SAML/IdP!  That's so recent that it slipped my mind.

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PhoneBoy
Admin
Admin

Yes as of R81.20 🙂

tavi0906
Contributor

In the SK its mentioned, Check Point plans to provide a fix in the upcoming Jumbo Hotfix Accumulator package for all supported versions.

My question is >

if we were to take the approach of changing the authentication method for the versions that are not supported, do we still require to install the hotfix?

if we are to install the mentioned hotfix, would it still be required to change the Authentication method? 

 

 

the_rock
Legend
Legend

Very good questions indeed @tavi0906 

PhoneBoy
Admin
Admin

Changing authentication methods away from RADIUS definitely mitigates the vulnerability, which is specific to usage of RADIUS.
Jumbo Hotfixes include many bugfixes and your decision to install a given one will depend on a number of factors.

tavi0906
Contributor

Do you mean for the CVE-2024-3596, there is no further action required (install JHF) if any of the following conditions is met:

  • RADIUS is not configured
  • RADIUS is configured but with the RADIUS server in an isolated internal network with Anti-Spoofing enabled

 

And also to check, so installing only the upcoming JHF with none of the points indicated above, might not be able to mitigate the CVE-2024-3596?

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PhoneBoy
Admin
Admin

There is now a hotfix available to support RADIUS Message-Authentication for the RADIUS client on the gateway for purposes OTHER than authenticating to Gaia OS itself (e.g. for clish/WebUI).
It is currently available as a hotfix on top of R81.20 JHF 65 via TAC and can be ported to other releases. 
The relevant Bug ID is PRHF-35233.

We are planning a separate fix for Gaia OS itself.
Both fixes (and possibly others) are expected to be included in a future JHF.

the_rock
Legend
Legend

Hope it will be included in next jumbo hotfix?

0 Kudos
PhoneBoy
Admin
Admin

ETA on this is unknown at this time.

0 Kudos
lraaicfdb
Participant

@PhoneBoy 
Is the fix also applicable for security management? Logging into the Smart Console via Active Directory does not work since the latest Microsoft update.

0 Kudos
PhoneBoy
Admin
Admin

I assume it is relevant for Management as well in this specific context.
Your best bet is to confirm with TAC, however.

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JP_Rex
Collaborator
Collaborator

I will let you know.
One of my Customers installs the Fix today on his MGMT for SmartConsole Authentication.

 

Regards
Peter

JP_Rex
Collaborator
Collaborator

The fix was installed on a R81.20 HFA Take 65 SMS since then the Login with Radius credentials works.

🍾
Case Closed

Regards
Peter 

0 Kudos
cdooer
Participant

Does the fix need to be requested, or can it be downloaded and applied? I've got an open TAC case, haven't heard back yet. Was hoping that maybe I could just download and apply it. 

0 Kudos
PhoneBoy
Admin
Admin

As the fix is only available for specific JHF levels, it needs to be requested.

0 Kudos
tavi0906
Contributor

Do you mean for the CVE-2024-3596, there is no further action required (install JHF) if any of the following conditions is met:

  • RADIUS is not configured
  • RADIUS is configured but with the RADIUS server in an isolated internal network with Anti-Spoofing enabled

 

And also to check, so installing only the upcoming JHF with none of the points indicated above, might not be able to mitigate the CVE-2024-3596?

0 Kudos
PhoneBoy
Admin
Admin

If you are not using RADIUS with a Check Point gateway/management, then no additional action is required with respect to this CVE.
If you use RADIUS with a Check Point gateway/management, apply the JHF when available.

The mitigation for CVE-2024-3596 includes requiring Message Authenticator attributes in RADIUS.
RADIUS authentication will fail if the RADIUS server used requires Message Authenticator attributes and you have not applied the relevant patches (JHF or otherwise) on Check Point devices.

I hope that's clear.

0 Kudos
BeardedKeyboard
Explorer

Do we have an update as to when the JHF will be available? We're currently using R81.10 on Take 150, so would need to request the fix from Check Point if the date isn't soon; in the meantime, we're having to hold off patching two NPS servers due to this issue.

0 Kudos
tjoll
Participant
Participant

Yesterday, I've got an update from TAC that they have an custom hotfix for R81.20 take 65 and are planning to integrate it in the JHF. Unfortunately, I do not have any ETA when it will be added in the JHF or when other versions receive the custom hotfix.

0 Kudos
gg_fga
Contributor

@Amir_Ayalon 

Can Spark appliance users also get the same support as others?
Is a fix also planned for version R81.10.10?

0 Kudos
PhoneBoy
Admin
Admin

I assume we will also roll out fixes for Quantum Spark as well.

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