

**NISTIR 8200**

# **Interagency Report on the Status of International Cybersecurity Standardization for the Internet of Things (IoT)**

Prepared by the Interagency International Cybersecurity Standardization  
Working Group

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NISTIR 8200

# Interagency Report on the Status of International Cybersecurity Standardization for the Internet of Things (IoT)

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Working Group

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## Reports on Computer Systems Technology

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems.

### Abstract

The Interagency International Cybersecurity Standardization Working Group (IICS WG) was established in December 2015 by the National Security Council's Cyber Interagency Policy Committee. Its purpose is to coordinate on major issues in international cybersecurity standardization and thereby enhance U.S. federal agency participation in the process.

Effective U.S. Government participation involves coordinating across the federal government and working with the U.S. private sector. The U.S. relies more heavily on the private sector for standards development than do many other countries. Companies and industry groups, academic institutions, professional societies, consumer groups, and other interested parties are major contributors to this process. Further, the many Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs) which provide the infrastructure for the standards development are overwhelmingly private sector organizations.

On April 25, 2017, the IICS WG established an Internet of Things (IoT) Task Group to determine the current state of international cybersecurity standards development for IoT. This report is intended for use by the working group member agencies to assist them in their standards planning and to help coordinate U.S. Government participation in international cybersecurity standardization for IoT. Other organizations may also find this document useful in their planning.

### Keywords

cybersecurity; cybersecurity objectives; cybersecurity risks; cybersecurity threats; IT; information technology; IoT; Internet of Things; IoT components; IoT systems; SDO; standards developing organizations; standards; standards gaps

## Acknowledgements

This report reflects the contributions and discussions by the interagency membership of the Internet of Things (IoT) Task Group established by the Interagency International Cybersecurity Standardization Working Group (IICS WG). The IoT Task Group Co-Conveners were Kat Megas (NIST) and Mike Rosa (DHS).

Additionally, the IoT Task Group would like to express its deep appreciation for the comments that were received from the 30 public reviewers of the draft report. Their thoughtful comments have enhanced the organization, content, and clarity of the final report.

### In Memoriam

An enthusiastic and knowledgeable contributor to the IoT Task Group was Mike Staufenberg. Mike was a Booz Allen Hamilton Support Contractor to the Army CIO/G-6. Sadly, Mike passed suddenly during the development of this report. The IoT Task Group wishes to dedicate this report to Mike's memory.

The IoT Task Group would like to acknowledge the specific contributions from the following IoT Task Group members:

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## Executive Summary

The Interagency International Cyber Security Working Group (IICS WG) was created in response to recommendations contained in the 2015 *Interagency Report on Strategic U.S. Government Engagement in International Standardization to Achieve U.S. Objectives for Cybersecurity* (NIST Interagency Report 8074 Volume 1 [1]). This working group coordinates on major issues in international cybersecurity standardization. It established an Internet of Things (IoT) Task Group to develop this report on the status of international cybersecurity standards relevant to IoT.

The growth of network-connected devices, systems, and services comprising the IoT creates immense opportunities and benefits for our society [2]. However, to reap the great benefits of IoT and to minimize the potentially significant risks, these network-connected devices need to be secure and resilient. This depends in large part upon the timely availability and widespread adoption of clear and effective international cybersecurity standards.

Both the government and the broader public are intended audiences for this report, which aims to inform and enable policymakers, managers, and standards participants as they seek timely development and use of such standards in IoT components, systems, and related services.

This report relies upon terms and definitions defined in Annex A – Terms and Definitions of NISTIR 8074 Volume 2 [3]. It aims to establish a common understanding of IoT components, systems and applications for which standards could be relevant. The report starts with a functional description of IoT components, which are the basic building blocks of IoT systems.

To provide insights into the present state of IoT cybersecurity standardization, the report describes five IoT technology application areas. These areas are certainly not exhaustive, but they are sufficiently representative to use in analyzing the present state of IoT cybersecurity standardization:

- Connected vehicle IoT enables vehicles, roads, and other infrastructure to communicate and share vital transportation information.
- Consumer IoT consists of IoT applications in residences as well as wearable and mobile devices.
- Health IoT processes data derived from sources such as electronic health records and patient-generated health data.
- Smart building IoT includes energy usage monitoring systems, physical access control security systems and lighting control systems.
- Smart manufacturing IoT enables enterprise-wide integration of data, technology, advanced manufacturing capabilities, and cloud and other services.

IoT cybersecurity objectives, risks, and threats are then analyzed for IoT applications in general and for each of the five illustrative IoT technology application areas. Cybersecurity objectives for traditional information technology (IT) systems generally prioritize Confidentiality, then Integrity, and lastly Availability. IoT systems cross multiple sectors as well as use cases within those sectors. Accordingly, cybersecurity objectives may be prioritized very differently by various parties, depending on the application. The increased ubiquity of IoT components and systems heighten the risks they present. Standards-based cybersecurity risk management will continue to be a major factor in the trustworthiness of IoT applications. Analysis of the

application areas makes it clear that cybersecurity for IoT is unique and requires tailoring existing standards *and* creating new standards to address challenges, for example: pop-up network connections, shared system components, the ability to change physical aspects of the environment, and related connections to safety.

Building upon NISTIR 8074 Volume 2, this report describes 12 cybersecurity core areas and provides examples of relevant standards. The analysis is based on the information in Annex D, which maps cybersecurity standards that may be relevant for IoT systems to the dozen cybersecurity core areas. The annotated standards listings in Annex D are not exhaustive, but they represent an extensive effort to identify presently relevant IoT cybersecurity standards. The market impacts of existing standards are noted; possible gaps in standards are identified in Section 8. While the Annex D listing is a onetime snapshot, it should prove useful as a point of departure for maintaining awareness of the evolving standards landscape. A summary of the status of cybersecurity standardization for the five specific examples of IoT applications is provided in Table 4.

The report's conclusions focus upon the issue of standards gaps and the effective use of existing standards. For example, further standards work is needed to secure communications which leverage the Internet as the main gateway for IT to Operations Technology (OT).

For identified priorities, agencies should work with industry to initiate new standards projects in Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs) to close such gaps. In accordance with U.S. Government policy [\[4\]](#), agencies should:

- participate in the development of IoT cybersecurity standards,
- cite appropriate standards in their procurements based upon their mission, and
- work with industry to support the development of appropriate conformity assessment schemes to help assure that the requirements in such standards are met.



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## 1 Introduction

The Internet of Things (IoT) has already changed the world for individuals, as consumers and citizens, as well as for governments and industry. The IoT is expected to provide more revolutionary capability and become more ubiquitous. Yet, the adoption of IoT brings cybersecurity risks that pose a significant threat to the Nation, to organizations, and to individuals<sup>1</sup>.

Securing IoT devices is a major challenge, as manufactures tend to focus on functionality, compatibility requirements, customer convenience, and time-to-market rather than security. Meanwhile, security threats are increasing. For example, Symantec reported a 600 % increase in attacks against IoT devices from 2016 to 2017 [5].

The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) has examined the cybersecurity implications of IoT within the context of national security and emergency preparedness. This examination “found that IoT adoption will increase in both speed and scope, and that it will impact virtually all sectors of our society. Additionally, the NSTAC determined that there is a small—and rapidly closing—window to ensure that IoT is adopted in a way that maximizes security and minimizes risk. If the country fails to do so, it will be coping with the consequences for generations [6].”

The President’s Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity reached a similar conclusion: “The IoT facilitates linking an incredible range of devices and products to each other and the world. Although this connectivity has the potential to revolutionize most industries and many facets of everyday life, the possible harm that malicious actors could cause by exploiting these technologies to gain access to parts of our critical infrastructure, given the current state of cybersecurity, is immense [7].”

Our economy is increasingly global, complex, and interconnected. It is characterized by rapid advances in information technology (IT). IT products and services need to provide sufficient levels of cybersecurity and resilience. The timely availability of international cybersecurity standards is a dynamic and critical component for the cybersecurity and resilience of all information and communications systems and supporting infrastructures [1].

The growth of network-connected devices, systems, and services comprising the IoT creates immense opportunities and benefits for our society [2]. However, to reap the great benefits of IoT and to minimize the potentially significant risks, these network-connected devices need to be secure and resilient. This depends in large part upon the timely availability and widespread adoption of clear and effective international cybersecurity standards.

---

<sup>1</sup> Cybersecurity is defined as “the prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and – if needed – the restoration of electronic information and communications systems, and the information they contain, in order to strengthen the confidentiality, integrity and availability of these systems” per NISTIR 8074 vol. 2

## 2 Scope

Consistent with U.S. Government policy, agencies are encouraged to support the development and use of voluntary consensus standards, which are developed by predominantly private sector led voluntary consensus standards bodies [4]. This report examines the current state of international cybersecurity standards development by voluntary consensus standards bodies for IoT. It distills IoT down to the simplest concepts and describes the nuances associated with these concepts. It acknowledges but does not focus on specific technologies or concerns associated with IoT such as societal impact, safety, or privacy.

This report recognizes that cybersecurity—and cybersecurity standards— can support individuals’ safety and privacy. For example, cybersecurity standards when applied to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of personally identifiable information (PII) are an important component of protecting individuals’ privacy. However, privacy cannot be achieved solely by securing individuals’ PII (see Figure 1). As noted in NISTIR 8062, *An Introduction to Privacy Engineering and Risk Management in Federal Systems*, privacy concerns can arise from intentional or authorized processing of information about individuals, and in certain contexts, even measures used to secure PII can result in privacy issues [8].




Figure 1 – Relationship Between Information Security and Privacy<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Id. at 8.

### 3 Methodology

This report uses terms and definitions as they are defined in Annex A – Terms and Definitions of [NISTIR 8074 Volume 2, Supplemental Information for the Interagency Report on Strategic U.S. Government Engagement in International Standardization to Achieve U.S. Objectives for Cybersecurity, December 2015](#).

This report:

- provides a functional description for IoT (Section 4);
- describes several representative IoT applications (Section 5);
- describes IoT cybersecurity objectives, risks, and threats (Section 6);
- summarizes the cybersecurity core areas and provides examples of relevant standards (Section 7);
- provides an analysis of the standards landscape for IoT cybersecurity, including market impact and possible standards gaps (Section 8);
- summarizes the status of international cybersecurity standards for selected IoT applications (Section 9); and
- maps cybersecurity standards that may be relevant for IoT systems to cybersecurity core areas (Annex D).

## 4 The Internet of Things (IoT)

IoT is a concept based on creating systems that interact with the physical world using networked entities (e.g., sensors, actuators, information resources, people).

There can be confusion around the meaning of the term IoT for a variety of reasons. They include: the cross-cutting aspect of IoT (specifically with respect to application domains); the multitude of stakeholders involved in IoT and their specific use cases; the complexity of IoT; and the rapidly changing technology supporting IoT.

While there is no universal definition of IoT, common elements exist among the many high-level definitions and descriptions for IoT. A few IoT definitions and descriptions from other sources are listed in Annex A. This report relies on the foundational concepts for IoT described in 4.1 below.

### 4.1 Foundational Concepts

The IoT consists of two foundational concepts:

- IoT components are connected by a network providing the potential for a many-to-many relationship between components (the network capability may or may not be Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) based); and
- Some IoT components have sensors and actuators that allow the components to observe (collect data about) and affect the physical world.

For the purposes of this report, the following definitions apply:

**IoT component:** The basic building block of an IoT system. Multiple IoT components interact with each other to form a system and achieve one or more goals. Each IoT component provides some function that is necessary within the system. An IoT component:

- must have at least one *network interface* that provides the ability to participate in a many-to-many network, although a given IoT component need not communicate with more than one other IoT component in a given system (e.g., assigning and limiting communication between two static IP addresses); and
- has some combination of the following capabilities: actuating; application interface; data processing; data storing; data transferring; human user interface (UI); latent; sensing; and supporting.

Other publications sometimes use “IoT device” as a synonym for “IoT component” or define “device” as an actuator or sensor. Moreover, traditional IT resources (such as servers) also can be considered IoT components.

**System:** a combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more stated purposes.

**IoT system:** a system composed of networked IoT components or other, integrated IoT systems that interacts with a physical entity through sensors and/or actuators within the IoT components. IoT systems differ from conventional IT systems in their ability to directly interact with the

physical world. IoT systems may also be considered IoT components if the system provides a network interface.

**IoT environment:** a set of IoT components and supporting technologies that are networked together and can be built into IoT systems. Such IoT systems are also part of the IoT environment. The Internet is an example of an IoT environment.

As shown in Figure 2 below, the IoT component is the basic element of an IoT system, and provides some combination of the system's capabilities.




Figure 2 – Capabilities of an IoT Component.

An IoT system builder combines IoT components to create an IoT system that can meet a set of requirements. By understanding each IoT component as a set of capabilities that are provided to the rest of the system, an IoT system builder can match those capabilities to the IoT system requirements. Using the capabilities model, an IoT component can be understood by the set of capabilities it can provide to a system. These capabilities are illustrated in Figure 2 above and described below.



## 4.2 Capabilities of an IoT Component

There are several types of IoT capabilities:

- *Transducer capabilities* interact with the physical world.
- *Data capabilities* are directly involved in providing functionality to the system.
- *Interface capabilities* provide the component the ability to interact with other IoT components (including people).
- *Supporting capabilities* are indirectly involved in providing functionality to the system, such as monitoring, management, security, or orchestration (the arrangement and coordination of IoT components in an IoT system).
- *Latent capabilities* are transducer, data, interface, or supporting capabilities that are not currently enabled and accessible outside the IoT component.

### Actuating

An *actuating capability* provides the ability to make a change in the physical world based on information given as input to the component. Examples include: heating coil (temperature control), electric shock delivery (cardiac pacing), electronic door lock (lock/unlock), unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operation (remote control), servo motors (simple motion/movement), and robotic arm (complex motion/movement).

### Application Interface

An *application interface capability* provides the ability for other computing devices (components, systems, etc.) to communicate with the IoT component through an IoT component application. An example of an application interface is an application programming interface (API).

### Data Processing

A *data processing capability* provides the ability to transform data based on an algorithm. The transformation may be very simple, with a single input variable and a single output, or it may be complex with multiple inputs and outputs. Control algorithms are an important type of processing that take the output of sensor(s) and actuator(s) or pre-processor(s) and provide an output that can be fed into an actuator or post-processor. These control algorithms often are used within negative feedback loops, but not always. A proportional-integral-derivative (PID)<sup>3</sup> controller (widely used in industrial control systems) is an example of such a control algorithm. Another example is an algorithm which models the human insulin response in a real-time system that manages the function of an artificial pancreas. Additional examples of data processing include: data aggregation capability, predictive analysis, and binary (Yes/No) analysis.

### Data Storing

A *data storing capability* provides the ability to store and retrieve data for later use. Examples include storage of component input as well as the storage of component generated data, such as electronic patient records.

### Data Transferring

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<sup>3</sup> Proportional-integral-derivative (PID) explained in length at <http://www.ni.com/white-paper/3782/en/>

A *data transferring capability* provides the ability to move data from one physical or logical location to another. The data transferring capability provides the ability to ‘black box’ a network and provide information about the network without having to understand the specific network topology. A component’s data transferring capability impacts the latency of information flow as well as the rate at which that information can flow. Some examples of data transferring capability include data networks based on: Ethernet protocol, and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 wireless protocol.

### **Human User Interface (UI)**

A *human UI capability* provides the ability for the component to interact directly with people. Not all IoT components will have a human UI. These components will pass information to other system components in order to support the UI capability. Examples include: optical and tactile displays and audio input and output.

### **Latent**

*Latent capabilities* are not currently enabled for access externally to the IoT component. For example, a component may have a USB port, but nothing is plugged into that port. In that state, the USB port is considered a latent capability. It has the potential to be used at any time, and if someone attaches something to it, that could enable any of the other capabilities; if someone plugs a Wi-Fi™ adapter into the USB port, the IoT component would then have an additional network interface capability.

### **Network Interface**

A *network interface capability* provides the interface between digital communication network components necessary for communicating data. Every IoT component must have at least one network interface capability. While the network interface capability allows for a component to be connected to a communication network, it does not provide the data transferring capability itself. Capability examples include: Ethernet adapter interface, cellular interface, and ZigBee radio interface.

### **Sensing**

A *sensing capability* provides the ability to observe an aspect of the physical world. Examples include: temperature sensing (temperature measurement capability), computerized tomography (CT) scans<sup>4</sup> (radiographic imaging), optical sensing, and audio sensing.

### **Supporting**

A *supporting capability* provides additional functional capabilities to support the IoT system. Examples include: orchestration, time synchronization, remote management, system memory encryption, authentication, and trusted execution.

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<sup>4</sup> This illustrates the nature of complex sensing systems which can apply potentially harmful energy through actuators.

### **An IoT Component as a Black Box**

From an IoT perspective, a “black box” viewpoint of each component is useful, because an IoT system builder may not have access to any details of the internal workings of a particular IoT component. In fact, the internal workings of a component may change over time. This is especially relevant for IoT systems of systems, in which components are comprised of a set of other IoT components. When interfaces, capabilities, and limitations of a component are accurately and completely documented, including any details necessary for the system builder to map the component against capabilities to system requirements, the details of the inner workings may not be important. An IoT component that is documented in this manner provides the described capabilities within the described limitations, and can be easily integrated into systems, regardless of internal implementations. There are use cases where the internal workings of an IoT component may need to be completely documented and understood, including National Security Systems (NSS) and systems that carry a risk of injury or harm to an individual.

### **4.3 IoT Attributes Affecting Cybersecurity**

IoT systems include a diverse set of new applications across consumer and industrial sectors. Cybersecurity considerations include but are not limited to the following possible attributes of IoT:

- Some IoT systems have direct connections to owner networks, while others directly connect to non-owner networks. Some IoT systems have direct connections to both owner and non-owner networks.
- IoT systems may comprise highly distributed IoT components that have a variety of owners or no defined owner.
- Some IoT systems are intended for use by or association with a particular person or group of people, while others are autonomous.
- Some IoT components use low-capability computing hardware (minimal processing, storage, etc.) and have low power consumption.
- Some IoT components are largely static (e.g., software cannot be updated, configuration cannot be changed as needed).
- Some IoT components process data locally, some IoT components have their data processed remotely, and some do both.
- A single IoT sensor may collect massive volumes of data.
- IoT components are highly heterogeneous (operating systems, network interfaces/protocols, functions, etc.)
- Many IoT systems rely on proprietary protocols for data communication.
- IoT systems are often deployed as part of highly dynamic systems and system environments.
- Many IoT systems do not provide centralized management capabilities for the owner.
- Many IoT systems can be remotely controlled by first parties (e.g., manufacturers).
- Some IoT components are deployed in physically unrestricted locations, making it difficult to provide physical security.
- IoT components may encounter statistical errors when sensing and acting on physical objects.
- IoT systems may affect the safety, reliability, resiliency, performance, and other aspects of an owner’s computing infrastructure and physical presence. If a failure occurs, the IoT

system should be given to the desired failure mode. (e.g., keeping a partially compromised IoT component online, take a component offline.)

- IoT systems may collect, store, and use data that the owner's personnel are not aware of or cannot manage properly.
- Some IoT systems have the ability to manage, update, and patch IoT components at scale.
- Some IoT systems support impromptu architectural changes.
- Some IoT systems are created through novel combinations of existing IoT systems and data streams that are re-purposed for an application not envisioned by the original designers. Further, such IoT systems may evolve as additional sensors or data streams become available or accessible.
- Some IoT systems include IoT components designed for decades-long use, such as smart meters in smart grid applications.
- IoT components may be poorly connected (dropped packets, interrupted connections).

## 5 Examples of IoT Applications

For this report, five significant IoT applications have been selected. They are sufficiently representative to use in the analysis of the present state of IoT cybersecurity standardization. Each application is explained below, including information about some of the notable security challenges and potential solutions. Sections 6 and 7 of this report provide greater detail about these challenges and solutions.

### 5.1 Connected Vehicles (CV)

In 1999, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) allocated 75 MHz of spectrum in the 5.9 GHz band for use by Intelligent Transportation systems (ITS) for vehicle safety and mobility applications. Since then, communications techniques, such as Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC), are using this bandwidth for Connected Vehicle (CV) technology pilots. CV technology is expected to enable vehicles, roads, and other infrastructure to communicate and share vital transportation information. Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) studies are underway, including by the Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office (ITS-JPO) at the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).



U.S. Department of Transportation

**Figure 3 – Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications [9]**

DSRC is currently part of a CV pilot run by DOT, which expects that a vehicle will use DSRC to transmit its position, direction, and speed -- as well as other information -- to vehicles sharing the road. DSRC will also “talk” to equipment installed in the road itself and in other infrastructure, such as traffic signals, stop signs, toll booths, work or school zones, and railroad crossings [10]. One concept implementation of DSRC involves vehicles exchanging Basic Safety Messages (BSM), which will be included with security credentials (see Figure 3, above). A possible alternative to DSRC is a technology concept called Visible Light Communication (VLC). LED

lights are increasingly being added to vehicles, and VLC can utilize these LED lights to communicate in the V2V and V2I scenarios.

The Security Credential Management System (SCMS) Proof-of-Concept (POC) is under development by DOT. One objective is to support a subset of security needs for the CV Pilots Program. Each Pilot site must interface with and use the SCMS as part of its approach to address at least a subset of the Pilot’s security requirements [11]. The goal of the SCMS POC design is to provide security services to support V2V and V2I communications at current passenger-vehicle production levels (up to 17 million annually) for the first year of deployment.




Figure 4 – V2X Public Key Infrastructure Overview [9]

An additional important goal of the SCMS POC system is to provide a flexible architecture that is capable of scaling to support larger numbers of V2V and V2I devices in the years following initial deployment [12]. The messages transmitted by vehicles are digitally signed for authentication and to indicate that the messages were not altered in transit. See Figure 4, above, for a V2V and V2I (consolidated as V2X) Public Key Infrastructure overview.

Significant privacy, safety, and security challenges associated with both of these projects remain. These include policies and laws governing the use of the information within BSM, and the security of BSMs, as well as the implementation and governance of a central Certificate Authority (CA).

## 5.2 Consumer


The consumer IoT includes all IoT applications for consumer products. In the residence, connected objects might include: thermostats, alarm systems, smoke detectors, doorbells, smart

appliances (e.g., washers, dryers, refrigerators, ovens, televisions), door locks, door openers, smart lightbulbs, room occupancy sensors, motion detectors, security cameras, pet monitors, and baby monitors. Wearables for consumer use, such as smart wristwear and smart fabrics, as well as implants, for applications such as consumer health or identification, are also part of the consumer IoT. Smartphones often serve as the human user interface for these components, as do smart home assistants.

Home assistants are increasingly common. They can provide information, perform tasks, and control other IoT components. Home assistants often use conversational interfaces but can also use text and images as input. These voice-enabled user interface devices can be placed throughout a house. Every major smartphone operating system available today includes the ability to control these home assistants, which may connect and control some or all IoT components in the home.

Smart appliances can provide sensing and actuating capabilities, as well as a network interface. Examples include cooking appliances that can be remotely programmed and monitored, and refrigerators that alert the occupants when the milk is running low or the steak is going bad. A smart home security system may alert the home occupant to a burglary, high carbon monoxide levels, or a fire event, even if the occupant is not within the sounding alarm's range (likely done through text, email, or dedicated app). Smart homes may include systems for fire detection, monitoring and communication for fire suppression, and alerting first responders. Chore automation is a growing trend for IoT devices in the home; autonomous home appliances and devices learn about users' behaviors and identify the best time to perform tasks autonomously. For example, a thermostat, linked to the owner opening the garage door, adjusts the home's temperature to the person's liking. A refrigerator or kitchen cabinet may communicate with a smartphone to place an order directly to a grocery delivery service.

While the idea of converting a home's control to smart devices has benefits, some consumers may be hesitant to embrace IoT-based systems if they perceive that their safety and privacy are at risk. Proper implementation of security within consumer IoT software, firmware, and hardware is often a neglected and overlooked priority. Securing IoT devices is a major challenge, and manufacturers tend to focus on functionality, compatibility requirements, and time-to-market rather than security. While the adoption of consumer IoT devices is expected to explode in the near future, the increased popularity and acceptance by the consumer must be weighed against security risks inherent to every device attached to a network.



**Figure 5 – Home Lighting Application**

Consumers may not be aware of the far-reaching security vulnerabilities introduced by something as innocuous as connecting a smart LED bulb to the home network. A representative diagram for connecting a smart LED bulb to a home network is shown in Figure 5, above. Connecting a smart LED bulb illustrates typical network connectivity for a consumer IoT device. The smart LED bulb allows the homeowner, via either a smartphone or remote control device, to turn the bulb on or off as well as schedule its activation and deactivation. The homeowner can access web services to store configurations of color, illumination intensity, and activation/deactivation schedules. These web-stored configurations can be used to seamlessly restore operation after a power outage.



If a consumer IoT device becomes compromised, it can be a gateway into the broader network. IoT threats could spread through networks and the Internet. By infecting a device and infiltrating one network, the threat can spread to an entirely separate network just by being in wireless range of another IoT device. In the case of a smart LED bulb, hackers in Wi-Fi™ range can learn Wi-Fi™ credentials sent in plain text and gain access to other systems and devices on the network and Internet. Possible attacks can range from spoofing connections to enabling malicious command and control of an IoT device by planting backdoors to create and launch an IoT distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. Securing IoT devices so that consumer safety and privacy remains protected is a continuing challenge.

### 5.3 Health and Medical Devices

IoT has recently gained traction by its spread from manufacturing to the electrical grid and other new sectors such as healthcare [13]. In the healthcare sector, health IoT components and systems gather, transmit and analyze personal data derived from sources such as electronic health records (EHR) containing personally identifiable information (PII), personal health records (PHR), patient generated health data, and other machine-generated healthcare data. Health IoT will support services such as real-time monitoring, medication compliance, and imaging.

### Characteristics of the Health IoT Environment

The health IoT is characterized by its objects, information resources, people, systems, and intelligent services. Table 1 illustrates some of the principal characteristics of the healthcare domain.

**Table 1 – Characteristics of the Health IoT Environment**

Objects	Information Resources	Systems	Intelligent Computing Services
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Home telehealth</li> <li>• Medical devices</li> <li>• Health and wellness products</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HL7 Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resource (FHIR)</li> <li>• Structural and semantic standards (vocabularies, code and value sets)</li> <li>• Actuators that receive commands</li> <li>• Personally worn physiological sensors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Payment</li> <li>• Research (system of systems)</li> <li>• Personal health records</li> <li>• Treatment                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Electronic health records</li> <li>○ Monitoring</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Learning Health System                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Big data</li> <li>○ High performance computing</li> <li>○ Knowledge access</li> <li>○ Natural language processing</li> <li>○ Transformation</li> <li>○ Longitudinal monitoring of patient progress</li> <li>○ Adverse event monitoring</li> <li>○ Translation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>People</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Patients                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Patient representatives</li> <li>○ Health conscious individuals</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Licensed Healthcare Providers:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Audiologists,</li> <li>○ Dentists</li> <li>○ Dietitians</li> <li>○ Optometrists</li> <li>○ Physicians</li> <li>○ Nurses</li> <li>○ Technicians/ Technologists</li> <li>○ Therapists</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Non-Licensed Healthcare Providers:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Administrative personnel</li> <li>○ Aides</li> <li>○ Emergency services</li> <li>○ Interpreters</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Transport personnel</li> <li>▪ Insurance payers</li> <li>▪ Regulators</li> <li>▪ Equipment Manufacturers</li> </ul>	

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## Use Cases

Wireless telecommunications companies have developed smart sensors that support wearable, implantable, injectable, and ingestible medical devices used in the healthcare industry, and vendors have incorporated them into products such as insulin pumps, cochlear implants, and pacemakers. Health IoT components “talk” to the Internet via a smart interactive interface connected to the device’s firmware [14]. The following use cases are representative of services that can be provided by the emerging health IoT.




Figure 6 – Precision Medicine Research Case


## Precision Medicine

Precision Medicine is an example of health IoT that is among the factors driving market growth in healthcare [15]. Figure 6 represents the steps in precision medicine research. According to the National Institutes of Health (NIH), **precision medicine** is "an emerging approach for disease treatment and prevention that takes into account individual variability in genes, environment, and lifestyle for each person [16]."

An example scenario would be Alice is a disabled veteran who has been determined to have hepatitis C [HCV] brought on by drug use related to combat-induced stress. As normal treatments have failed, the Veterans Administration wants her to participate in a large-scale hepatitis research program involving clinical trials of DNA matched treatments in an environment containing data from hundreds of thousands of other patients. Emerging standards for information sharing, such as Health Level 7's (HL7) Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resource (FHIR), provide Internet addressable information flow. Sequenced DNA from participant blood samples will be analyzed for efficacy of alternative hepatitis treatments. Alice consents to participate in the clinical trial. She receives medicine reminders via cellphone or via an IoT-enabled pillbox offering a wireless link to the patient, doctor, family members, and monitoring center. The pillbox helps to ensure Alice complies with the strict medication regimen times and sequences that are essential for the trial.

### Diabetes Treatment

Alice has decided to travel outside of the United States but is diabetic and wants to monitor her blood glucose levels and receive updates on her condition from her primary care provider.



As Figure 7 shows, Alice has a wireless-enabled wearable glucose monitor and injection device (insulin pump). Blood sugar data reflecting the results of Alice's advanced diabetes treatments which are being evaluated will be published electronically and provided to her after they are processed via intelligent computing technologies. Clinicians then will proactively evaluate and personalize her treatment, sending predictive alerts for hypoglycemia and insulin dosage updates.

Figure 7 – Diabetes Treatment/Allergen Identification

### Nutrition control

While still on travel Alice wants to know more about the nutrition aspects of the local food. She downloads an app which can recognize typical ingredients of many available menu choices and, when presented at the table, can estimate the caloric and nutritional values from the photo image of her plate. This allows her to make more appropriate choices later in the day when she has her next meal. The app also notes what she consumes and enters that data into a diabetes management app for her physician to monitor and study later.

The physician can see in near real-time how the consumed food affects the existing insulin response and can suggest any necessary behavior changes by email.

In the above examples, consent provides the core access control attribute needed to authorize disclosure and distribution of protected health information. Emerging healthcare security and messaging standards will enable information classification (labeling) that, with appropriate clearances, will provide interoperable security systems employing attribute-based access control (ABAC) methods. In the IoT, new models of computable healthcare trust may become commonplace.

#### **5.4 Smart Buildings**

The following GSA Smart Building application illustrates the general requirements for smart buildings.


The GSA Headquarters Building includes over 750,000 square feet of space, two-thirds of which has been modernized. The structure incorporates a variety of smart building technologies to help its occupants work comfortably, while improving energy efficiency and achieving mandatory sustainability goals. The various technology components form an integrated automated environment (see Table 2 for an illustrative listing), that helps building and facilities managers achieve their goals of occupant satisfaction, energy use intensity, maintenance costs, water usage, and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

**Table 2 – IoT Components for Intelligent Buildings**  
**IoT Components for Intelligent Buildings**

Managed Infrastructure	People	Combined Systems
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plumbing</li> <li>• Windows</li> <li>• Building wrap</li> <li>• Solar panels</li> <li>• Back-up power</li> <li>• Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)</li> <li>• Waste control</li> <li>• Parking facilities</li> <li>• Elevators</li> <li>• Communication facilities</li> <li>• Rooms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tenants provide feedback on lighting and temp conditions via mobile app</li> <li>• Property managers share practices/know-how</li> <li>• Managers</li> <li>• Security guards</li> <li>• Maintenance/custodial crews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Energy usage monitoring system</li> <li>▪ Hoteling book-it system</li> <li>▪ Card access and security system</li> <li>▪ Weather station</li> <li>▪ Occupant interface dashboard</li> <li>▪ Lighting control system</li> <li>▪ Universal control and monitoring system</li> </ul>
Sensing	Actuating	Computing
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)</li> <li>• IP video</li> <li>• Air quality</li> <li>• Water flow</li> <li>• Air temp</li> <li>• Humidity</li> <li>• Light</li> <li>• Door</li> <li>• Smoke/fire</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Door access</li> <li>• Elevator</li> <li>• Heater/AC</li> <li>• Fire alarms</li> <li>• Irrigation system</li> <li>• Window blinds</li> <li>• Alarms</li> <li>• Lights</li> <li>• Security system</li> </ul>	<p>Processors/data stores</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Databases</li> <li>• Servers</li> <li>• Cloud services</li> <li>• Edge devices</li> </ul> <p>Network</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethernet</li> <li>• Fiber optics</li> <li>• Wi-Fi™</li> <li>• Low power networks</li> <li>• Cellular</li> </ul>

Figure 8 illustrates a scenario that begins before GSA staff begin arriving Tuesday morning. A Universal Control system reviews its business rules and informs the HVAC system controller that a 20 % higher occupancy rate is expected. The system also checks the Hoteling Book-It system to estimate power and ventilation demands of all pre-scheduled meetings. The HVAC system initiates its cooling routines to compensate for the increased demand. As GSA staff and guests arrive, the Card Access and Security System sends data wirelessly to the Universal Control system that verifies that the rate of occupancy is within the projected arrival rate and no additional BTUs are needed.

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**Figure 8 – IoT for the GSA Smart Building**

Around 2 p.m., a significant cold front moves into the area. The building's Weather Station system, which is tied to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Internet Weather Service, detects the drop in outside temperature and feeds that data to the Occupant Interface Dashboard, which controls the Window Switch report and Shade Control system within each zone floor plan. As the outside cloud cover increases, the window shades are raised automatically, and the interior lights are increased by the Lutron Lighting Control System. After a while, several users begin to complain that it is too cold. Individually, they open the building control app and submit their requests to raise the temperature and increase the lighting in their area. The system receives this feedback and averages the input from other users to make adjustments, as well as record the information for future adjustments.

By now, the meeting in GSA's largest conference room, reserved until 3 p.m., has ended. The Hoteling Book-It system notifies the Universal Control system, which verifies that lack of occupants. To conserve energy, the air conditioning is placed into standby state and lights are turned off until the space is occupied again. At the end of the day, the facility manager reviews energy consumption and checks tomorrow's meeting calendar. The dashboard alerts the manager to a large conference, with over 200 attendees, starting with a 7 a.m. breakfast. The manager verifies that AC and ventilation will begin one hour earlier and adjusts the power metering to ensure plug loads are adequate for the A/V equipment and number of devices expected.

## 5.5 Smart Manufacturing<sup>5</sup>

Smart manufacturing environments will leverage enterprise-wide integration of data, technology, advanced manufacturing capabilities, and cloud and other services with new business models as shown in Figure 9. These technological developments are enabling product innovation, process efficiencies, customization, collaborative and/or distributed production, and other new modes and business models. However, strategies are still needed to comprehensively address security challenges brought about by this new industrial revolution, as these opportunities are revolutionizing attack capabilities as well.




Figure 9 – An Example of a Smart Manufacturing Environment

Securing smart manufacturing assets requires a comprehensive security model based on a well-defined set of security policies. Given the human-to-machine and machine-to-machine interfaces, a robust Security Management Plan must address people, process, and technology (Figure 10). As security of organizations could be compromised at many layers, it is important to create a single point of contact (individual or office) to coordinate security matters and report incidents. Solutions are emerging that allow unified reporting to detect any threat to the application, process, or network, providing granular visibility of traffic and alerts to deviations from baseline operations and facilitating attack forensics.

<sup>5</sup> content courtesy of NDIA CFAM effort – final paper under development





Figure 10 – Security Management Plan

Currently, smart manufacturing environments are custom solutions that are complicated, expensive, and built on specialized communications protocols. To achieve affordable plug-and-play capabilities, next generation hardware and software technologies need to work together through common security and communication standards. Standardization would lower the cost of entry to smart manufacturing for small and medium-sized businesses. In addition, as more cloud technology and Internet connectivity is leveraged toward the Industrial IoT, a major challenge is to assure the identity of the “things” in order to have secure exchanges of information.

A distributed global manufacturing ecosystem increases the challenge of intellectual property protection. Engineers and operators are no longer under one roof but, rather, in different physical locations or countries. The process of black-boxing intellectual property could be the norm, so that no single entity has total exposure to the full process intellectual property. As some vendors start to shift from providing physical parts to providing digital code that the end-user purchases to make parts themselves, new business models and rules for protecting intellectual property will also emerge out of necessity. For example, a 3D printer file may need not only to be encrypted for security, but also may need to limit the number of times it may be printed.

Smart manufacturing includes software and sensors that allow for precise predictions of maintenance needs, material demand, overtime, and other factors, based on data captured through all points of production. However, the volume of unstructured data (e.g., emails, blogs, webpages) that could be consumed in big-data projects creates new kinds of security challenges and requires a new mindset toward data-centric security measures. Big data is too new for security personnel to understand what constitutes normal behavior. Security professionals need to comprehend the analytics and automation being applied to determine how best to protect a big-data enterprise, because there is currently no practical way to fully maintain situational awareness of the data at the accelerated rates of acquisition and change. With that level of

understanding, organizations and vendors working in big data will continue to evolve their tools, techniques, and best practices, which will benefit smart manufacturing security.

Combining the advantages of big data and mobile devices, augmented reality (AR) is being used with increasing frequency on the shop floor, including as a training aid, maintenance aid, and operational dashboard. While the virtual overlay of information provides many benefits, it also opens up another vulnerable interface. For example, a hacker could compromise the output of an AR system, tricking users into thinking computer-generated objects are real. AR applications require access to a variety of sensor data such as video and audio feeds and geolocation; a malicious application could leak a user's field of view or location. AR solution vendors must address head-on the potential privacy and security risks that this technology can introduce. Some existing security controls and practices—such as encrypting wireless data transmissions—can provide a degree of protection for AR system inputs and outputs. Organizations need to have clear visions about how to overlay their existing security regimes onto the AR field.

The Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile, as presented in NISTIR 8183 [\[17\]](#), may help to manage cybersecurity risks associated with implementing IoT technologies in manufacturing environments. This “target” profile has been developed to help reduce cybersecurity risk for manufacturers in a way that aligns with manufacturing sector goals and industry best practices. It focuses on desired cybersecurity outcomes and can be used to identify opportunities for improving the current cybersecurity posture of a manufacturing system. The voluntary profile is meant to enhance, but not replace, current cybersecurity standards and industry guidelines that the manufacturer is embracing.

## 6 IoT Cybersecurity Objectives, Risks, and Threats

### 6.1 Overview

Trustworthiness reflects the degree of confidence one has that the system performs as expected—with regard to characteristics including safety, security, privacy, reliability and resilience—in the face of environmental disruptions, human errors, system faults and attacks [18]. Trustworthiness of IoT systems will require active management of risks for privacy, safety, security, etc.

Cybersecurity is the prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and—if needed—the restoration of electronic information and communications systems, and the information they contain, in order to strengthen the confidentiality, integrity and availability of these systems [3]. Cybersecurity risk management for IoT systems will continue to be a major factor in the trustworthiness of IoT applications.

#### Cybersecurity Objectives

**Confidentiality:** Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information;

**Integrity:** Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity; and

**Availability:** Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.

Given that IT innovation is outpacing the development of supporting standards, it is critical to be forward thinking about current and future cybersecurity needs. Cyber-attacks on one or more IoT components already have had cyber and physical implications. Traditional IT security focuses on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Due to the nature of many IoT components, which interact with the physical world through sensors and actuators, IoT security also addresses threats to people, their objects, and their environment.

Cybersecurity objectives for traditional IT systems generally prioritize confidentiality, then integrity, and lastly availability. IoT systems cross multiple sectors as well as use cases within those sectors and their cybersecurity objectives may be prioritized very differently, depending on the application. For some IoT applications, availability or integrity may be the highest priority.

“IIoT [Industrial IoT] organizations must place increased importance on safety and resilience beyond the levels expected in many traditional IT environments. IIoT systems may also have data flows that include intermediaries and involve multiple organizations, requiring more sophisticated security approaches than, for example, link encryption. Unfortunately, IT departments rarely speak the same language as those concerned with control systems and OT. The two perceive risk differently, and they cannot be combined for positive gain without a balanced consideration of their differing motivations [19].”

With the changing threat environment, the cybersecurity needs of the future—including the data that informs, reports, and controls functionality of the IoT—should be considered. Privacy,

safety, authentication, and resilience contribute to IT and cybersecurity features. Evolutions in system security engineering approaches can aid in reducing the susceptibility of systems to a variety of simple, complex, and hybrid threats—including physical and cyber-attacks, structural failures, natural disasters, and errors of omission and commission. This reduction in susceptibility is accomplished by understanding stakeholder protection needs and employing sound security design principles and concepts throughout the system life cycle.

The specific security objectives for industrial control systems in NIST SP 800-82 [20] can be adapted for IoT systems in general:

- **Restricting logical access to the network and network activity.** This may include using unidirectional gateways, a demilitarized zone network architecture with firewalls to prevent network traffic from passing directly between the corporate and IoT networks, and having separate authentication mechanisms and credentials for users of the corporate and IoT networks. An IoT system should use a network topology that has multiple layers, with each layer’s security considered separately, so that all communication occurs with as much security and reliability as afforded by the technology.
- **Restricting physical access to IoT network and components.** Unauthorized physical access to components could cause serious disruption of an IoT system’s functionality. A combination of physical access controls should be used, such as locks, card readers, and/or guards.
- **Protecting individual IoT components from exploitation.** This includes deploying security patches as expeditiously as possible, after testing them under field conditions; disabling all unused ports and services and assuring that they remain disabled; restricting IoT user privileges to only those that are required for each person’s role; tracking and monitoring audit trails; preventing RF attacks and restricting physical access; and using security controls such as antivirus software and file integrity checking software where technically feasible to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate malware.
- **Preventing unauthorized modification of data.** This includes data that is in transit (at least across the network boundaries) and at rest. Methods such as encryption and digital signatures can be used to preserve the integrity of data.
- **Detecting security events and incidents.** Detecting security events, which have not yet escalated into incidents, can help defenders break the attack chain before attackers attain their objectives. This includes the capability to detect failed IoT components, unavailable services, and exhausted resources that are important to provide proper and safe functioning of an IoT system.
- **Maintaining functionality during adverse conditions.** This involves designing IoT systems so that each critical component has a redundant counterpart. Additionally, if a component fails, it should fail in a manner that does not generate unnecessary traffic on IoT or other networks, or does not cause another problem elsewhere, such as a cascading event. IoT system should also allow for graceful degradation such as moving from “normal operation” with full automation to “emergency operation” with operators more involved and less automation to “manual operation” with no automation.

- **Restoring the system after an incident.** Incidents are inevitable, and an incident response plan is essential. A major characteristic of a good security program is how quickly an IoT system can be recovered after an incident has occurred.

### Risks

For the purposes of this report, *risk* is a measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event and is typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence. For example, information security risks are those that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or information systems. Information security risks reflect the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Risk assessment is the process of identifying, estimating, and prioritizing risks. Assessing risk requires the careful analysis of threat and vulnerability information to determine the extent to which circumstances or events could adversely impact an organization and the likelihood that such circumstances or events will occur [21].

The proliferation and increased ubiquity of IoT components are likely to heighten the risks they present; particularly as cyber criminals work to develop new generations of malware dedicated to exploiting them. For instance, Dyn, a company that monitors and routes Internet traffic, was a victim of a DDoS attack in October 2016. This attack included thousands of IoT components infected with the “Mirai” malware. The torrent of traffic unleashed by the Mirai-infected IoT components overwhelmed Dyn’s systems and, in turn, rendered unavailable many high-traffic websites (e.g., PayPal, Twitter, Netflix, and CNN) that used Dyn’s Internet services for substantial periods of the day. The disruption of Dyn and associated Internet services underscores the significant, systemic harm that may be caused by malware dedicated to exploiting the security vulnerabilities of IoT components.

As the market for IoT components expands, it is critical that manufacturers design components with security in mind and that system designers pay attention to new attack surfaces—in addition to evaluating the overall network risk.

To minimize impact of the multiplicity of risks associated with IoT, they should not be assessed and monitored in isolation. Rather, they should be considered in the broader perspective of enterprise risk to ensure all aspects of threat and vulnerability are addressed.

### Threats

A threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, or modification of information, and/or denial of service [22].

Threats exist to *and* from the IoT. Data storage and communication must be protected even as the growing quantity of components will increase the amount of data requiring protection. Threats to people, their property, and their interactions within society are becoming more abundant as a result of the growing attack surface.

NIST SP 800-30 Revision 1 provides an extensive list of threats [21]. Methods of adversarial threats include:

- Perform reconnaissance and gather information;
- Craft or create attack tools;
- Deliver/insert/install malicious capabilities;
- Exploit and compromise;
- Conduct an attack (i.e., direct/coordinate attack tools or activities);
- Achieve results (i.e., cause adverse impacts, obtain information); and
- Maintain a presence or set of capabilities.

Non-adversarial threats include mistakes by authorized privileged users and severe natural events such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes.

## 6.2 Connected Vehicles

### Cybersecurity Objectives

<b>Confidentiality</b>	V2V, V2I, and V2X communications require secure cryptographic authentication.
<b>Integrity</b>	The contents of messages (e.g., BSM) require protection from modification of the authentic information via cryptographic techniques.
<b>Availability</b>	The real-time nature of V2V, V2I, and V2X communications require resilient and secure networks.

Vehicle manufacturers already focus on driver and passenger safety. Greater emphasis may be required due to the increased attack surface from V2V, V2I, and V2X communications. Beyond physical safety, there are privacy concerns. Users may connect and have access to their vehicles through their smartphones personal information on these components needs to be protected from unauthorized access through the vehicle. Similarly, the vehicle's ability to perform as designed and as intended by the user must be protected from threats that may come through the mobile device.

### Risks

Connected vehicles face many of the same risks as other IoT systems and cyber systems in general. Severe safety consequences to vehicles and people require risk assessments to be developed. Potential safety-critical risks include [23]:

- Driver distractions (volume, wipers, etc.);
- Engine shutoff or degradation; and
- Steering changes (in drive-by-wire vehicles).

There are other risks less critical to safety, some of which are fairly unique to vehicles:

- Theft of the car or its contents;
- Enabling physical crimes against the occupants;
- Insurance or lease fraud;

- Eavesdropping on the occupants;
- Vector for attacking mobile devices in the car;
- Theft of personally identifiable information (PII), such as phone lists;
- Tracking the vehicle's location;
- Rendering the car undriveable, for example by erasing all drive-by-wire firmware; and
- Physically damaging engine or other components, for example by constantly applying a degree of braking pressure during normal operations.

### Threats

The addition of Internet connectivity to “infotainment” consoles has already introduced threats to driver and passenger safety as a result of communications between vehicle controls and entertainment applications. Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications introduce new attack vectors. The addition of these communication channels brings an increased threat of spoofed, manipulated, damaged, and missing sensors and actuators, which could cause vehicles to behave unpredictably.

Appropriate security measures must be taken within each subsystem, as well as any communications or interactions between them. Protections must be made against user error, device malfunction, and device damage, in addition to deliberate attacks by malicious actors (e.g., disgruntled employees, agents of industrial espionage, and terrorists).

Additional threats include:

- Increased complexity of these dynamic networks may introduce vulnerabilities and increase exposure to potential attackers and unintentional errors.
- Set-and-forget sensors will provide ample opportunities for capture and compromise attacks to cause unexpected and unsafe behavior of vehicles.
- Threats to sensors and actuators risk harm to passengers and passersby in addition to damage to vehicles and objects on and along the road.
- Location of the vehicle could be exposed through vulnerabilities in the vehicle's information system as well as those in mobile devices used to communicate with the vehicle.

The Tampa Hillsborough Expressway Authority (THEA) CV Pilot Team [24] has assembled the following lists of V2X threats:

- An attacker learns restricted information on the device/system, such as private keys, certificates, etc., using a non-invasive attack such as a side channel attack and/or cryptanalysis of algorithms and signed messages.
- An attacker learns restricted information on the device/system, such as private keys, certificates, etc., using an invasive software attack such as malware (available on Internet for example) that exploits vulnerabilities in algorithms and software.
- An attacker learns physically protected restricted information on the device, such as private keys, using a physical attack.
- An attacker replays a BSM or other system message at a different (than original) time and/or location.
- An attacker modifies the sensor inputs on a single device before the device uses them to generate and send a BSM or other system message.
- An attacker modifies the sensor inputs to multiple devices before the device uses them to generate and send a BSM or other system message (for example, by GPS spoofing).

- An attacker is able to use restricted information on the device/system to create a false BSM or other system message without actually extracting the information from the device/system (e.g., use private key to sign a message without completing one of the T.Extract attacks).
- An attacker who knows about the misbehavior detection algorithms (and associated parameters) manipulates the content of the BSM to evade detection.
- An attacker who has been reported sending invalid messages denies that those messages came from the attacker's device, thwarting the misbehavior detection process.
- An attacker who knows about the misbehavior detection algorithms (and associated parameters) manipulates misbehavior reports to implicate innocent devices/systems and evade detection.
- An attacker uses the change pattern(s) of certificates and other BSM-relevant information to track a vehicle or other device.
- An attacker uses BSM data to track a vehicle/device.
- An attacker installs malware on a device/system that prevents receiving, or making use of, or providing user interaction based on BSMs or other system messages.
- An attacker uses the device as an attack vector on the rest of the vehicle/system.
- An attacker transmits noise and energy on the same frequency as the DSRC safety channel.
- An attacker transmits messages to jam or distract. These messages may contain incorrect information but are validly signed or may appear valid but have a bad cert or signature.

### 6.3 Consumer

#### Cybersecurity Objectives

<b>Confidentiality</b>	Consumer IoT systems require preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure to consumer data and services.
<b>Integrity</b>	Consumer IoT systems require the protection of data integrity and the operation of other electronic components on the network.
<b>Availability</b>	Consumer IoT systems require continuity of operations for consumer IoT components that are connected to the physical world.

The main cybersecurity objectives for Internet-connected consumer electronic components are confidentiality, integrity, and availability of consumer data and services. These objectives can intersect with consumer safety and privacy. The cybersecurity of an Internet-connected consumer device is also important to depriving hackers of a conduit through which they may compromise the data integrity and operation of other electronic components on the same network. In addition, the burgeoning popularity of connected consumer components also makes them ripe targets for criminals who seek to execute coordinated, widespread cyber-attacks that cause significant, systemic harm across the Internet. Additionally, IoT components would benefit from "out of the box" security, which requires immediate password change on first use. To achieve these security objectives, consumer components should use secure and readily updatable firmware and robust authentication practices, such as strong password or passphrase requirements. In some instances,



using encryption or a virtual private network (VPN) connection to a local network may protect against unauthorized eavesdropping and protect the login credentials of IoT consumer components.

### **Risks**

Consumer IoT components are challenged by many of the same cybersecurity risks as computers, smartphones, and other categories of IoT components. For instance, to attack IoT components, cyber criminals often probe the components for security vulnerabilities and then install malicious software (“malware”) to surreptitiously control the device, damage the device, gain unauthorized access to the data on the device, and/or otherwise affect the device’s operation without permission. The risks posed by malware-infected IoT components, however, may be more pronounced because their low costs and energy constraints often constrain the resources that are invested in their cybersecurity and, therefore, make them ripe targets for hackers intent on causing widespread harm. Indeed, given their growing volume, consumer IoT components are increasingly targeted as a means for penetrating other electronic components on the same network, or assembling an army of machines capable of transmitting Internet traffic without the device owners’ knowledge as part of a DDoS attack.

Additional risks created by consumer IoT components include:

- Risks to physical safety by small consumer IoT components that are connected to the physical world and may be accessed or controlled remotely, such as smart ovens, stoves, toasters, etc.;
- Risks to property that may be caused by interrupting the operation of certain consumer IoT components that are connected to the physical world, such as refrigerators, thermostats, or washing machines;
- Risks to privacy that may be caused by accessing and remotely controlling components that are capable of collecting information about their surroundings, such as digital web cameras, autonomous robotic vacuum cleaners, connected toys, etc.;
- Risks to data security and privacy from consumer IoT components that collect a substantial amount of personal information. While consumers stand to reap the greatest benefits from the IoT, they will have to balance potential benefits with privacy concerns. Consumers will have to be discerning about how they engage with that information and with whom they share it;
- Risks to other components on the network by creating a variety of new interconnection between components and drastically expanding the attack surface of consumer/home networks;
- Risks to privacy by exposing login information for various consumer accounts that are stored on consumer IoT components; and
- Risks of side-channel attacks that could lead to physical intrusions of consumer premises and loss of property.

### **Threats**

Without adequate cybersecurity safeguards, even inexpensive, consumer IoT components with limited functionalities may be exploited to threaten confidentiality, integrity, availability of consumer data and services, consumer privacy and safety, and other systems on the Internet. For

instance, as detailed above, the disruption of Internet services in October 2016 by a DDoS attack underscores the significant, systemic harm that insecure IoT components may cause. Further, as connected IoT technologies progressively extend their reach to consumer components critical to basic home functions (e.g., the connected thermostat), cyber criminals may increasingly target them in ransomware attacks or other traditional cyber-attacks directed to collecting highly-sensitive personal information. Personal privacy and safety may also be compromised by the interruption of certain consumer IoT components (e.g., the connected oven) or certain side-channel attacks, such as a prospective burglar monitoring communication between and the operations of components to determine the whereabouts of a homeowner.

## 6.4 Health and Medical Devices

### Cybersecurity Objectives

<b>Confidentiality</b>	Health IoT requires the protection of patient information from unauthorized disclosure and access.
<b>Integrity</b>	Health IoT requires the protection of patient safety from unauthorized modification of the intended use of the medical device.
<b>Availability</b>	Health IoT requires that patient information is available to authorized entities when it is needed and that the medical device's functionality continues to be available when needed.

The security objectives of health information technology (HIT) revolve around the implementation of security controls that provide for the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of patient information and for the systems supporting the use and exchange of that information. The security objectives of medical devices are concentrated around *patient safety aspects* and concentrate more on Integrity and Availability.

Major security objectives for this application area include the following:

- Protect patient safety from network originated inauthentic commands to actuators;
- Protect patient sensor data from tampering to allow correct algorithmic response;
- Protect medical device processing capability;
- Protect patient data where the data forms part of a treatment and monitoring regime;
- Protect patient information from unauthorized disclosure or modification;
- Ensure patient information is available to authorized entities when it is needed;
- Ensure prompt and secure patch delivery to medical devices;
- Ensure continuous security risk management throughout the device lifecycle;
- Explore and promote, where appropriate, existing and emerging technologies to enhance security and confidentiality of health information; and
- Educate HIT practitioners and consumers on security and privacy issues related to the uses of HIT and protected health information.

### Risks [\[25\]](#)

Cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities can impact the safety of IT networks and the medical devices and other systems connected to these networks. However, medical devices and the IT

networks they connect to are unique. In addition to data security and privacy impacts, patients may be physically affected (i.e., illness, injury, death) by cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities of medical devices. This harm may stem from the performance of the device itself, inaccurate information, or the inability to deliver timely care. As a result, addressing the patient privacy and safety risks posed by cyber threats are of paramount importance.

Table 3 below provides examples of cybersecurity risks that may relate to networked medical devices. In Table 3: C = Confidentiality, I = Integrity, A = Availability, and PS = Patient Safety.

**Table 3 – Examples of Cybersecurity Risks to Networked Medical Devices and Connected ID Networks**

<b>Risk Description</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>I</b>	<b>PS</b>
Failure to provide timely security software updates and patches to medical devices and networks and to address related vulnerabilities in older medical device models (legacy devices).	X	X	X	X
Failure to place authentication between a remote command and a risk.	X	X	X	X
Malware which alters data on a diagnostic device.			X	X
Device reprogramming which alters device function (by unauthorized users, malware, etc.).	X	X	X	X
Denial of service attacks which make a device unavailable.		X		X
Exfiltration of patient data or PHI from the network.	X			
Unauthorized access to the healthcare network, which allows access to other devices.	X	X	X	X
Uncontrolled distribution of passwords, disabled passwords, hard-coded passwords for software intended for privileged device access (e.g., to administrative, technical, and maintenance personnel).	X	X	X	X
Security vulnerabilities in off-the-shelf software due to poorly designed software security features.	X	X	X	X
Improper disposal of patient data or information, including test results or health records.	X			
Misconfigured networks or poor network security practices.	X	X	X	X
Open, unused communication ports on a device which allow for unauthorized, remote firmware downloads.	X	X	X	X

## Threats

Threat and vulnerability challenges include:

- The economic penalty incurred by manufacturers for ongoing cyberthreat management during the product's lifetime;
- The difficulty in updating a life-preserving device (heart pacemaker, etc.);
- The delivery of prompt secure and authenticated firmware and software updates to fielded systems;
- The incorrect deployment of a device system which does not optimally utilize the features available in device systems;
- Funding shortages which permit unsupported devices to remain in service; and
- The unauthorized access and modification of patient identifiable information, including protected health information.

## 6.5 Smart Buildings

### Cybersecurity Objectives

<b>Authentication</b>	Smart buildings require identity verification to prevent unauthorized access to any building control system.
<b>Integrity</b>	Smart buildings require the protection of building control system information from unauthorized modification.
<b>Availability</b>	Smart buildings require that building control system information is available to authorized entities when it is needed.

Preventing unauthorized access to any building control system is paramount to securing smart buildings. Thus, the main objective must be to protect the interfaces to and between each system, even when they may be overlaid on top of one another. A domino effect caused by the compromise of one system leading to the compromise of another cannot be allowed happen. It is also important for fail-safes and backup systems to be in place in the event of a malfunction of any one of the systems. Since some of these systems may be dynamic and impossible to model in each-and-every scenario, robust modeling and testing must be done to handle foreseeable situations. Occupant safety is also a vital objective.

### Risks

Smart buildings may contain several sets of IoT components that each have their own security objectives, risks, and threats. They include infrastructure, networked, people, digital transducers, computing resources, and combined systems. This heterogeneity is a challenge with securing smart buildings. Interoperability between systems and components from different vendors may introduce weaknesses for an attacker to exploit. The interfaces between these different components may present vulnerabilities; once one system becomes compromised, it may be an avenue for an attacker to traverse laterally into another. On the other hand, homogeneous networks also can be vulnerable because they can be subject to single points of failures. The dynamic nature of these networks presents additional difficulties. As employees and visitors

move around inside and around the building, the components they carry may be interacting with various networks. Vulnerabilities may be missed since every scenario cannot be tested. Appropriate security policies and security awareness programs, particularly focused on Bring Your Own Device risks, can help mitigate the risk of employee and visitor device interactions with building networks.

### Threats

In addition to threats and vulnerabilities arising from the many IoT systems in a smart building, additional threats and vulnerabilities include:

- Smart building-controlled data centers and information systems are subject to traditional cybersecurity threats, including corporate espionage and bad actors (employees or contractors);
- Threats to power management risk outages, surges, and inefficient operation;
- Threats to alarm systems could raise false alarms which may be used as distractions for other attacks;
- Compromise of security systems could allow unauthorized access/entry;
- An attack on automated HVAC systems could result in uncomfortable work conditions that make it difficult to continue day-to-day operations; and
- A physical attack could be combined with a cyber-attack; for instance, arson could be combined with the cyber compromise of a sprinkler system.

## 6.6 Smart Manufacturing

### Cybersecurity Objectives

<b>Confidentiality</b>	Smart Manufacturing requires the protection of manufacturing information from unauthorized disclosure and access.
<b>Integrity</b>	Smart Manufacturing requires the protection of manufacturing information from unauthorized modification.
<b>Availability</b>	Smart Manufacturing requires that manufacturing information is available to authorized entities when it is needed. This includes information processed within milliseconds so that it is available virtually immediately.

Today's manufacturing environment poses unique cybersecurity challenges beyond the considerable technical complexities of cyber-physical systems. These challenges stem from fundamental differences between IT and OT. Too often, organizational stovepipes separate engineering, management and decision-making processes for enterprise business operations and the production environment, a problem exacerbated by the inherently change- and risk-averse culture on the shop floor. In the past 30 years, adaptation has meant integrating advanced technologies involving computer-based systems into the manufacturing processes. Today, the

line from design to production to distribution to employment of goods may begin in one part of the country (or the globe) and extend across the nation (or across continents).

### **Risks**

The emerging digital manufacturing environment, often referred to as Industry 4.0, includes technologies such as automation, cyber-physical systems, cloud computing. New technologies allow manufacturers to produce reliable products efficiently and safely to adapt to changing requirements from both civilian and military customers. But with this integration and flexibility comes the potential for malicious actors to infiltrate key systems by gaining access to manufacturing networks. When successful, these actors may extort ransom from a company to release the system from their control, copy sensitive proprietary information that can be sold to other companies or other governments, or install software that can affect a product's performance. The potential consequences for national security are compelling.

Equally troubling is the fact that adversaries who penetrate the security systems in processes used to produce arms and equipment for the U.S. military may have the capability to alter or halt production processes to affect these items' reliability, safety, or security, putting the lives of service personnel at risk and materially degrading the ability of the nation's fighting forces to succeed on the battlefield.

### **Threats**

Managing a modern manufacturing enterprise exposes the data exchanged by designers, the production team, and those involved in the supply chain to attacks. These attacks can be made by individuals or state actors, intent on stealing intellectual property, damaging the United States' competitive advantage, or sabotaging mission-critical components. Similar to emerging cybersecurity concerns related to the rapid expansion of the commercial IoT, as the number of factory floor device connections grows, the cyber-attack surface expands and requires new cybersecurity protections for confidentiality, integrity, and availability, as well as, prevention of distributed denial of service (DDoS) and other attacks that require the use of distributed devices.

## 7 Cybersecurity Areas and IoT

Annex D provides an annotated listing of standards relevant for the following areas in this section.

### 7.1 Cryptographic Techniques

Cryptographic techniques are integral to securing IoT data and transactions. Conventional cryptographic techniques are appropriate for some IoT implementations, but due to the constrained environments of many IoT applications, new adaptations of cryptographic techniques are being pursued to support cybersecurity within IoT environments.

IoT cybersecurity rests on three fundamental security objectives: confidentiality, integrity, and availability, known as the CIA triad. CIA is defined and discussed in Section 6. Fundamentally, the goal of cybersecurity is to prevent unauthorized viewing (confidentiality) and modification (integrity) of data while safeguarding authorized access (availability).

Cryptographic techniques that provide confidentiality and integrity include encryption, digital signatures, and message authentication codes (MACs). Encryption provides confidentiality to data in motion, data at rest, and data in use. A digital signature provides authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation, MACs provide authenticity and integrity protection, but not non-repudiation protection.

Cryptographic techniques do not directly provide for availability, the third security objective; however, availability can be detrimentally affected by defective implementations of cryptographic techniques. For example, if keys are not properly synchronized, the secure communications link will be inoperable, causing unavailability.

#### Encryption

Cryptographic algorithm standards have been widely available for some time. For example, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher, included in International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 18033-3:2010, is the preferred block cipher for Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 to secure wireless networks, and is required to implement in version 1.2 of the Internet Engineering Task Force's (IETF) Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.

Public key cryptography standards have also been widely available. IETF has been developing public key cryptography standards for Internet applications. The IEEE 1363 working group has been publishing standards for public key cryptography including:

- IEEE 1363-2000 – *Public-Key Cryptography*;
- IEEE 1363a-2004 – *Public-Key Cryptography – Amendment 1: Additional Techniques*;
- ANSI/IEEE 1363.1-2008 – *Public-Key Cryptographic Techniques Based on Hard Problems over Lattices*;
- ANSI/IEEE 1363.2-2008 – *Password-Based Public-Key Cryptographic Techniques*;
- IEEE 1363.3-2013 – *Identity Based Cryptographic Techniques using Pairings*; and

- IEEE 1363-2013 Cor.

Lightweight cryptography standards are needed for emerging areas in which highly constrained devices are interconnected, typically communicating wirelessly with one another, working in concert to accomplish some task. Examples of these areas include: sensor networks, healthcare, distributed control systems, IoT, cyber-physical systems, and the smart grid. Security and privacy can be very important in these areas. Because most modern cryptographic algorithms were designed for desktop/server environments, many of these algorithms cannot be implemented in the devices used by these applications [26].

Approved lightweight cryptography standards include:

- ISO/IEC 29192-1: 2012, *Information technology – Security techniques – Lightweight cryptography – Part 1: General*;
- ISO/IEC 29192-2: 2012, *Information technology – Security techniques – Lightweight cryptography – Part 2: Block ciphers*;
- ISO/IEC 29192-3: 2012, *Information technology – Security techniques – Lightweight cryptography – Part 3: Stream ciphers*;
- ISO/IEC 29192-4: 2013, *Information technology – Security techniques – Lightweight cryptography – Part 4: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques*;
- ISO/IEC 29192-4:2013/Amd.1: (2016), *Information technology – Security techniques – Lightweight cryptography – Part 4: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques*; and
- ISO/IEC 29192-5:2016, *Information technology – Security techniques – Lightweight cryptography – Part 5: Hash-functions*

## Digital Signatures

A digital signature is an electronic analogue of a written signature and provides assurance that the claimed signatory signed the information and that the information was not modified after signature generation. Digital signatures are used in technologies including Connected Vehicle Systems and in cryptographic-enabled protocols such as internet protocol security (IPSEC), secure/multipurpose internet mail extensions (S/MIME), and transport layer security (TLS). Example implementations include using digital signatures to authenticate from one machine to another, sign software/firmware to verify source and integrity, and sign PKI public key certificates. Common digital signature algorithms include:

- RSA with Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) 1 or probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) padding schemes;
- DSA (digital signature algorithm) (FIPS 180-4); and
- Elliptic curve DSA (ECDSA) (FIPS 186-4).

## 7.2 Cyber Incident Management

Cyber incident management standards support information sharing processes, products, and technology implementations for cyber incident identification, handling, and remediation. Such standards enable organizations to identify when a cyber incident has occurred, to properly respond to that incident, and recover from any losses as a result of the incident. Such standards are one method to enable jurisdictions to exchange information about incidents, vulnerabilities,



threats and attacks, the system(s) that were exploited, security configurations and weaknesses that could be exploited, etc.

While it is important that each organization has an internal process to monitor the IoT environment health and detect anomalies, it is necessary to establish a process to encourage external reports of vulnerabilities and risks. Such a process enables an organization to triage external reports in a timely matter for appropriate actions

While higher-level standards for cyber incident management are available, emerging low-level standards and implementations are under development that will facilitate the automated exchange of incident-related data such as indicators of compromise; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); threat actors; and courses of action. Existing standards include:

- ISO/IEC 27035:2016, *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security incident management – Part 1*;
- ISO/IEC 27035-2:2016, *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security incident management – Part 2*;
- ITU-T X.1056, *Security incident management guidelines for telecommunications organizations*;
- Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard (DSS) v3;
- ISO/IEC 29147: 2014, *Information technology – Security techniques – Vulnerability disclosure*;
- ISO/IEC 30111: 2013, *Information technology – Security techniques – Vulnerability handling process*;
- IETF Request for Comments (RFC) 4765, *Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF)*;
- IETF RFC 5070, *Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)*;
- IETF RFC 5901, *Extensions to the IODEF for Reporting Phishing*;
- IETF RFC 6545, *Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)*;
- *OASIS Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) Version 2.0*; and
- *OASIS Trusted Automated Exchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) Version 2.0*.

IT cyber incident management procedures are relatively well understood. For industrial control systems (ICS), the procedures are not so well understood, specifically related to what critical infrastructure organizations should do in the event of a cyber incident. Shutting down a continuously operating plant has its own risks—commercial and safety—and careful consideration and consensus are required to identify scenarios and recommended courses of action.

### 7.3 Hardware Assurance

Hardware assurance is an activity to ensure a level of confidence that microelectronics (also known as microcircuits, semiconductors, and integrated circuits, including embedded software and/or intellectual property) function as intended and are free of known vulnerabilities, either intentionally or unintentionally designed or inserted as part of the system’s hardware and/or its embedded software and/or intellectual property, throughout the life cycle.

Existing standards include:

- ISO/IEC 15408 *Information technology – Security techniques – Evaluation criteria for IT security* (three parts);
- ISO/IEC 20243:2015 *Information technology – Open Trusted Technology Provider™ Standard (O-TTPS) – Mitigating maliciously tainted and counterfeit products identifies secure engineering best practices, including secure management of the IT products, components, and their supply chains*;
- ISO/IEC 27036 *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships* (three parts);
- NATO – AEP-67 – *Engineering for System Assurance in NATO Programmes*;
- SAE International AS5553B-2016 *Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition Verification Criteria*; and
- SAE International AS6081-2012 *Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance Protocol, Distributors*.

#### 7.4 Identity and Access Management

Identity and access management and related standards help to enable the use of secure, interoperable digital identities and attributes of entities to be used across security domains and organizational boundaries. Examples of entities include people, places, organizations, hardware devices, software applications, information artifacts, and physical items. Standards for identity and access management support identification, authentication, authorization, privilege assignment, and audit to ensure that entities have appropriate access to information, services, and assets. In addition, many identity and access management standards include privacy features to maintain anonymity, unlinkability, untraceability, ensure data minimization, and require explicit user consent when attribute information may be shared among entities.

Significant identity and access management standards are included in risk management techniques and specifications to assert identity and authentication, as well as enforce access policy on a range of platforms. Mature enterprise standards such as Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) and the family of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) cryptographic techniques to authenticate users and devices are widely deployed and in use in the cloud-computing key IT application. Emerging standards are being developed to abstract authentication form factors away from applications, allowing a rich set of strong credentials to be interoperable online.

Risk-based approaches to determine assurance levels required to protect online transactions, and the associated technical and procedural controls, have been adopted at the federal level and similar standards ratified within international standards organizations. However, international government identity programs are developing their own standards and guidelines rather than adopting a smaller set of existing standards. In the private sector, industry has developed profiles to meet the needs of their business model and partners, as well as their risk tolerance, but there is not agreement among organizations as to which identity assurance standard is the most holistic and therefore capable of being adopted cross-industry.

Standards to enforce access policies, share attributes, preserve anonymity, minimize data release, and consent are still immature, difficult to deploy, and not available by a large majority of

software-as-a-service providers and traditional enterprise product vendors, additionally hampering adoption.

Health information technology (health IT) [27] is standardizing authentication, consent, and authorization to medical records across patients, providers, insurers, and research entities to secure use and sharing of health information.

With the increase of commercial and enterprise Internet-connected devices (such as IoT components), standards for device identity, outside of traditional PKI, are just being researched, but the market has yet to determine what, if any that exist, will be leveraged.

PKI architecture for privacy: PKI is traditionally implemented to provide a trusted identity to either an individual or device. However, the ability to remain anonymous and to not be tracked while operating in network and RF environments is becoming more and more important.

## 7.5 Information Security Management Systems (ISMS)

Information security management system (ISMS) standards provide a set of processes and corresponding security controls to establish a governance, risk, and compliance structure for information security for an organization, an organizational unit, or a set of processes controlled by a single organizational entity. An ISMS requires a risk-based approach to security that involves selecting specific security controls based on the desired risk posture of the organization and requires measuring effectiveness of security processes and controls. An ISMS requires a cycle of continual improvement for an organization to continue assessing security risks, assessing controls, and improving security to remain within risk tolerance levels by balancing security and risk tolerances.

The ISO/IEC 27000 series provides best practice recommendations on information security management, risks, and controls within the context of an overall information security management system. The fundamental parts of this series are broadly applicable to IT systems and applications.

ISO/IEC 27001:2013 *Information technology - Security techniques - Information security management systems – Requirements* provides a model for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving an information security management system (ISMS).

Because of some distinctive attributes of cloud computing, several standards have been approved or are under development for cloud computing applications. These include:

- ISO/IEC 27017:2015 *Code of practice for information security controls based on ISO/IEC 27002 for cloud services*;
- ISO/IEC 27036-4:2016 *Information technology – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 4: Guidelines for security of Cloud services*;
- ISO/IEC 27018:2014 *Code of practice for protection of personally identifiable information (PII) in public clouds acting as PII processors*;

- ISO/IEC 19941:2017 *Information technology – Cloud computing – Interoperability and portability*; and
- ISO/IEC 19944:2017 *Information technology – Cloud computing – Cloud services and devices: Data flow, data categories and data use*.

There is a sector-specific technical report (TR) for smart grid:

- ISO/IEC TR 27019:2013 (1<sup>st</sup> edition), *Information security management guidelines based on ISO/IEC 27002 for process control systems specific to the energy industry*.

There is one standard for business continuity that is relevant to emergency management:

- ISO/IEC 27031:2011 (1<sup>st</sup> edition), *Guidelines for information and communications technology (ICT) readiness for business continuity*.

The ISA/IEC 62443 series of Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) standards and technical reports includes security management requirements.

ISO/IEC 20243:2015 *Information Technology – Open Trusted Technology Provider™ Standard (O-TTPS) – Mitigating maliciously tainted and counterfeit products* identifies secure engineering best practices, including secure management of the IT products, components, and their supply chains.

More specific standards have been and are being developed to augment existing portfolios, such as the 27000-series.

## 7.6 IT System Security Evaluation

IT system security evaluation and assurance standards are used to provide: security assessment of systems, security requirements for cryptographic modules, security tests for cryptographic modules, automated security checklists, and security metrics.

There is a growing portfolio of standards for testing and validation of cryptographic modules that are being widely applied. Approved standards include:

- ISO/IEC 19790:2015 *Security requirements for cryptographic modules*;
- ISO/IEC 24759:2014 *Test requirements for cryptographic modules*;
- ISO/IEC 17825:2016 *Information technology – Security techniques – Testing methods for the mitigation of non-invasive attack classes against cryptographic modules*;
- ISO/IEC 18367:2016 *Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic algorithms and security mechanisms conformance testing*;
- ISO/IEC 19896-1:2018 *Information technology – IT Security techniques – Competence requirements for information security testers and evaluators – Part 1: Introduction, concepts and general requirements*; and
- ISO/IEC 19896-2:2018 *Information technology – Security techniques – Competence requirements for information security testers and evaluators – Part 2: Knowledge, skills and effectiveness requirements for ISO/IEC 19790 testers*.

A technical report is also published: ISO/IEC TR 30104:2015 *Physical security attacks, mitigation techniques and security requirements*.

Standards under development include:

- ISO/IEC CD 20085-1 *Test tool requirements and test tool calibration methods for use in testing noninvasive attack mitigation techniques in cryptographic modules – Part 1: Test tools and techniques*; and
- ISO/IEC CD 20085-2 *Test tool requirements and test tool calibration methods for use in testing noninvasive attack mitigation techniques in cryptographic modules – Part 2: Test calibration methods and apparatus*;

Standards for the security assessment of systems have been revised several times. These include the three-part standard ISO/IEC 15408, *Information technology – Security techniques – Evaluation criteria for IT security*.

In addition, certain process evaluation programs should be considered. One program for mitigating the risk of maliciously tainted and counterfeit parts in IT products, to help assure security and integrity in these products, is *ISO/IEC 20243-2:2018 Information technology -- Open Trusted Technology Provider<sup>TM</sup> Standard (O-TTPS) -- Mitigating maliciously tainted and counterfeit products -- Part 2: Assessment procedures for the O-TTPS and ISO/IEC 20243-1:2018*. As noted under the ISMS core area above, this standard identifies secure engineering best practices, including secure management of the IT products, components, and their supply chains. While it does not cover product evaluations, it does provide for process evaluation. Such evaluations determine if a technology provider, component supplier, or distributor meets all the process requirements in the standard throughout a product's life-cycle (design through disposal). This would include the product development and secure engineering methods they use and the supply chain security they provide.

These above standards are broadly applicable to the evaluation of security properties of IT products.

## 7.7 Network Security

Network security standards provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections. Such standards-based technologies can help to assure the confidentiality and integrity of data in motion, assure electronic commerce, and provide for a robust, secure and stable network and Internet.

IoT networks are deployed using a multitude of protocols and physical links. Selecting the appropriate messaging and communication protocols depends on the use case and security requirements for each system.

One characteristic of IoT is the potential for spontaneous connections (due to the networking) without a system view. Viewed in this way the IoT could not be 'planned' nor secured well using traditional approaches to security since system compositional or emergent properties would never be seen by a risk manager. The network interfaces in these loosely coupled systems represent attack surfaces. Therefore, without a system asset definition and subsequent threat analysis the security design is very unlikely to be useful.

Radio Frequency (RF) connections may be based on industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) radio band, cellular data, or other standards. RF interference should be considered as a source of risk for IoT deployments. Individual sensors may be disabled or degraded by RF interference. This could be inadvertent, e.g., use of a poorly shielded microwave oven near an IP based security camera; or malicious, e.g., use of a cell-phone jammer to prevent long-term evolution (LTE)-connected motion sensors from transmitting activity to a security officer monitoring station

Annex D lists the standards of the common protocols that support IoT communications and establish the security of the underlying network connections. These protocols extend over the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers, i.e., physical, link, network, transport, and application layers.

A variety of organizations are involved in developing network security standards. The IETF developed RFC 2196 provides a general and broad overview of information security including network security, incident response, or security policies. IETF Security Area Working Groups include: IP Security Maintenance and Extensions, Kitten (GSS-API Next Generation), Managed Incident Lightweight Exchange, Network Endpoint Assessment, Open Authentication, and Transport Layer Security.

ISA/IEC-62443 standards series define procedures for implementing electronically secure industrial automation and control systems.

The IEEE standard, 802.11i-2004, implemented as Wi-Fi™ Protected Access II (WPA2). This amendment to IEEE 802.11 defined Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and Counter Mode Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP), which provided more robust data protection mechanisms than Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) affords. The current version of IEEE 802.11 is [IEEE 802.11™-2016: IEEE Standard for Information technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control \(MAC\) and Physical Layer \(PHY\) Specifications](#).

## 7.8 Physical Security

Physical security standards provide requirements and guidance to prevent unauthorized personnel, attackers or accidental intruders from physically accessing an area, building, room, computer, etc. Such standards can help to ensure that IoT components are not disabled or replaced it with a component that serves the same purpose but is compromised. IoT components may be distributed over a wide area, a remote location or an unattended location where physical access is difficult to restrict.

There are broadly applicable physical security standards, such as ANSI/ASIS PAP.1-2012 *Security Management Standard: Physical Asset Protection*. This standard provides a management approach for the protection of assets by the application of security measures for physical asset protection that can be applied to IoT components and systems.

There are some specific physical security standards that are applicable to IoT components, such as INCITS/ISO/IEC TS 30104:2015 (2017) *Information Technology - Security Techniques - Physical Security Attacks, Mitigation Techniques and Security Requirements*. This standard describes physical security mechanisms for cryptographic modules where the protection of the modules sensitive security parameters is desired.

## 7.9 Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM)

Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) standards describe protocols and data formats that enable the ongoing, automated collection, monitoring, verification, and maintenance of software, system, and network security configurations, and provide greater awareness of vulnerabilities and threats to support organizational risk management decisions. Automation protocols also include standards for machine-readable vulnerability identification and metrics, platform and asset identification, actionable threat information and policy triggers for actions to respond to threats and policy violations. Automated activities would include a security operation center (SOC) to ensure autonomous and continuing monitoring and evolution of the security state of assets based upon prescribed events.

While higher-level standards for security automation and continuous monitoring are available and low-level specifications and implementations are in use, they require maturation and shepherding through international standards developing organizations.

Existing standards include a large body of work under ISO/IEC, IETF, and industry-led efforts (e.g., Cloud Security Alliance, Health Information Trust Alliance [HITRUST], North American Electric Reliability Corporation [NERC] Critical Infrastructure Protection [CIP]) related to asset, configuration, and vulnerability management—the underpinning of a continuous monitoring capability. Other standards include those being developed by the IETF [Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring \(SACM\)](#) Working Group.

As with incident management, IT security automation and continuous monitoring is relatively well developed. Security automation and continuous monitoring is much more difficult to implement in ICS. Disruption of finely balanced network communications timing and the lack of in-depth understanding of industrial communications protocols are two major limiting factors that will need to be addressed before this security barrier is more widely used.

## 7.10 Software Assurance

Software assurance standards describe requirements and guidance for significantly decreasing the likelihood of software having vulnerabilities, either intentionally designed into the software or accidentally inserted at any time during its life cycle, and that the software functions in the intended manner. This includes custom software, commercial off-the-shelf software, firmware, operating systems, utilities, databases, applications and applets for the Web, software/platform/infrastructure as a service (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS), mobile and consumer devices, etc.

It is important to have in place software assurance standards that provide assurance over the full lifecycle of software. Software assurance across the life cycle includes threat modeling, use/misuse cases, secure design, defensive design, and secure coding expectations that can be

validated using source code and binary analysis techniques. The integrity of the code is also considered an aspect of software assurance. ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 *Information technology – Software asset management – Part 2: Software identification tag* can be used to identify software, measure the integrity of software distributions and installations, and to detect and manage missing software patches for deployed software. Further work is needed to either apply this existing standard to cloud deployments or to identify additional approaches that address software and service deployments in cloud scenarios. Other relevant standards include:

- ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011 *Information technology -- Security techniques – Application security*
- ISO/ IEC 27036-1:2014, *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships (Part 1: Overview and concepts)*;
- ISO/ IEC 27036-2:2014, *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships (Part 2: Common requirements)*;
- ISO/ IEC 27036-3: 2013, *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships (Part 3: Guidelines for ICT supply chain security)*;
- ISO/IEC 20243:2015 *Information Technology – Open Trusted Technology Provider™ Standard (O-TTPS) – Mitigating maliciously tainted and counterfeit products*;
- SAE International AS5553, *Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition*;
- SAE International AS6462A - AS5553A, *Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition Verification Criteria*;
- ISO/ IEC 27035, *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security incident management*;
- ISO 3011, *Information technology – Security techniques – Vulnerability handling processes*; and
- ISO/IEC 29147:2014, *Information technology – Security techniques – Vulnerability disclosure*.
- OWASP *Secure Software Development Lifecycle*;
- ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011, *Systems and software engineering – Systems and software assurance - Part 2: Assurance case*;
- ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012, *Systems and software engineering – Systems and software assurance – Part 4: Assurance in the life cycle*; and
- NATO AEP-67, *Engineering for System Assurance on NATO Programmes*.

### 7.11 Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM)

Supply chain risk management (SCRM) standards aim to provide the confidence that organizations will produce and deliver information technology products or services that perform as required. They seek to mitigate supply chain-related risks, such as insertion of counterfeits and malicious software, unauthorized production, tampering, theft, and poor quality products and services. IT SCRM standardization requirements include methodologies and processes that enable an organization’s increased visibility into, and understanding of, how technology that they acquire and manage is developed, integrated, and deployed, as well as the processes, procedures, and practices used to assure the integrity, security, resilience, and quality of the products and services. IT SCRM standardization lies at the intersection of cybersecurity and supply chain management and provides a mix of mitigation strategies from both disciplines for a targeted approach to managing IT supply chain risks.



There are two high-level SCRM standards available: The Open Group standard is focused on IT providers (not the acquirer), and the multipart standard, ISO/IEC 27036, covers information security for supplier relationships.

The Open Group standard has been approved as ISO/IEC 20243:2015 *Information Technology – Open Trusted Technology Provider™ Standard (O-TTPS) – Mitigating maliciously tainted and counterfeit products*). The requirements cover best practices for product development, secure methodologies, and supply chain security—from design through disposal. The Open Group O-TTPS conformance assessment program is for providers, component suppliers, integrators, and distributors of IT. It is not applicable to acquirers.

ISO/IEC 27036 has four parts:

- ISO/IEC 27036-1:2014 *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 1: Overview and concepts*;
- ISO/IEC 27036-2:2014 *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 2: Requirements*;
- ISO/IEC 27036-3:2013 *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 3: Guidelines for information and communication technology supply chain security*; and
- ISO/IEC 27036-4:2016 *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 4: Guidelines for security of cloud services*.

In a couple of cases, standards developers are focused on SCRM for specific applications, such as ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1) for cloud computing and IEC Technical Committee (TC) 65 for industrial-process measurement, control and automation for industrial control systems (ICS). While any organization and any application would benefit from implementing those broad-based standards immediately, there is still a need for defining additional application specific requirements, which could be achieved either by evolving these standards, or by developing more specific standards to supplement or overlay these.

ISO 28000:2007 *Specification for security management systems for the supply chain* specifies the requirements for a security management system, including those aspects critical to security assurance of the supply chain. This is a generic standard for security management of supply chain. It is not specific for cybersecurity.

## 7.12 System Security Engineering

System security engineering standards describe planning and design activities to meet security specifications or requirements for the purpose of reducing system susceptibility to threats, increasing system resilience, and enforcing organizational security policy. A comprehensive system security engineering effort:

- Includes a combination of technical and nontechnical activities;
- Ensures all relevant stakeholders are included in security requirements definition activities;

- Ensures that security requirements are planned, designed, and implemented into a system during all phases of its lifecycle;
- Assesses and understands susceptibility to threats in the projected or actual environment of operation;
- Identifies and assesses vulnerabilities in the system and its environment of operation;
- Identifies, specifies, designs, and develops protective measures to address system vulnerabilities;
- Evaluates/assesses protective measures to ascertain their suitability, effectiveness, and degree to which they can be expected to reduce mission/business risk;
- Provides assurance evidence to substantiate the trustworthiness of protective measures;
- Identifies, quantifies, and evaluates the costs and benefits of protective measures to inform engineering trade-off and risk response decisions; and
- Leverages multiple security focus areas to ensure that protective measures are appropriate, effective in combination, and interact properly with other system capabilities.

Relevant international standards include:

- The ISA/IEC-62443 standards series define procedures for implementing electronically secure industrial automation and control systems (IACS);
- ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011, *Systems and software engineering – Systems and software assurance – Part 2: Assurance case*
- ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012, *Systems and software engineering – Systems and software assurance – Part 4: Assurance in the life cycle*;
- NATO AEP-67, Engineering for System Assurance in NATO Programs; and
- ISO/IEC 20243:2015 *Information Technology – Open Trusted Technology Provider™ Standard (O-TTPS) – Mitigating maliciously tainted and counterfeit products.*

## 8 Standards Landscape for IoT Cybersecurity

Annex C of this report—An IT Standards Maturity Model— provides a classification system for characterizing the present state of market impact of a standard or draft standard. The standards listed in Annex D—IoT Standards Mapping to Core Areas of Cybersecurity, have been collected by the IoT Task Group. They are the basis for the following observations on the present state of standards availability and standards use for IoT systems.

For the possible standard gaps identified in Section 8, agencies should further review these gaps with respect to their respective missions. For identified priorities, agencies should work with the private sector to initiate new projects in Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs) to close such gaps.

### 8.1 Cryptographic Techniques

Cryptographic techniques will need adjustments and innovations to accommodate the IoT. Scalability, performance, memory- and power-limited devices, and constrained communication channels all contribute to the cryptographic challenges associated with the IoT. The need for cryptographic algorithms that can work within the confines of a simple electronic device is motivating development of standardized “lightweight cryptography” (LWC). LWC does not imply lightweight security. Rather, the “lightweight” concept refers to design constraints on LWC algorithms evaluated in two separate contexts: software and hardware. In software LWC implementations, smaller code and/or RAM size are preferable. Important measures for hardware LWC implementations are chip size and/or energy consumption.

In some implementations, existing cryptographic standards can support IoT systems. For instance, IoT devices that possess the required resources can use the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher, a symmetric key encryption algorithm specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010. Additionally, substantial effort has gone into reshaping AES into a solution for lightweight applications. The AES standard has widespread market acceptance.

Other standards have been developed to specifically support IoT systems. For example, the multipart ISO/IEC 29167 standard provides cryptographic options for the air interface of radio-frequency identification (RFID) components and the multipart ISO/IEC 29192 standard for lightweight cryptography provides cryptographic options for IoT components with constrained processing capabilities. Market acceptance for parts of these standards has not yet occurred.

Public-key cryptography (PKC), ubiquitous on the Web, may appear as a natural choice since the inconvenience and restrictions of shared secrets are eliminated. However, the computational demands of public-key cryptography, which may not be feasible for tiny IoT devices, must be weighed against the key management and protocol limitations that come with symmetric key cryptography. As an example, and given the immense scale envisioned for IoT applications, certificate revocation, which include resource-hungry activities such as the processing and storage associated with certificate revocation lists (CRLs) or the bandwidth associated with Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), would have to be compared to the manual process and vulnerability of symmetric key distribution and update.

Existing standards and those being developed address these concerns. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), defined in accepted standards such as ISO/IEC 29192-4:2013, is a public-key approach that provides well understood levels of security with smaller keys and signatures than, for example, RSA. ECC has also become entrenched as a "must implement" mechanism in many Internet protocols, such as TLS (RFC 5246), DTLS (RFC 6347), and the Internet Key Exchange for IPsec (RFC 7296). For symmetric key applications (either alone or in conjunction with PKC), light-weight algorithms are defined in ISO/IEC 29192-2. These symmetric ciphers are tuned for limited power devices. Key management guidance is available in publications such as NIST Special Publication 800-57.

### **Market Impact?**

The AES standard has widespread market acceptance, including testing and validation of thousands of implementations, which indicates a strong market impact. In contrast, some of the recently approved RFID and lightweight cryptographic standards have no or few commercial implementations.

### **Possible Standards Gaps?**

Blockchain is an evolving technology that could revolutionize IoT security. The blockchain model favors peer-to-peer interactions between devices and thus de-centralizes security. Because blockchain is still evolving and its applicability to security mechanisms is still not well understood, no standards exist for using blockchain in a regular interoperable fashion. However, the potential is significant enough that SDOs should be taking note.

## **8.2 Cyber Incident Management**

There are many standards for cyber incident management that cover cyber incident identification, handling, and remediation. Many are applicable to IoT systems. Examples include: HITRUST CSF v9 for reporting information security incidents and weaknesses; IETF RFC 5070 – 2007 for sharing information about computer security incidents; ISO/IEC 29147: 2014 and ISO/IEC 30111: 2013 for vulnerability disclosure and handling process; Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) OpenC2 (draft) for machine to machine exchange of commands to achieve investigative, remediation and/or mitigation effects; and OpenFog Reference Architecture (RA) (February 2017) for tamper response. Some of these standards have widespread market acceptance.

### **Market Impact**

Market implementations are lagging for cyber incident management for IoT systems. Some IoT systems are not able to use software patches to fix cybersecurity flaws. In such cases, cyber incident management is important for identifying incidents, but remediation may require replacing IoT components. Replacement could be time-consuming and expensive.

### **Possible Standards Gaps**

Some IoT systems are not able to use software patches to fix cybersecurity flaws. New standards development could be undertaken to address remediation (compensating controls) when software patches are not feasible.

There are no standards for performing forensics on IoT devices. This lack of standards will create an immense burden when responding to incidents involving IoT devices. This risk can be mitigated by developing standards and tools that address the storage and access of forensic data that will be available for post-mortem analysis.

### **8.3 Hardware Assurance**

ISO/IEC JTC 1 has developed several standards relevant to hardware assurance such as: ISO/IEC 27036, a multipart information security management system standard for supplier relationships; and ISO/IEC 20243:2015, for secure engineering best practices, including secure management of the IT products, components, and their supply chains. SAE International has over ten approved or draft standards dealing with counterfeit electronic parts, such as AS5553B (2016), Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition Verification Criteria.

#### **Market Impact**

Detecting malware in software is technically challenging and expensive when it comes to firmware, and could slow down market uptake of relevant standards.

#### **Possible Standards Gaps**

Developing best practices for avoiding malware in firmware could be an area for new standards development.

### **8.4 Identity and Access Management**

There are many identity and access management standards with guidance available. Many of these standards have been developed to specifically support IoT systems or specific IoT applications. As in the case of the other core areas of cybersecurity, standards are being developed by many SDOs. Examples include: Fast Identity Online Alliance (FIDO); Universal Authentication Framework (UAF) v1.1 Specifications; HITRUST CSF v9; IEEE 802.1X-2004 for port based network access control; Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) SPEC 1.0 for access control; the IETF RFC 7925 to authenticate and to negotiate cryptographic algorithms and keys; and the Thread Specifications for home and building IoT applications.

#### **Market Impact**

The impact is unknown.

#### **Possible Standards Gaps**

Existing standards should be reviewed to determine if they are sufficient or require revision for IoT systems.

### **8.5 Information Security Management Systems (ISMS)**

There are several ISMS standards with market acceptance that are generally applicable to IoT systems or specific IoT applications. The ISA/IEC 62443 series includes security management requirements for Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS). ISO 13485:2016 provides

management requirements for medical devices and related services. ISO 27799:2016 covers information security management in health using ISO/IEC 27002. ISO/IEC 20243:2015 identifies secure engineering best practices, including secure management of the IT products, components, and their supply chains. ISO/IEC 27001:2013 provides best practices for implementing an ISMS and is being widely used. ISO/IEC 27002:2013 is also being widely used as a reference for selecting security controls when implementing an ISMS.

### **Market Impact**

Existing standards are being implemented.

### **Possible Standards Gaps**

While there are specific management system standards for some IoT applications, there are other IoT applications that could possibly benefit from a management system standard based upon ISO/IEC 27002. Although ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 are widely used, the widespread adoption of these standards to IoT has not yet occurred.

A new area of work could be to develop IoT security controls overlay where they would not only specify the security controls, but also could stipulate specific implementation requirements for the controls. For example, NIST SP 800-82 includes a security controls overlay for industrial control systems; and NIST SP 800-161 includes a security controls overlay for supply chain.

## **8.6 IT System Security Evaluation**

There are many IT system security evaluation standards with market acceptance that should be relevant to IoT systems. Standards for security requirements for cryptographic modules (e.g., ISO/IEC 19790:2015) and security test requirements for cryptographic modules (e.g., ISO/IEC 24759:2014) are relevant for many types of IoT components. Other examples include: the three-part ISO/IEC 15408 for IT security evaluation; ISO/IEC TR 30104:2015 for guidance on physical security attacks, mitigation techniques and security requirements; and UL 2900 for testable cybersecurity criteria for network-connectable products and systems.

### **Market Impact**

Although standards exist, practical application to IoT systems have not been consistently demonstrated and is affecting implementation.

### **Possible Standards Gaps**

Existing standards are not specific to IoT and should be reviewed to determine if they are sufficient or require revision for IoT systems.

## **8.7 Network Security**

There are many network security standards for various types of networks that are relevant to IoT systems. Examples include: the 3GPP Long-Term Evolution (LTE) for high-speed wireless communication for mobile phones; the Bluetooth wireless standard for exchanging data over short distances from fixed and mobile devices, and building personal area networks; the IETF

RFC 7252 for a generic web protocol for the special requirements of the constrained environment of machine-to-machine (M2M) applications; IEC 62591:2016 for industrial wireless sensor networks; the IEEE 1609 family of standards for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE); IEEE 802.11-2016 for Wi-Fi™; the OMA Lightweight Machine to Machine Technical Specification, a device management protocol designed for sensor networks and the demands of a machine-to-machine (M2M) environment; and the ZigBee 3.0 specification that enables IoT components from separate IoT systems/applications to communicate.

### **Market Impact**

Many of these existing standards have widespread market acceptance with numerous commercial implementations.

### **Possible Standards Gaps**

Updates and/or new standards may be needed to deal with the IoT cybersecurity considerations listed in Section 4.3. Additionally, many of these existing standards may require updates and/or new standards to address IoT networks that have the potential for spontaneous connection (due to the networking) without a system view. Such IoT systems cannot be planned or secured well using traditional approaches to security since system compositional or emergent properties would never be seen by a risk manager.

IEEE 802.15.7 is a physical layer specification for visible light communication. Standards from the viewpoint of application service function development have yet to be developed.

## **8.8 Physical Security**

IoT components may be in remote and unattended locations where physical access is almost unrestricted. Due to their cost model, very low cost IoT components cannot be protected by physically hardening the component or by adding anti-tampering features.

Where physical access can be controlled, there are sector specific and generic standards available, such as the six-part ISO/IEC TS 22237 for data center facilities and infrastructures and Security Industry Association (SIA) Open Supervised Device Protocol (OSDP) v2.1.7 for interoperability among access control and security products.

### **Market Impact**

Existing standards are being implemented.

### **Possible Standards Gaps**

A specific standard or standard development project does not appear to exist for physical security requirements and guidance for IoT components and IoT systems. This should be a candidate for additional standards efforts.

## **8.9 Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM)**

There are several approved and draft SACM standards. Most are specifically relevant to IoT systems. Approved standards include: IEC TR 62443-2-3:2015 for requirements for asset owners and industrial automation and control system (IACS) product suppliers that have established and

are now maintaining an IACS patch management program; and the IETF RFC 7632 with use cases for securely aggregating configuration and operational data and evaluating that data to determine an organization's security posture. IETF Active Internet Drafts include: the Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE) Definition of the ROLIE Software Descriptor Extension; Concise Software Identifiers; Endpoint Compliance Profile; Software Inventory Message and Attributes (SWIMA) for PA-TNC; and Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Terminology.

### **Market Impact**

The resource limitations of IoT devices (memory, processor, power) can make it difficult to implement agent-based approaches to continuous monitoring. Device manufacturers will need to consider price and performance as more advanced capabilities are developed. The IoT ecosystem is heterogeneous and until standards are in place and broadly adopted, device manufacturers and security vendors will need to make investments in developing device-specific agents and interfaces for monitoring.

### **Possible Standards Gaps**

Adoption of standard protocols, interfaces, and data models will help achieve the interoperability needed to automate security operations.

### **8.10 Software Assurance**

There are many approved software assurance standards. Many are specifically relevant to IoT systems. Examples include: IEC 82304-1:2016 for the safety and security of health software products; ISO/IEC 20243:2015 for secure engineering best practices, including secure management of the products, components, and their supply chains; the multi-part ISO/IEC 27036 for the information security for supplier relationships; and the UL 2900 criteria to assess software vulnerabilities and weaknesses, minimize exploitation, address known malware, review security controls and increase security awareness.

### **Market Impact**

Despite known impacts of insecure software, the pace of adoption is slow. This is because detecting malware in software is technically challenging and could be time consuming and expensive.

### **Possible Standards Gaps**

The integration of best practices for software development into standards for IoT contributing disciplines is slow.

Detecting malware in software is technically challenging. Developing best practices for avoiding malware in software could be an area for new standards development.



### **8.11 Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM)**

There are three approved SCRM standards. They are relevant to IoT systems or specific IoT systems (i.e., medical IoT components). They are the multi-part ISO/IEC 27036; ISO/IEC 20243:2015; and UL 2900, which are also included above for software assurance.

#### **Market Impact**

The market has been slow to implement.

#### **Possible Standards Gaps**

The generic standards (e.g., ISO/IEC 27036) are not specific to IoT and they need to be reviewed to determine if they are sufficient or require revision for IoT systems.

### **8.12 System Security Engineering**

There are many approved or draft system security engineering standards. Some are relevant to IoT systems or specific IoT systems (e.g., healthcare). Examples include: ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2015 for a set of systems engineering processes and associated terminology; the ISA/IEC 62443 series for Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) that includes security management requirements.

The generic, multipart ISO/IEC 15026 for systems and software engineering assurance may be relevant to IoT systems.

#### **Market Impact**

It is unclear if system security engineers apply systems engineering practices to IoT systems. This would lead to additional implementation costs.

#### **Possible Standards Gaps**

It is unclear if the generic system engineering standards (e.g., ISO/IEC 15026) consider IoT systems as part of the IT system.

## 9 Status of International Cybersecurity Standards for Selected IoT Applications

Based upon the preceding information and analysis, Table 4 provides a snapshot of the present status of cybersecurity standards development and their implementation by the marketplace.

“**Standards Available – May Need Revisions**” indicates that SDO-approved cybersecurity standards are for the most part available while some additional standards may still be needed. However, these standards should be reviewed and possibly revised to deal with existing and emerging IoT cybersecurity considerations such as those listed in Section 4.3.

“**Some Standards – May Need Revisions**” indicates that some SDO-approved cybersecurity standards are available. However, additional standards may be needed and existing standards should be reviewed and possibly revised to deal with existing and emerging IoT cybersecurity considerations such as those listed in Section 4.3.

“**Being Developed**” indicates that needed SDO-approved cybersecurity standards are still under development to deal with existing and emerging IoT cybersecurity considerations such as those listed in Section 4.3.

“**Standards Needed**” indicates that new cybersecurity standards development projects need to be considered by various SDOs.

“**Implemented – May Need Updates**” indicates that two or more standards-based implementations are available for most of these SDO-approved cybersecurity standards. As standards are reviewed and possibly revised to deal with existing and emerging IoT cybersecurity considerations such as those listed in Section 4.3, implementations may need to be updated.

“**Slow Uptake- May Need Updates**” indicates market implementations are lagging for many SDO-approved cybersecurity standards. As standards are reviewed and possibly revised to deal with existing and emerging IoT cybersecurity considerations such as those listed in Section 4.3, implementations may need to be updated.

“**Not Implemented**” indicates a lack of known commercial implementations. This may be caused by cybersecurity standards still being under development or new standards projects will be needed.

Where there are existing standards that are being implemented, it should be noted that these standards typically require continuous maintenance and updating. This is based upon feedback from testing and deployments of standards-based products, processes, and services, as well as improvements in technology

**Table 4 – Status of Cybersecurity Standardization for Several IoT Applications**

<b>Core Areas of Cybersecurity Standardization</b>	<b>Examples of Relevant SDOs</b>	<b>Connected Vehicles</b>	<b>Consumer IoT</b>	<b>Health IoT &amp; Medical Devices</b>	<b>Smart Buildings</b>	<b>Smart Manufacturing</b>
Cryptographic Techniques	ETSI; IEEE; ISO/IEC JTC 1; ISO TC 68; ISO TC 307; W3C	<b>Standards Available</b> <b>May Need Revisions</b> Slow Uptake May Need Updates	<b>Standards Available</b> <b>May Need Revisions</b> Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	<b>Standards Available</b> <b>May Need Revisions</b> Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates
Cyber Incident Management	ETSI ; ISO/IEC JTC 1; ITU-T; PCI	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates
Hardware Assurance	ISO/IEC JTC 1; SAE International	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions <b>Not Implemented</b>	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions <b>Not Implemented</b>	Some Standards May Need Revisions <b>Not Implemented</b>
Identity and Access Management	ETSI; FIDO Alliance; IETF; OASIS; OI DF; ISO/IEC JTC 1; ITU-T; W3C	<b>Standards Available</b> <b>May Need Revisions</b> Slow Uptake May Need Updates	<b>Standards Available</b> <b>May Need Revisions</b> Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	<b>Standards Available</b> <b>May Need Revisions</b> Slow Uptake May Need Updates	<b>Standards Available</b> <b>May Need Revisions</b> Slow Uptake May Need Updates
Information Security Management Systems	ATIS; IEC; ISA; ISO/IEC JTC 1; ISO TC 223; OASIS; The Open Group	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates
IT System Security Evaluation	ISO/IEC JTC 1; The Open Group; UL	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates

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Core Areas of Cybersecurity Standardization	Examples of Relevant SDOs	Connected Vehicles	Consumer IoT	Health IoT & Medical Devices	Smart Buildings	Smart Manufacturing
Network Security	3GPP; 3GPP2; IEC; IETF; IEEE; ISO/IEC JTC 1; ITU-T; The Open Group; WiMAX Forum	Standards Available May Need Revisions Implemented May Need Updates	Standards Available May Need Revisions Implemented May Need Updates	Standards Available May Need Revisions Implemented May Need Updates	Standards Available May Need Revisions Implemented May Need Updates	Standards Available May Need Revisions Implemented May Need Updates
Physical Security	ASIS International; IEC; IEEE; ISO/IEC JTC 1; NEMA; SIA	Standards Available May Need Revisions Implemented May Need Updates	Standards Available May Need Revisions Implemented May Need Updates	Standards Available May Need Revisions Implemented May Need Updates	Standards Available May Need Revisions Implemented May Need Updates	Standards Available May Need Revisions Implemented May Need Updates
Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring	IEEE; IETF; ISO/IEC JTC 1; TCG; The Open Group	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates
Software Assurance	IEEE; ISO/IEC JTC 1; OMG; TCG; The Open Group; UL	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates
Supply Chain Risk Management	IEEE; ISO/IEC JTC 1; IEC TC 65; The Open Group; UL	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates
System Security Engineering	IEC; IEEE; ISA; ISO/IEC JTC 1; SAE International; The Open Group	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Standards Needed	Some Standards May Need Revisions Slow Uptake May Need Updates	Standards Needed	Standards Needed

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## 10 Conclusions

The functional description of IoT (Section 4) in this report provides a starting point for assessing and improving the current state of international cybersecurity standards development for IoT. It may also serve as a basis for future understanding and communications among agencies about IoT and cybersecurity-related challenges and solutions.

Several IoT applications have been reviewed in this report to better understand IoT cybersecurity objectives, risks, and threats. From this review, it appears that many IoT systems, which have been developed for diverse agency missions, share common cybersecurity threats. Specific IoT applications may face additional classes of threats. Cybersecurity risk assessments need to be based upon an IoT application's priorities for confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.

With the continuing, rapid innovation of IT, the inventory of IoT-relevant cybersecurity standards will remain dynamic. Annex D of this report lists international cybersecurity standards that the IoT Task Group has identified to be IoT relevant. The listing is substantial but it is not being represented as complete. It is also a one-time, static listing. The standards have been organized by the 12 core areas of cybersecurity described in this report (Section 7). The substantial number of standards for some of the core cybersecurity areas are the result of IT innovation as well as competitive solutions for various technologies. Based upon the information in Annex D, a high-level summary has been developed of IoT-relevant cybersecurity standards including market impact, where known, and possible standards gaps (Section 8).

The identified possible standards gaps are:

- **Cryptographic Techniques:** applying blockchain technology should be explored for IoT security mechanisms;
- **Cyber Incident Management:** best practices for remediation should be explored when software patches are not feasible;
- **Hardware Assurance:** best practices for avoiding malware in firmware should be explored;
- **Identity and Access Management:** existing standards should be reviewed to determine if they are sufficient or require revision for IoT systems;
- **Information Security Management Systems (ISMS):** management system standards based upon ISO/IEC 27002 for IoT applications based upon 27000 series should be considered;
- **IT System Security Evaluation:** existing standards are not specific to IoT and should be reviewed to determine if they are sufficient or require revision for IoT systems;
- **Network Security:** existing standards may require updates and/or new standards will be needed to address IoT networks that have the potential for spontaneous connections (due to the networking) without a system view;
- **Physical Security:** physical security requirements and guidance for IoT components and IoT systems does not exist and new standards should be investigated;
- **Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring:** since the IoT ecosystem is heterogeneous, IoT device manufacturers and security vendors may need to develop

device-specific agents and interfaces for monitoring until the standards are tailored for the various IoT use cases and implemented in products;

- **Software Assurance:** standards for avoiding vulnerabilities in software should be investigated (e.g., malware; integration of best practices for software development into standards for IoT contributing disciplines);
- **Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM):** generic standards (e.g., ISO/IEC 27036) are not specific to IoT and should be reviewed to determine if they are sufficient or require revision for IoT systems; and
- **System Security Engineering:** generic system security engineering standards (e.g., ISO/IEC 15026) should be reviewed for application to IoT systems.

Agencies should further review these possible standards gaps with respect to their respective missions. For identified priorities, agencies should work with industry to initiate new standards projects in SDOs to close such gaps.

Further, based upon agency missions and use of specific IoT systems and applications, agencies should also review existing standards (e.g., Annex D) to ascertain if they need to be revised to deal with existing and emerging IoT cybersecurity considerations such as those listed in Section 4.3.

Table 4 provides a summary of the Task Group's views on the status of cybersecurity standardization for the five IoT applications described in Sections 5 and 6.

The availability and use of international cybersecurity standards are major factors for ensuring the secure and resilient operation of the expanding number of agency mission critical IoT systems. In accordance with U.S. Government policy, agencies should participate in the development of these standards in many SDOs and, based upon each agency's mission, cite appropriate standards in agency procurements.

Also, in accordance with federal policy, agencies should support the development of appropriate conformity assessment schemes to the requirements in such standards. U.S. industry has a rich history of developing conformity assessment (CA) programs to meet our society's needs. In the IT sector for example, the Wi-Fi™ logo appearing on wireless network devices shows that the product has been tested and certified by the Wi-Fi™ Alliance, a non-profit member association, whose goal is to ensure that any device carrying the logo connect seamlessly to any Wi-Fi™ network. Many consumers may not understand the technical details of Wi-Fi™, but they have confidence that the logo ensures that the device will connect to their home networks.

The decision on the type, independence and technical rigor of conformity assessment for IoT should be risk-based. The need for confidence in conformity must be balanced with the cost to the public and private sectors, including their international operations and legal obligations. Successful conformity assessment provides the needed level of confidence, is efficient, and has a sustainable and scalable business model.

## Annex A—Some IoT Definitions and Descriptions

### **Internet of Things (IoT) [6]**

Systems underpin every facet of American society—from transportation to utilities to communications—and are accessible and often controllable from around the world. More devices are connected to networks, and those networks are connected to each other, a concept known as IoT; however, there is no universal definition of IoT, just as there is no agreement in the use of that name to describe this trend. Whether it is called IoT, the Industrial Internet, or cyber-physical systems (CPS), the term describes a decentralized network of objects (or devices), applications, and services that can sense, log, interpret, communicate, process, and act on a variety of information or control devices in the physical environment. These devices range from small sensors on consumer devices to sophisticated computers in industrial control systems (ICS). Ultimately, the devices have some type of kinetic impact on the physical world, whether directly or through a mechanical device to which they are connected.

### **Internet of Things (IoT) [28]**

An infrastructure of interconnected objects, people, systems and information resources together with intelligent services to allow them to process information of the physical and the virtual world and react.

### **Internet of Things (IoT) [29]**

It is important to understand what the Internet of Things is and what the difference is between IoT ecosystem and an IoT system. A simple definition of an Internet of Things system is “a system of entities (including cyber-physical devices, information resources, and people) that exchange information and interact with the physical world by sensing, processing information, and actuating.” An IoT ecosystem may be defined as “an infrastructure of networked objects (cyber-physical devices, information resources, and people) that can be combined to create systems that interact with the physical world.

### **Internet of Things (IoT) [2]**

In this context, the term IoT refers to the connection of systems and devices with primarily physical purposes (e.g., sensing, heating/cooling, lighting, motor actuation, transportation) to information networks (including the Internet) via interoperable protocols, often built into embedded systems.

### **Internet of Things (IoT) [30]**

This green paper will continue to use the term Internet of Things as an umbrella term to reference the technological development in which a greatly increasing number of devices are connected to one another and/or to the Internet. This acknowledges the widespread use and general popular acceptance of the term. The term itself is, as pointed out by some commenters, a misnomer, as many of the devices included in the Internet of Things do not use Internet Protocol or in any event may not connect directly to the Internet. At times, IoT term is more descriptive of the system or network than an actual thing. IoT has become the commonly used term for the technologies and related issues discussed here, and for the sake of simplicity it will be used throughout this paper.

**Internet of Things (IoT) [31]**

There is no formal, analytic, or even descriptive set of the building blocks that govern the operation, trustworthiness, and lifecycle of IoT. A composability model and vocabulary that defines principles common to most, if not all networks of things, is needed to address the question: “what is the science, if any, underlying IoT?” This document offers an underlying and foundational science to IoT based on a belief that IoT involves *sensing*, *computing*, *communication*, and *actuation*.

**Internet of Things (IoT) [32]**

A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies.



**Annex B— Key IoT Capabilities Transformations**

This table provides some details about the types of functions that each capability type can perform and the type of inputs and outputs for the function.

**Table 5 – IoT Key Capabilities Transformations**

Capability Type	Input Type	Transform Input	Transform Output	Output Type
Sensing	Physical energy	Property of physical system state	Representation of physical state	Digital data
Actuating	Digital data	Representation of desired change in aspect of physical state	Changed property of physical system state	Physical energy
Data Processing	Digital data	Set of information	New set of information	Digital data
Data Storing	Digital data	Set of information	Set or subset of information available over time	Digital data
Data Transferring	Digital data	Set of information	Same set of information available over distance	Digital data

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**Annex C—An IT Standards Maturity Model**

Table 6 provides a proposed classification system for characterizing the present state of market impact of a standard. The present state may consist of several maturity levels. For instance, it is possible for Under Development, Reference Implementation, Testing, Commercial Availability and Market Acceptance levels to occur concurrently.

**Table 6 – IT Standards Maturity Model**

<b>Maturity Level</b>	<b>Definition</b>
No Standard	SDOs have not initiated any standard development projects.
Under Development	SDOs have initiated standard development projects. Open source projects have been initiated.
Guidance Available	A company, government agency, or industry group document is available, indicating there may be sufficient understanding and content to use the document as a basis for a standard.
Approved Standard	SDO-approved standard is available to public. Some SDOs require multiple implementations before final designation as a “standard.”
Under Revision	Revisions or amendments are in progress that may affect backward compatibility with the original standard.
Technically Stable	The standard is stable and its technical content is mature. No major revisions or amendments are in progress that will affect backward compatibility with the original standard.
Reference Implementation	Reference implementation is available.
Testing	Test tools are available. Testing and test reports are available.
Conformity Assessment	First, second, or third party (e.g., certification) assessment programs are available.
Commercial Availability	Several products/services from different vendors exist on the market to implement this standard.
Market Acceptance	Widespread use of technology within an industry. De facto or de jure market acceptance of standards-based products/services.
Sunset	Newer standards (revisions or replacements) are under development.

Some SDOs require two or more implementations before final approval of a standard. Such implementations may or may not be commercial products or services. In other cases, an SDO may be developing a standard while conforming commercial products or services are already being sold. Innovation in IT means that IT standards are constantly being developed, approved, and maintained. Revisions to previous editions of standards may or may not be backward-compatible. An SDO approved standard does not necessarily equate with success. Widespread market acceptance of an approved standard is the goal.

**Annex D—IoT Standards Mapping to Core Areas of Cybersecurity**

This annex represents a snapshot in time. It has been developed by the IoT Task Group to help understand the present state of international cybersecurity standards development for IoT.

The following annotated listing of standards is not exhaustive but does represent an extensive effort to identify cybersecurity standards that may be relevant for IoT systems. Some standards may be listed for more than one core area of cybersecurity.

The state of market acceptance for standards (i.e., Maturity Level) can be relatively easy or difficult to ascertain. The Maturity Levels are described in Table 6.

The listing is sorted by Core Area of Cybersecurity, then by SDO, and last by Documents.

**Table 7 – Cryptographic Techniques Standards**

Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">Bluetooth LE</a>	<b>Bluetooth SIG</b>	<p>Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)</p> <p>A BLE beacon is a small device – usually powered by battery or USB – that emits a Bluetooth Low Energy signal.</p> <p><u>Key Generation:</u> When using Bluetooth LE Secure Connections, the following keys are exchanged between master and slave:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Connection Signature Resolving Key (CSRK) for Authentication of unencrypted data</li> <li>• Identity Resolving Key (IRK) for Device Identity and Privacy</li> </ul>	Guidance Available Commercial Availability Market Acceptance Reference Implementation

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Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p><u>Encryption</u>: BLE uses AES-CCM cryptography. Like Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate (BR/EDR), the LE controller will perform the encryption function. This function generates 128-bit encrypted data from a 128-bit key and 128-bit plaintext data using the AES-128-bit cypher defined in FIPS-1971.</p> <p><u>Signed Data</u>: BLE supports the ability to send authenticated data over an unencrypted transport between two devices with a trusted relationship. This is accomplished by signing the data with a CSRK.</p>	
<a href="#">ETSI GR QSC 004 V1.1.1 (2017-03)</a>	ETSI	<p>Quantum-Safe Cryptography; Quantum-Safe threat assessment</p> <p>The present document presents the results of a simplified threat assessment following the guidelines of ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.3] for a number of use cases. The method and key results of the analysis is described in clause 4.</p> <p>The present document makes a number of assumptions regarding the timescale for the deployment of viable quantum computers, however the overriding assertion is that quantum computing will become viable in due course. This is examined in more detail in clause 5.</p> <p>The impact of quantum computing attacks on the cryptographic deployments used in a number of existing industrial deployment scenarios are considered in clause 7.</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ETSI GR QSC 001 V1.1.1 (2016-07)</a>	ETSI	<p>Quantum-Safe Cryptography (QSC); Quantum-safe algorithmic framework</p> <p>The present document gives an overview of the current understanding and best practice in academia and industry about quantum-safe cryptography (QSC). It focuses on identifying and assessing cryptographic primitives that have been proposed for efficient key establishment and authentication applications, and which may be suitable for standardization by ETSI and subsequent use by industry to develop quantum-safe solutions for real-world applications.</p>	Approved Standard

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Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>QSC is a rapidly growing area of research. There are already academic conference series such as PQC and workshops have been established by ETSI/IQC [i.1] and NIST. The European Commission has recently granted funding to two QSC projects under the Horizon 2020 framework: SAFEcrypto [i.2] and PQCrypto [i.3] and [i.4]. The present document draws on all these research efforts.</p> <p>The present document will cover three main areas. Clauses 4 and 5 discuss the types of primitives being considered and describe an assessment framework; clauses 6 to 10 discuss some representative cryptographic primitives; and clause 11 gives a preliminary discussion of key sizes.</p>	
<p><a href="#">ETSI GR QSC 003 V1.1.1 (2017-02)</a></p>	<p><b>ETSI</b></p>	<p>Quantum Safe Cryptography; Case Studies and Deployment Scenarios</p> <p>The present document examines a number of real-world uses cases for the deployment of quantum-safe cryptography (QSC). Specifically, it examines some typical applications where cryptographic primitives are deployed today and discusses some points for consideration by developers, highlighting features that may need change to accommodate quantum-safe cryptography. The main focus of the document is on options for upgrading public-key primitives for key establishment and authentication, although several alternative, non-public-key options are also discussed.</p> <p>The present document gives an overview of different technology areas; identify where the security and cryptography currently resides; and indicate how things may have to evolve to support quantum-safe cryptographic primitives. Clauses five and six discuss network security protocols, using TLS and S/MIME as typical examples. These are contrasted in clauses seven and eight by an examination of security options for IoT and Satellite use cases, which have very different requirements and constraints than traditional Internet-type services. Some alternatives to public key protocols are reviewed in clause nine. Authentication requirements are discussed in</p>	<p>Approved Standard</p>

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Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		clause ten and some forward-looking examples providing advanced functionality are examined in clause eleven.	
<a href="#">ETSI GS QKD 002 V1.1.1 (2010-06)</a>	<b>ETSI</b>	Quantum Key Distribution; Use Cases The Use Cases Document shall provide an overview of possible application scenarios in which Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems ([i.1]) can be used as building blocks for high security Information and communication technology (ICT) systems. QKD	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)</a>	<b>Global Platform</b>	The TEE is a secure area of the main processor in any connected device that ensures that sensitive area is stored, process and protected.  The TEE's ability to offer isolated safe execution of authorized security software, known as 'trusted applications', enables it to provide end-to-end security by enforcing protected execution of authenticated code, confidentiality, authenticity, privacy, system integrity and data access rights. <i>Under Section "What is a TEE?"</i>	Approved Standards Guidance Available
<a href="#">HITRUST CSF v9 10 September 2017</a>	<b>HITRUST Alliance</b>	<u>Message Integrity:</u> Specification: Requirements for ensuring authenticity and protecting message integrity in applications shall be identified and controls implemented. Implementation: The information system provides mechanisms to protect the authenticity of communications sessions. The system shall implement one (1) of the following integrity protection algorithms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HMAC-SHA-1</li> <li>• HMAC-MD5</li> </ul>	Approved Standard Under Revision Guidance Available

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Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p><u>Output Data Validation:</u> Specification: Data output from an application shall be validated to ensure that the processing of stored information is correct and appropriate to the circumstances. Implementation: Output validation shall include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plausibility checks to test whether the output data is reasonable</li> <li>• Reconciliation control counts to ensure processing of all data</li> <li>• Providing sufficient information for a reader</li> <li>• Procedures for responding to output validation tests</li> <li>• Defining the responsibilities of all personnel involved in the data output process</li> <li>• Creating an automated log of activities in the data output validation process</li> </ul> <p><u>Cryptographic Controls:</u> Objective: to protect the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of information by cryptographic means. A policy shall be developed on the use of cryptographic controls. Key management should be in place to support the use of cryptographic techniques.</p> <p><u>Key Management:</u> Specification: key management shall be in place to support the organization’s use of cryptographic techniques. Implementation: all cryptographic keys shall be protected against modification, loss, and destruction. Keys shall not be stored in the Cloud, but maintained by the cloud consumer or trusted key management provider. Key management and key usage are separated duties. <i>Page 462, Sections under category 10</i></p>	
<p><a href="#">IEEE 1363-2000</a></p>	<p><b>IEEE</b></p>	<p>traditional public-key cryptography</p>	<p>Approved Standard</p>

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**Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
and <a href="#">IEEE 1363a-2004</a>			
<a href="#">IEEE 1619-2007</a>	<b>IEEE</b>	cryptographic protection of data on block-oriented storage devices	Approved Standard Some activity regarding revisions
<a href="#">IEEE 802.1X-2010</a>	<b>IEEE</b>	<p>An IEEE Standard for port-based Network Access Control (PNAC). It provides authentication mechanisms to devices wishing to attach to an LAN or WLAN.</p> <p>802.1X authentication involves three parties: a supplicant, an authenticator, and an authentication server.</p> <p><u>Supplicant</u>: a client device that wishes to attach to the LAN/WLAN.</p> <p><u>Authenticator</u>: a network device, such as an Ethernet switch or wireless access point. It acts like a security guard to a protected network.</p> <p><u>Authentication server</u>: typically, a host running software supporting the Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) protocols.</p> <p><u>Typical authentication progression</u>:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Initialization: on detection of a new supplicant, the port on the switch is enabled and set to the unauthorized state.</li> </ol>	Approved Standard  Under Revision?

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Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Initiation: to initiate authentication the authenticator will periodically transmit EAP-Request Identity frames to a special Layer 2 address on the local network segment.</li> <li>3. Negotiation: The authentication server sends a reply to the authenticator, containing an EAP Request specifying the EAP Method. The authenticator encapsulates the EAP Request in an Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAPOL) frame and transmits it to the supplicant. At this point the supplicant can start using the requested EAP Method, or do an NAK ("Negative Acknowledgement") and respond with the EAP Methods it is willing to perform.</li> <li>4. Authentication: If the authentication server and supplicant agree on an EAP Method, EAP Requests and Responses are sent between the supplicant and the authentication server (translated by the authenticator) until the authentication server responds with either an EAP-Success message (encapsulated in a RADIUS Access-Accept packet), or an EAP-Failure message (encapsulated in a RADIUS Access-Reject packet). If authentication is successful, the authenticator sets the port to the "authorized" state and normal traffic is allowed, if it is unsuccessful the port remains in the "unauthorized" state. When the supplicant logs off, it sends an EAPOL-logoff message to the authenticator, the authenticator then sets the port to the "unauthorized" state, once again blocking all non-EAP traffic.</li> </ol>	
<a href="#">IEEE P1363.3</a>	<b>IEEE</b>	identity-based public-key cryptography using pairings	Under Development
<a href="#">IEEE 1619.1-2007</a>	<b>IEEE</b>	authenticated encryption with length expansion for storage devices  <u>Cryptographic unit:</u> a cryptographic unit is any combination of software, firmware, or hardware that is capable of handling plaintext and ciphertext using at least one of the cryptographic modes.	Approved Standard

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**Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>The cryptographic unit shall contain the following subcomponents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plaintext record formatter and/or plaintext record de-formatter</li> <li>• Encryption routine and/or decryption routine</li> <li>• Cryptographic parameters</li> </ul> <p>The cryptographic unit may contain the following subcomponents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Random bit generator</li> <li>• Key wrapping routine</li> <li>• Key unwrapping routine</li> </ul> <p><i>Page 10, Section 4.2.4</i></p> <p><u>Cryptographic modes:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Counter with cipher block chaining-message authentication code (CCM)</li> <li>• Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)</li> <li>• Cipher block chaining with keyed-hash message authentication code (CBC-HMAC)</li> <li>• Xor-encrypt-xor with tweakable clock-cipher with keyed-hash message authentication code (XTS-HMAC)</li> </ul> <p><i>Page 13, Section 5</i></p>	
<p><a href="#">IEEE 1363.2-2008</a></p>	<p><b>IEEE</b></p>	<p><u>Variations of the network password problem:</u> This standard describes three classes of password-based methods that solve three variations of the password-only network login problem. These methods can provide mutual zero knowledge password proof and remote password-authenticated establishment of cryptographic keys.</p>	<p>Approved Standard</p>

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**Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Balanced password-authenticated key agreement – two parties share a common password and they want to prove to each other that they know the password, and only then engage in secure communications, without revealing the password to others.</li> <li>2. Augmented password-authenticated key agreement methods – similar to the first except that one of the parties, the Server, has password verification data derived using a one-way function of the password.</li> <li>3. Password- authenticated key retrieval – addresses the scenario where one desires to further decrease the sensitivity of stored password-derived data.</li> </ol> <p>All these methods require one or more parties to use specific password-related data to make the method succeed.</p> <p><u>Primitives:</u> The following types of primitives are defined in this standard:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Random element derivation primitives (REDP), components of password-authenticated key agreement schemes (PKAS) and password-authenticated key retrieval schemes (PKRS).</li> <li>• Password-entangled public-key generation primitives (PEPKGP); components of PKASs and PKRSs</li> <li>• Secret value derivation primitives (SVDP), components of augmented password-authenticated key agreement and PKRSs</li> <li>• Password verification data generation primitives (PVDGP), components of augmented password-authenticated key agreement schemes (APKAS)</li> <li>• Key retrieval blinding primitives (KRBP), key retrieval unblinding primitives (KRUP), and key retrieval permutation primitives (KRPP), components of key retrieval schemes.</li> </ul>	

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**Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">IEEE 1619.2-2010</a>	<b>IEEE</b>	<p>wide-block encryption for shared storage media</p> <p>This document specifies two different EAD algorithms: EME2-AES and XCB-AES. Both implement a tweakable pseudorandom permutation with substantially similar security properties and have similar bounds with respect to the amount of data that is able to be safely be encrypted with a single key.</p> <p>Nevertheless, upon choosing an algorithm, implementers might need to consider other factors than security level such as software performance or hardware implementation size</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">IEEE 802.11-2016</a>	<b>IEEE</b>	<p><u>Classes of security algorithm:</u> This standard defines two classes of security algorithms for IEEE802.11 networks: Algorithms for creating and using Robust Security Network Association (RSNA), called <i>RSNA algorithms</i>, and Pre-RSNA algorithms.</p> <p><u>Security methods:</u> Pre-RSNA security comprises the following algorithms and procedures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WEP</li> <li>• IEEE 802.11 entity authentication</li> </ul> <p>RSNA security comprises the following algorithms and procedures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TKIP</li> <li>• CCMP</li> <li>• Galois/Counter Mode Protocol (GCMP)</li> <li>• Broadcast Integrity Protocol (BIP)</li> </ul>	Approved Standard Market Acceptance

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**Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RSNA establishment and termination procedures, including use of IEEE 802.1X authentication and SAE authentication</li> <li>• Key management procedures</li> </ul> <p><i>Page 1923, Section 12</i></p>	
<a href="#">IEEE 802.15.4-2015</a>	<p><b>IEEE</b></p>	<p><u>Security:</u> The MAC sublayer is responsible for providing security services on specified incoming and outgoing frames when requested to do so by the higher layers. This standard supports the following security services:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data confidentiality</li> <li>• Data authenticity</li> <li>• Replay protection (when not using Time Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mode)</li> </ul> <p><u>Outgoing frame security procedure:</u> The inputs to this procedure are the frame to be secured and the SecurityLevel, KeyIdMode, KeySource, and KeyIndex parameters.</p> <p><i>Page 360, Section 9</i></p>	<p>Approved Standard Market Acceptance</p>
<a href="#">Internet Draft</a>	<p><b>IETF</b></p>	<p>IETF “State of the Art and Challenges for the Internet of Things” draft-irtf-t2trg-iot-seacons-02</p> <p><u>End-to-end Security:</u> Regarding end-to-end security in the context of the confidentiality and integrity protection, the packets are processed applying message authentication codes or encryption. The five approaches to handle such end-to end confidentiality and integrity protection while letting middleboxes access/modify data for different purposes:</p>	<p>Under Development</p>

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**Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sharing credentials with middleboxes enables middleboxes to transform packets and re-apply the security measures after transformation</li> <li>• Reusing the Internet wire format in the IoT makes conversion between IoT and Internet protocols unnecessary. However, it can lead to poor performance in some use cases because IoT specific optimizations are not possible.</li> <li>• Selectively protecting vital and immutable packet parts with a MAC or with encryption requires a careful balance between performance and security. Otherwise, this approach will either result in poor performance or poor security.</li> <li>• Message authentication codes that sustain transformation can be realized by considering the order of transformation and protection.</li> <li>• Object security based mechanisms can bridge the protocol worlds, but still requires that the two worlds use the same object security formats.</li> </ul> <p><i>Page 35 section 7.1.3</i></p>	
<a href="#">RFC 5280 - 2015</a>	<p><b>IETF</b></p>	<p>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile (Updated)</p>	<p>Approved Standard</p>
<a href="#">RFC 7925</a>	<p><b>IETF</b></p>	<p><u>TLS and DTLS:</u> The TLS protocol provides authenticated, confidentiality and integrity protected communication between two endpoints. The protocol is composed of two layers: The Record Protocol and the handshaking protocols. At the lowest level, layered on top of a reliable transport protocol (e.g., TSP), is the Record Protocol. It provides connection security by using symmetric cryptography for confidentiality, data origin authentication, and integrity protection.</p> <p><i>Page 5, Section 3.1</i></p>	<p>Approved Standard Commercial Availability Conformity Assessment Market Acceptance</p>

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**Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">RFC 8105</a>	<b>IETF</b>	<p>Guidance Available Currently in the IETF Standard Track</p> <p>Security Considerations: The secure transmission of circuit more services in DECT (Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications) is based on the DSAA2 (DECT Standard Authentication Algorithm #2) and DSC/DSC2 (DECT Standard Cipher/DECT Standard Cipher #2) specifications developed by ETSI Technical Committee (TC) DECT and the ETSI Security Algorithms Group of Experts (SAGE). DECT ULE communications are secured at the link layer (DLC) by encryption and per-message authentication through CCM (Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC)) mode. The underlying algorithm for providing encryption and authentication is AES128. The DECT ULE (Digital Enhances Cordless Telecommunications Ultra Low Energy) pairing procedure generates a master User Authentication Key (UAK). During the location registration procedure, or when the permanent virtual circuits are established, the session security keys are generated. Both the master authentication key and session security keys are generated by use of the DSAA2 algorithm, which uses AES127 as the underlying algorithm. <i>Page 17, Section 5</i></p>	Under Development
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29167-1:2014</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	<p>security services for radio frequency identification (RFID) air interfaces</p> <p>Defines the architecture for security services for the ISO/IEC 18000 air interfaces standards for (RFID) devices.</p>	Approved Standard

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<b>Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.</b>			
<b>Documents</b>	<b>SDO</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Maturity Level (Table 6)</b>
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29167-10:2017</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Part 10: Crypto Suite AES-128 Security Services for Air Interface Communications	Approved Standard Commercial Availability
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29167-11:2014</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Part 11: Crypto Suite PRESENT-80 Security Services for Air Interface Communications	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Part 12: Crypto Suite ECC-DH Security Services for Air Interface Communications	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29167-13:2015</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Part 13: Crypto Suite Grain-128A Security Services for Air Interface Communications	Approved Standard Commercial Availability
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Part 14: Crypto Suite AES Output Feedback Block (OFB) Security Services for Air Interface Communications	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29167-16:2015</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Part 16: Crypto Suite ECDSA-ECDH Security Services for Air Interface Communications	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29167-17:2015</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Part 17: Crypto Suite CryptoGPS Security Services for Air Interface Communications	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Part 19: Crypto suite RAMON security services for air interface communications	Approved Standard



**Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">ISO/IEC TR 29181-9:2017</a>	ISO/IEC	<p>Data Encryption: IPv4 can only utilize data encryption (IPV6-IPSec), but its addresses cannot be encrypted. It cannot provide address confidentiality.</p> <p>This technical report is Part 2 of the Technical report on Future Network – Problem Statement and Requirements developed by ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 6. Part 2 focuses on the issue of naming and addressing.</p> <p>New Communications Rules to Supplement New Network Attached Storage (NAS): In order to protect the addressing security, Future Network may consider adopting a new communication rule requiring verification of source address and destination address before sending message to the networks. The new rules should design and utilize better and newer authentication and verification systems to achieve system wide security.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To construct a true identity authentication, verification and certification system.</li> <li>• To change from passive and defensive network security into proactively managed cybersecurity.</li> <li>• To prove communicator true identity, verify network (Internet) address and routing path authenticity, and prevent unauthorized access, and realize trusted connection.</li> <li>• To certify the authenticity of software and the consistency of software identity and software data, achieving trusted computing.</li> <li>• Trusted connection which is the key for trusted systems. Trusted routing is the key for realizing trusted connection.</li> </ul> <p><i>Page 23, Section 6.2.4.3</i></p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29192-1:2012</a>	ISO/IEC	Lightweight Cryptography – includes general information such as security, classification and implementation requirements	Approved Standard

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Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
			Market Acceptance Under Revision
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29192-2:2012</a>	ISO/IEC	specifies two block ciphers suitable for lightweight cryptography: a) PRESENT: a lightweight block cipher with a block size of 64 bits and a key size of 80 or 128 bits; b) CLEFIA: a lightweight block cipher with a block size of 128 bits and a key size of 128, 192 or 256 bits.	Approved Standard Market Acceptance
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29192-2:2012 PDAM 1</a>	ISO/IEC	The SIMON and SPECK families of lightweight block ciphers were developed as an aid for securing applications in very constrained environments where AES may not be suitable.	Under Development
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29192-2:2012 NP Amd 2</a>	ISO/IEC	LEA is a lightweight block cipher that is being developed within ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 27 WG 2 as an aid for securing application in very constrained environments.	Under Development
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29192-3:2012</a>	ISO/IEC	specifies two dedicated keystream generators for lightweight stream ciphers: •Enocoro: a lightweight keystream generator with a key size of 80 or 128 bits; •Trivium: a lightweight keystream generator with a key size of 80 bits.	Approved Standard Market Acceptance
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29192-4:2013</a>	ISO/IEC	specifies three lightweight mechanisms using asymmetric techniques: a) a unilateral authentication mechanism based on discrete logarithms on elliptic curves;	Approved Standard

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Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">Amd.1: (2016)</a>		b) an authenticated lightweight key exchange (ALIKE) mechanism for unilateral authentication and establishment of a session key; c) an identity-based signature mechanism.	Market Acceptance
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29192-5:2016</a>	ISO/IEC	specifies three hash-functions suitable for applications requiring lightweight cryptographic implementations. - PHOTON: a lightweight hash-function with permutation sizes of 100, 144, 196, 256 and 288 bits computing hash-codes of length 80, 128, 160, 224, and 256 bits, respectively. - SPONGENT: a lightweight hash-function with permutation sizes of 88, 136, 176, 240 and 272 bits computing hash-codes of length 88, 128, 160, 224, and 256 bits, respectively. - Lesamnta-LW: a lightweight hash-function with permutation size 384 bits computing a hash-code of length 256 bits.	Approved Standard Market Acceptance
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 9594-8:2017</a>	ISO/IEC	X.509 Certificate definition	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC CD 29192-6</a>	ISO/IEC	message authentication codes (MACs)	Under Development
<a href="#">ISO/IEC WD 29192-7</a>	ISO/IEC	broadcast authentication protocols	Under Development
<a href="#">KMIP 1.1 and KMIP Profiles 1.1 -2013</a>	OASIS	key management interoperability protocol	Approved Standard
<a href="#">OCF 2.0</a> June 21, 2018	OCF	OCF SPECIFICATION 2.0	Approved Standard

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Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>Specifies the OCF core architecture, core features, and protocols to enable OCF profiles implementation for Internet of Things (IoT) usages and ecosystems.</p> <p>The Open Interconnect Consortium (OIC) has been re-launched in early 2016 as the Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF)</p>	<p>Guidance Available Reference Implementation</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8200">OMA-TS-LightweightM2M-V1_0-20170208-A</a></p>	<p><b>OMA</b></p>	<p>Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) What is OMA M2M? OMA’s LightweightM2M is a device management protocol designed for sensor networks and the demands of a machine-to-machine (M2M) environment.</p> <p>The LwM2M protocol utilizes DTLS with these channel bindings to implement authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity features of the protocol between communicating LwM2M entities. LwM2M supports three different types of credentials, namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Certificates</li> <li>• Raw public keys                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ TLS_PSK_WITH_128_CCM_8</li> <li>○ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Pre-shared secrets                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8</li> <li>○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><i>Page 58 Section 7</i></p>	<p>Guidance Available</p>
<p><a href="#">OpenFog RA</a></p>	<p><b>OpenFog Consortium</b></p>	<p>What is Fog?</p>	<p>Guidance Available</p>

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**Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>A system-level horizontal architecture that distributes resources and services of computing, storage, control and networking anywhere along the continuum from Cloud to Things.</p> <p>There are three cornerstones of the fog security perspective: Confidentiality, Integrity and availability Threat model is also displayed. <i>Page 49, Section 5.4.2.3</i></p> <p><u>Cryptographic Functions</u>: Initial base list of required standard cryptographic algorithms that must be available on all OpenFog nodes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Symmetric (or Secret-key) Ciphers for confidentiality protection</li> <li>• Cryptographic Hash Functions for integrity protection and authentication of communicating parties</li> <li>• Asymmetric (or Public-Key) Ciphers for generating secret keys, establishing long-term security credentials and providing non-repudiation services.</li> </ul> <p>The OpenFog cryptographic module must support the following FIPS approved cryptographic functions at a minimum:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Symmetric Key Ciphers                         <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ AES (with at least 128-bit keys)</li> <li>○ Triple-DES</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Asymmetric Key Ciphers</li> </ul> <p><i>Page 122, Section 10.1.1</i></p>	(has a few use cases)

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**Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<p><a href="#">TPM</a></p> <p>September 2016 or later</p>	<p><b>TCG</b></p>	<p>Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 What is TPM 2.0? An International standard (also published as ISO/IEC 11889:2015) that enables trust in computing platforms in general by receiving commands</p> <p>The TPM 2.0 provides support for a wide array of cryptographic operations including hashing, symmetric and asymmetric encryption, key generation, digital signatures, random number generation, protected storage and protected capabilities. The TPM architecture is cryptographic agile with support for numerous algorithms and curves with an extensible model to add more algorithms or curves as needed. The TPM 2.0 standard uses a library model so simpler profiles for a particular purpose can be defined using a subset of the available algorithms and capabilities to address platform specific requirements or constraints like Mobile, Automotive or IoT.</p> <p>The TPM 2.0 can create Endorsement Keys that serve as a statically unique TPM identity or an identity for an IoT component that a TPM is bound to. TPM manufacturers may also issue Endorsement Key certificates to provide confidence to third parties that interaction with a TPM is based on an implementation provided by the manufacturer issuing the certificate. TPM generated keys can be used for device authentication and cryptographically associated with Endorsement Keys in a TPM.</p> <p>TPM 2.0 supports anonymous remote attestation to help remote entities validate IoT component software measurements stored in a TPM during the boot process or based on the dynamic launch of a measured component. Remote attestation and its local equivalent called sealing provide evidence of IoT component integrity for both code and configuration.</p>	<p>Approved Standard Technically Stable Reference Implementation Testing Conformity Assessment Commercial Availability Market Acceptance</p>

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**Cryptographic Techniques: Techniques and mechanisms and their associated standards are used to provide: confidentiality; entity authentication; non-repudiation; key management; data integrity; trust worthy data platforms; message authentication; and digital signatures.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">Thread Spec 1.1</a> Feb 13 2017	<b>Thread Group</b>	<p>What is Thread? Securely and reliably connects products around the home using a robust mesh network and an open IPv6 based protocol.</p> <p>What is IEEE 802.15.4? Thread leverages IEEE 802.15.4 The IEEE 802.15.4 standard targets low-power personal area networks.</p> <p><u>J-PAKE/EC J-PAKE:</u> The fundamental security used during the joining of authentication and key agreement is an elliptic curve variant of J-PAKE (Password Authenticated Key Exchange with juggling), using the NIST P-256 elliptic curve. Key agreement: Diffie-Hellmann Authentication: Schnorr signatures <i>Doc 2, Page 28, Section 1.3.3.1</i></p> <p><u>Key Generation:</u> Each Thread node receives the Master Key when joining and assigns it to the <i>thrMasterKey</i> attribute, which is used in conjunction with a sequence counter. The use of Hashed Message Authentication Mode with the SHA-256 algorithm (HMAC-SHA256) as the keyed hash function produces an output of 32 bytes. Therefore, this is sufficient for the two separate keys required for the MAC sublayer and Mesh Link Establishment (MLE). <i>Doc 2, Page 162, Section 7.1.4</i></p>	Approved Standard Guidance Available Commercial Availability Conformity Assessment Market Acceptance Reference Implement- ation

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**Table 8 – Cyber Incident Management Standards**

<b>Cyber Incident Management: Standards that support information sharing processes, products, and technology implementations for cyber incident identification, handling, and remediation.</b>			
<b>Documents</b>	<b>SDO</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Maturity Level (Table 6)</b>
<a href="#">ETSI GS NGP 005 V1.1.1</a> (2017-04)	<b>ETSI</b>	<p>Next Generation Protocols (NGP); Next Generation Protocol Requirements The scope of the present document is to specify the minimum set of key requirements for the Next Generation Protocols (NGP), Industry Specific Group (ISG).</p> <p>The present document addresses requirements in the following areas: • Business Case and Techno-Economics • Migration • General Technical Requirements • Addressing • Security • Mobility • Multi-Access Support (including FMC) • Context Awareness • Performance (including Content Enablement) • Network Virtualisation • IoT Support • Energy Efficiency • e-Commerce • MEC • Mission Critical Services • Drones and Autonomous Vehicles and Connected Vehicles • Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communications</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ETSI TR 103 118 V1.1.1</a> (2015-08)	<b>ETSI</b>	<p>Machine-to-Machine communications (M2M); Smart Energy Infrastructures security; Review of existing security measures and convergence investigations</p> <p>The present document reviews security methods provided by deployed standards used in the Smart Energy industry (e.g., IEC 62351 [i.7], IEC 62443 [i.8]) or mandated by regulation (e.g., Requirements from the German BSI for Smart Meter Gateways and Secure Element) as well as gaps identified by the Smart Grid Information Security group for the M/490 mandate, in order to identify areas where ETSI may bring additional value, e.g., by extending or harmonising security solutions where possible</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ETSI TR 103 375 V1.1.1</a> (2016-10)	<b>ETSI</b>	<p>SmartM2M; IoT Standards landscape and future evolutions:</p> <p>The scope of the present document is to provide an overview of the IoT standards landscape: requirements, architecture, protocols, tests, etc. to provide the roadmaps of the IoT standards, when they are available.</p>	Approved Standard

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Cyber Incident Management: Standards that support information sharing processes, products, and technology implementations for cyber incident identification, handling, and remediation.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		The essential objectives are: • To analyse the status of current IoT standardisation. • To assess the degree of industry and vertical market fragmentation. • To point towards actions that can increase the effectiveness of IoT standardisation, to improve interoperability, and to allow for the building of IoT ecosystems	
<a href="#">ETSI TR 118 518 V2.0.0 (2016-09)</a>	<b>ETSI</b>	oneM2M; Industrial Domain Enablement (oneM2M TR-0018 version 2.0.0 Release 2)  The present document collects the use cases of the industrial domain and the requirements needed to support the use cases collectively. In addition, it identifies the necessary technical work needed to be addressed while enhancing future oneM2M specifications.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">HITRUST CSF v9 10 September 2017</a>	<b>HITRUST Alliance</b>	<u>Access Control:</u> Control objective: to control access to information, information assets, and business processes based on business and security requirements. <u>Authorized Access to Information Systems:</u> Control Objective: to ensure authorized user accounts are registered, tracked and periodically validated to prevent unauthorized access to information systems. <u>Network Access Control:</u> Control Objective: to prevent unauthorized access to networking services that they have been specifically authorized to use. Authentication and authorization mechanisms shall be applied for users and equipment. <u>Operating System Access Control:</u> Objective: to prevent unauthorized access to operating systems. <u>User identification and Authentication:</u> Specification: All users shall have a unique identifier for their personal use only, and an authentication technique shall be implemented to substantiate the claimed identity of a user.	Approved Standard Under Revision Guidance Available

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<b>Cyber Incident Management: Standards that support information sharing processes, products, and technology implementations for cyber incident identification, handling, and remediation.</b>			
<b>Documents</b>	<b>SDO</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Maturity Level (Table 6)</b>
<a href="#">Internet Draft SACM Information Model</a>	<b>IETF</b>	Secure Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Information Model	Under Development
<a href="#">RFC 5070 – 2007</a>	<b>IETF</b>	Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) for sharing information commonly exchanged by Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) about computer security incidents	Approved Standard
<a href="#">RFC 5901 - 2010</a>	<b>IETF</b>	extensions to the IODEF for reporting phishing	Approved Standard
<a href="#">RFC 6545 - 2012</a>	<b>IETF</b>	real-time inter-network defense	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 27035-1:2016</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	guidance on information security incident management for large and medium-sized organizations	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 29147: 2014</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	vulnerability disclosure	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC 30111: 2013</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	vulnerability handling process	Approved Standard
<a href="#">X.1056 - 2009</a>	<b>ITU-T</b>	security incident management guidelines for telecommunications organizations	Approved Standard

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Cyber Incident Management: Standards that support information sharing processes, products, and technology implementations for cyber incident identification, handling, and remediation.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">OpenC2</a>	OASIS	Enables the machine to machine exchange of commands to achieve investigative, remediation and/or mitigation effects. Enables real-time automated and active cyber defense through the use of standardized commands. Provides the action to be taken.	Under Development
<a href="#">Trusted Automated Exchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) Version 2.0 October – 2017</a>	OASIS	<i>OASIS Trusted Automated Exchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) Version 2.0</i> application layer protocol for the communication of cyber threat information	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) Version 2.0 – October 2017</a>	OASIS	<i>OASIS Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) Version 2.0</i> defines a framework that enables cyber threat information sharing and cyber threat analysis	Approved Standard
<a href="#">OpenFog RA February 2017</a>	OpenFog Consortium	What is Fog? A system-level horizontal architecture that distributes resources and services of computing, storage, control and networking anywhere along the continuum from Cloud to Things. <u>Tamper Response:</u>	Guidance Available (has a few use cases)

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Cyber Incident Management: Standards that support information sharing processes, products, and technology implementations for cyber incident identification, handling, and remediation.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>Soft Fail: Sensitive data is cleared and a second interrupt signal is sent to the security monitor to confirm this has been done so that it can restart the processor and continue execution.</p> <p>Hard Fail: The actions for a Soft Fail are performed, plus the caches and memory are zeroed and the system is reset. Both lower and higher consequences may be available. The lowest consequence would be to do nothing, or the event can be logged for later analysis.</p> <p><i>Page 71, Section 5.5.6.5</i></p>	
<a href="#">DSS 3.2 – 2016</a>	PCI	security controls around cardholder data to reduce credit card fraud	Approved Standard

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**Table 9 – Hardware Assurance Standards**

<p><a href="#">15408-1:2009</a></p>	<p><b>ISO/IEC</b></p>	<p>Information technology – Security techniques – Evaluation criteria for IT security (Part 1: Introduction and general model)</p>	<p>Approved Standard Technically Stable Conformity Assessment Commercial Availability Market Acceptance</p>
<p><a href="#">15408-2:2008</a></p>	<p><b>ISO/IEC</b></p>	<p>Information technology – Security techniques – Evaluation criteria for IT security – Part 2: Security functional components</p>	<p>Approved Standard Technically Stable Conformity Assessment Commercial Availability Market Acceptance</p>
<p><a href="#">15408-3:2008</a></p>	<p><b>ISO/IEC</b></p>	<p>Information technology – Security techniques – Evaluation criteria for IT security – Part 3: Security assurance components</p>	<p>Approved Standard Technically Stable Conformity Assessment Commercial Availability Market Acceptance</p>

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<a href="#">20243-1:2018</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Open Trusted Technology Provider™ Standard (O-TTPS) -- Mitigating maliciously tainted and counterfeit products -- Part 1: Requirements and recommendations  This standard can be freely <a href="#">downloaded</a>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">27036-1 2014</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships (Part 1: Overview and concepts)  This standard can be freely <a href="#">downloaded</a> .	Approved Standard
<a href="#">27036-2 2014</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships (Part 2: Common requirements)	Approved Standard
<a href="#">27036-3 2013</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 3: Guidelines for ICT supply chain security	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ARP6178 2011</a>	<b>SAE International</b>	Counterfeit Electronic Parts: Tool for Risk Assessment of Distributors	Approved Standard
<a href="#">AS5553B 2016</a>	<b>SAE International</b>	Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition Verification Criteria	Approved Standard
<a href="#">AS6081 2012</a>	<b>SAE International</b>	Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance Protocol, Distributors	Approved Standard
<a href="#">AS6171 2015</a>	<b>SAE International</b>	Test Method Standard; Counterfeit Electronic Parts	Approved Standard
<a href="#">AS6171/11 2016</a>	<b>SAE International</b>	Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Design Recovery Test Methods.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">AS6171/5</a>	<b>SAE International</b>	Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Radiological Test Methods.	Under Development

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<a href="#">AS6171/7</a>	<b>SAE International</b>	Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Electrical Test Methods	Under Develop- ment
<a href="#">AS6171/8</a> 2016	<b>SAE International</b>	Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Raman Spectroscopy Test Methods.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">AS6174A</a> 2014	<b>SAE International</b>	Compliance Verification Matrix (VM) Slash Sheet for SAE AS6174A, Counterfeit Materiel; Assuring Acquisition of Authentic and Conforming Materiel.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">AS6462A</a> 2014	<b>SAE International</b>	Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition Verification Criteria (2014)	Approved Standard

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**Table 10 – Identity and Access Management Standards**

Identity and Access Management: Standards that enable the use of secure, interoperable digital identities and attributes of entities to be used across security domains and organizational boundaries.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">ETSI TR 118 512 V2.0.0 (2016-09)</a>	ETSI	The present document provides options and analyses for the security features and mechanisms providing end-to-end security and group authentication for oneM2M. The scope of this technical report includes use cases, threat analyses, high level architecture, generic requirements, available options, evaluation of options, and detailed procedures for executing end-to-end security and group authentication.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Universal Authentication Framework (UAF) v1.1 Specifications</a>	FIDO	The UAF is designed around passwordless and multifactor authentication flows. This architecture lends itself to authentication of users connecting to devices and M2M authentication. <a href="https://fidoalliance.org">https://fidoalliance.org</a>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">CLP.14 v1.1</a>	GSMA	<u>Secure Identification:</u> When appropriate for the IoT Service, Network Operators recommend the use of Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) based mechanisms to securely identify Endpoint devices. “Single sign-on” services could also be provided by Network Operators to allow Endpoint devices to establish and prove their identity once, and then connect to several IoT Service Platforms without further inconvenience. <i>Page 11. Section 3.1</i>  The GSMA IoT Security Guidelines are backed by an IoT Security Assessment scheme that enables companies to build secure IoT devices and solutions.	Guidance Available
<a href="#">DS4P Release 1, May 2014</a>	HL7	Implementation Guide: Data Segmentation for Privacy (DS4P), Release 1, May 2014	Approved Standard

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Identity and Access Management: Standards that enable the use of secure, interoperable digital identities and attributes of entities to be used across security domains and organizational boundaries.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">FHIR Release 3</a>	HL7	Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources Specification (FHIR), Release 3	Under Development (Trial Use)
<a href="#">HCS Release 1, August 2014</a>	HL7	HL7 Healthcare Privacy and Security Classification System (HCS), Release 1, August 2014	Approved Standard
<a href="#">PASS;SLS Release 1 June 2014</a>	HL7	Privacy, Access and Security Services (PASS); Security Labeling Service (SLS) describes the conceptual-level viewpoints associated with the business requirements that relate to the content, structure, and functional behavior of information important to the Access Control area of the Privacy, Access, and Security domains within the healthcare environment.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">PASS - Access Control, Release 1 January 2017</a>	HL7	Version 3 Standard: Privacy, Access and Security Services (PASS) - Access Control, Release 1 Describes the conceptual-level viewpoints associated with the business requirements that relate to the content, structure, and functional behavior of information important to the Access Control area of the Privacy, Access, and Security domains within the healthcare environment.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">802.1AE-2006</a> <a href="#">802.1AEbw-2013</a>	IEEE	connectionless data confidentiality and integrity for media access independent protocols  Security Services: The guarantees provided by MACsec support the following security services for stations participating in MACsec: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Connectionless data integrity</li> </ul>	Approved Standard

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**Identity and Access Management: Standards that enable the use of secure, interoperable digital identities and attributes of entities to be used across security domains and organizational boundaries.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data origin authenticity</li> <li>• Confidentiality</li> <li>• Replay protection</li> <li>• Bounded receive delay</li> <li>• And can be used to limit the nature and extent of denial of service attacks</li> </ul> <p><i>Page 19, Section 6.9</i></p>	
<a href="#">802.1X-2004</a>	<b>IEEE</b>	port based network access control	Approved Standard Under Revision?
<a href="#">MUD</a>	<b>IETF</b>	<p>Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) Specification</p> <p>The MUD Specification is a scalable network security application specification.</p> <p>The goal of MUD is to provide a means for end devices to signal to the network what sort of access and network functionality they require to properly function. The initial focus is on access control.</p> <p>The MUD supporting network controller enforces security policies derived from a policy file originally provided by the IoT device manufacturer. Moreover, the MUD controller can enforce security policies for classes of devices. For example, the MUD controller can ensure that an IP camera communicates with its monitoring station server only. If physical compromise of the IP camera attempts to divert video streaming to an adversary server, the MUD controller will block and flag these attempts, assuming correct implementation of the MUD file and network administration.</p>	Under Development

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Identity and Access Management: Standards that enable the use of secure, interoperable digital identities and attributes of entities to be used across security domains and organizational boundaries.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">Open Trust Protocol</a>	IETF	protocol to install, update, and delete applications and to manage security configuration in a Trusted Execution Environment	Under Development
<a href="#">RFC 7925</a> July 2016	IETF	The handshaking protocol consist of three subprotocols, namely the handshake protocol, the change cipher spec protocol. And the alert protocol. The handshake protocol allows the server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic key before the application protocol transmits or received data. <i>Page 5, Section 3.1</i>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO 19731: 2017</a>	ISO	Digital analytics and web analyses for purposes of market, opinion and social research <u>Confidentiality of information:</u> All information supplied to the service provider by the client to conduct a research project shall be treated in the strictest confidence. It shall only be used in this context and shall not be made available to third parties without the client’s authorization. Confidential information shall be stored securely. <i>Page 16, Section 4.2</i>  <u>Data Security:</u> Service providers shall provide personnel with adequate access technology controls and protocols for data centers, processing and reporting servers, and general system access, as well as encryption and password policies. Service providers shall ensure that security arrangements are sufficient to ensure that only those authorized can access systems and data. <i>Page 24, Section 6.7</i>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">OCF 2.0</a> June 21, 2018	OCF	OCF SPECIFICATION 2.0	Approved Standard

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Identity and Access Management: Standards that enable the use of secure, interoperable digital identities and attributes of entities to be used across security domains and organizational boundaries.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>Specifies the OCF core architecture, core features, and protocols to enable OCF profiles implementation for Internet of Things (IoT) usages and ecosystems.</p> <p>The Open Interconnect Consortium (OIC) has been re-launched in early 2016 as the Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF)</p>	<p>Guidance Available Reference Implementation</p>
<p><a href="#">M2M Link</a> 08 Feb 2017</p>	<p><b>OMA</b></p>	<p>OMA’s LightweightM2M is a device management protocol designed for sensor networks and the demands of a machine-to-machine (M2M) environment.</p> <p><u>Access Control:</u> In the particular case where a single LwM2M Server Account exists in the LwM2M Client, the Server must have full access right on all the Objects and Object Instances in the LwM2M Client.</p> <p><u>Access Control Object:</u> In the presence of several LwM2M Servers, there is a need to determine if a certain LwM2M Server is authorized to instantiate a supported Object in the LwM2M Client. This kind of authorization can only be managed during a Bootstrap Phase. Furthermore, the LwM2M Client needs to determine – per Object Instance – who the “Access Control Owner” of the Object Instance is</p> <p><u>DTLS-based Security:</u> For authentication of communicating LwM2M entities, the LwM2M protocol required that all communication between LwM2M Clients and LwM2M Servers as well as LwM2M Clients and LwM2M Bootstrap-Servers are authenticated using mutual authentication.</p> <p><i>Page 68, Section 7.3.1</i></p>	<p>Approved Standard Guidance Available</p>

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Identity and Access Management: Standards that enable the use of secure, interoperable digital identities and attributes of entities to be used across security domains and organizational boundaries.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">DDS-Security specification – 2016</a>	OMG	Data Distribution Service (DDS)	Approved Standard
<a href="#">OpenFog RA Link</a>	OpenFog RA	<p>What is Fog? A system-level horizontal architecture that distributes resources and services of computing, storage, control and networking anywhere along the continuum from Cloud to Things.</p> <p><u>Identity and Identity Protection:</u> Public-key ciphers can be used to establishing a longer-term cyber identity, e.g., for authentication. In public-key cryptography, keys come in matched pairs (public key and private key) for each user, entity, computer, or subject. The private key must be accessible only to the subject and represents the subject’s digital identity in cyberspace.</p> <p>Hashes can be used to verify the integrity of code modules by taking the hash of the good known code module and using that to identify the module (like a unique global name).</p> <p>The private key of someone’s key pair is like their digital identity. Private keys must be kept confidential in order to protect someone’s digital identity.</p> <p><i>Page 50, Section 5.4.2.6</i></p>	Guidance Available (has a few use cases)
<a href="#">Trust Framework v2.5 -</a>	OTA	<p>strategic principles to help secure IOT devices and their data when shipped and throughout their entire life-cycle</p> <p>Online Trust Alliance (OTA) is now an initiative within the Internet Society (ISOC)</p>	Approved Standard

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**Identity and Access Management: Standards that enable the use of secure, interoperable digital identities and attributes of entities to be used across security domains and organizational boundaries.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
Updated June 22, 2017			
<a href="#">TPM</a> September 2016 or later	TCG	<p>Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 What is TPM 2.0? An International standard (also published as ISO/IEC 11889:2015) that enables trust in computing platforms in general by receiving commands</p> <p>The TPM 2.0 provides support for a wide array of cryptographic operations including hashing, symmetric and asymmetric encryption, key generation, digital signatures, random number generation, protected storage and protected capabilities. The TPM architecture is cryptographic agile with support for numerous algorithms and curves with an extensible model to add more algorithms or curves as needed. The TPM 2.0 standard uses a library model so simpler profiles for a particular purpose can be defined using a subset of the available algorithms and capabilities to address platform specific requirements or constraints like Mobile, Automotive or IoT.</p> <p>The TPM 2.0 can create Endorsement Keys that serve as a statically unique TPM identity or an identity for an IoT component that a TPM is bound to. TPM manufacturers may also issue Endorsement Key certificates to provide confidence to third parties that interaction with a TPM is based on an implementation provided by the manufacturer issuing the certificate. TPM generated keys can be used for device authentication and cryptographically associated with Endorsement Keys in a TPM.O</p> <p>TPM 2.0 supports anonymous remote attestation to help remote entities validate IoT component software measurements stored in a TPM during the boot process or based on the dynamic launch of</p>	Approved Standard Technically Stable Reference Implementation Testing Conformity Assessment Commercial Availability Market Acceptance

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Identity and Access Management: Standards that enable the use of secure, interoperable digital identities and attributes of entities to be used across security domains and organizational boundaries.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		a measured component. Remote attestation and its local equivalent called sealing provide evidence of IoT component integrity for both code and configuration.	
<a href="#">Thread Specs</a> Feb 13 2017	<b>Thread Group</b>	<p>What is Thread? Securely and reliably connects products around the home using a robust mesh network and an open IPv6 based protocol.</p> <p><u>Network-wide Key:</u> To verify the joining device and limit the effect of rogue devices attempting to join the Thread Network, the network requires the joining device to identify a trusted device and communicate solely in a point-to-point fashion with this trusted device. The trusted device policies any traffic from the joining device and forwards it to the commissioning device to allow the authentication protocol (DTLS handshake) to execute. <i>Page 29, Section 1.3.3.2</i></p>	Approved Standard Guidance Available Commercial Availability Conformity Assessment Market Acceptance

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Table 11 – Information Security Management Systems Standards

Information Security Management Systems: Standards provide a set of processes and corresponding security controls to establish a governance, risk, and compliance structure for information security for an organization, an organizational unit, or a set of processes controlled by a single organizational entity.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">TR 80001-2-2 2012</a>	AAMI IEC	Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices -- Part 2-2: Guidance for the communication of medical device security needs, risks and controls Provides a framework for the disclosure of security-related capabilities and risks necessary for managing the risk in connecting medical devices to IT-networks and for the security dialog that surrounds the IEC 80001-1 risk management of IT-network connection.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">AUTO11-A2</a> October 31, 2014	CLSI	Provides a framework for communication of information technology security issues between the in vitro diagnostic system vendor and the health care organization.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">COSO Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Framework</a>	COSO	Addresses the evolution of enterprise risk management and the need for organizations to improve their approach to managing risk to meet the demands of an evolving business environment.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">62443 series</a>	ISA/IEC	Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) standards and technical reports includes security management requirements	<a href="#">Status for Each Part</a>
<a href="#">13485:2016</a>	ISO	requirements for a quality management system where an organization needs to demonstrate its ability to provide medical devices and related services that consistently meet customer and applicable regulatory requirements	Approved Standard

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Information Security Management Systems: Standards provide a set of processes and corresponding security controls to establish a governance, risk, and compliance structure for information security for an organization, an organizational unit, or a set of processes controlled by a single organizational entity.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">27799:2016</a>	ISO	information security management in health using ISO/IEC 27002	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO 31000:2009</a>	ISO	A family of standards relating to risk management codified by the International Organization for Standardization. The purpose of ISO 31000 is to provide principles and generic guidelines on risk management.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">20243:2015</a>	ISO/IEC	identifies secure engineering best practices, including secure management of the IT products, components, and their supply chains	Approved Standard Conformance Testing
<a href="#">27001:2013</a>	ISO/IEC	This International Standard has been prepared to provide requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining and continually improving an information security management system.  The information security management system preserves the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information by applying a risk management process and gives confidence to interested parties that risks are adequately managed.	Approved Standard Market Acceptance
<a href="#">27002:2013</a>	ISO/IEC	This International Standard is designed for organizations to use as a reference for selecting controls within the process of implementing an Information Security Management System (ISMS) based on ISO/IEC 27001 or as a guidance document for organizations implementing commonly accepted information security controls.	Approved Standard Market Acceptance

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Information Security Management Systems: Standards provide a set of processes and corresponding security controls to establish a governance, risk, and compliance structure for information security for an organization, an organizational unit, or a set of processes controlled by a single organizational entity.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		This standard is also intended for use in developing industry- and organization-specific information security management guidelines, taking into consideration their specific information security risk environments(s).	
<a href="#">27031:2011</a>	ISO/IEC	guidelines for ICT readiness for business continuity	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC TR 27019:2013</a>	ISO/IEC	information security management guidelines based on ISO/IEC 27002 for process control systems specific to the energy industry	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Y.4408 2015</a>	ITU	<p>This Recommendation specifies the capability framework for support of the requirements of e-health monitoring (EHM) services [ITU-T Y.2065].</p> <p>The scope of this Recommendation includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– EHM conceptual framework</li> <li>– EHM capability framework</li> </ul> <p>An overview of the EHM capabilities in the various EHM components is provided in Annex A. Two EHM service deployment technical scenarios are described in Appendix I.</p> <p>Former ITU-T Y.2075 renumbered as ITU-T Y.4408 on 2016-02-05 without further modification and without being republished.</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">J3061</a>	SAE International	<p>Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems</p> <p>Both provides and describes a cybersecurity process framework from which an organization can develop an internal cybersecurity process to design and build cybersecurity in to vehicle systems.</p>	Under Development

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Table 12 – IT System Security Evaluation Standards

IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">TR 80001-2-2 2012</a>	AAMI IEC	Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices -- Part 2-2: Guidance for the communication of medical device security needs, risks and controls	Approved Standard
<a href="#">80001-1:2010</a>	AAMI IEC	Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices -- Part 1: Roles, responsibilities and activities	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Common Criteria</a> April 2017	<b>Common Criteria</b>	<p>What is Common Criteria? Provides a common set of requirements for the security functionality of IT products and for assurance measures applied to these IT products during a security evaluation.</p> <p>Definitions: Target of Evaluation (TOE): a set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by user and administrator guidance documentation.</p> <p>TOE Security Functionality (TSF): consists of all hardware, software and firmware of a TOE that is either directly or indirectly relied upon for security enforcements.</p> <p><u>Class FIA: Identification and Authentication:</u> Families in this class address the requirements for functions to establish and verify a claimed user identity.</p> <p>Authentication Failures: this family contains requirements for defining values for some number of unsuccessful authentication attempts and TSF actions in cases of authentication attempt failures.</p>	Approved Standard  Guidance Available

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**IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>User Attribute Definition: this family defines the requirements for associating user security attributes with users as needed to support the TSF in making security decisions.</p> <p>Specification of Secrets: this family defines requirements for mechanisms that enforce defined quality metrics on provided secrets and generate secrets to satisfy the defined metric.</p> <p>User Authentication: this family defines the types of user authentication mechanisms supported by the TSF.</p> <p>User Identification: defines the conditions under which users shall be required to identify themselves before performing any other actions that are to be mediated by the TSF and which require user identification. <i>Page 87, Section 12</i></p> <p><u>Class FCS: Cryptographic Support:</u> The TSF (TOE Security Functionality) may employ cryptographic functionality to help satisfy several high-level security objectives. These include (but are not limited to): identification and authentication, non-repudiation, trusted path, trusted channel, and data separation. This class is composed of two families: FCS_CKM and FCS_COP.</p> <p>Cryptographic Key Management (FCS_CKM): intended to support the lifecycle of cryptographic keys and defines requirements for: cryptographic key generation, cryptographic key distribution, cryptographic key access and cryptographic key destruction.</p>	

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IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>Cryptographic Operation (FCS_COP): concerned with the operational use of those cryptographic keys. Typical cryptographic operations include data encryption and/or decryption, digital signature generation and/or verification, cryptographic checksum generation for integrity and/or verification of checksum, secure hash (message digest), cryptographic key encryption and/or decryption, and cryptographic key agreement.</p> <p><i>Page 48, Section 10</i></p>	
<p><a href="#">DTSec Standard Version 1.0</a> May 23, 2016</p>	DTS	<p>Diabetes Technology Society (DTS)</p> <p>Following the general framework of establishing security standards for information and electronic systems (ISO/IEC 15408), the DTSec program calls for the specification of security requirements for wireless diabetes devices. These requirements have the following objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To establish the general requirements for connected devices that meet the balanced needs for security and clinical application.</li> <li>• To identify possible and potential threats related to the various components and interfaces of the connected devices, such as network, storage, software, connected peer devices, and cryptography.</li> <li>• To define a set of generalized requirements that apply to families of similar devices</li> <li>• To define a set of specific mandatory requirements, derived from the generalized requirements, corresponding to specific connected-diabetes device products and components.</li> <li>• To outline additional optional functional requirements for manufacturers to consider adding to their toolbox for future development.</li> </ul>	Approved Standard

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IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p><u>Identification of assets, threats and vulnerabilities:</u> DTSec leverages ISO 15408 to help developers identify and document, using the ISO 15408 standardized framework, the threats applicable to medical device products and components.</p> <p>The DTSec assurance-through-evaluation program helps developers identify vulnerabilities by augmenting the developer secure development lifecycle with independent vulnerability assessment by qualified cybersecurity test labs.</p> <p><u>Assessment of the impact of threats and vulnerabilities on the device functionality and end user/patients:</u> DTSec helps to assess the impact of threats and vulnerabilities on device functionality and end users/patients by requiring developers to consider relevant threats and how they might impact safe clinical use.</p> <p>DTSec also helps assess the impact of vulnerabilities discovered during the security evaluation program</p> <p>DTSec also helps stakeholders balance the need for security with essential clinical performance.</p> <p><u>Assessment of the likelihood of a threat and of a vulnerability being exploited:</u> DTSec helps to assess the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited. As part of the vulnerability assessment requirement included in the Protection Profiles and Security Targets, the security evaluator will attempt to understand not only whether a vulnerability is exploitable but also what level of attack potential is required to exploit.</p>	

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IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p><u>Determination of risk levels and suitable mitigation strategies:</u> DTSec helps to determine suitable mitigation strategies; as part of the protection profile and Security Target authoring process, the DWG, evaluators, and developers work together to ensure that the security threats while balancing overall safe clinical use.</p> <p><u>Assessment of residual risk and risk acceptance criteria:</u> The is a central focus of the DTSec assurance program. During a security evaluation, the evaluator must determine whether residual risk are acceptable relative to the assurance requirements specified in the Security Target.</p> <p><i>Page 6, Sections 1 to 5</i></p>	
<p><a href="#">HITRUST CSF v9</a> 10 September 2017</p>	<p><b>HITRUST Alliance</b></p>	<p><u>Information Security Policy</u> Objective: To provide management direction in line with business objectives and relevant laws and regulations, demonstrate support for, and commitment to information security through the issue and maintenance of information security policies across the organization. Specification: The Information Security policy documents shall be supported by a strategic plan and a security program with well-defined roles and responsibilities for leadership and officer roles.</p> <p><u>Security Requirements of Information Systems:</u> Objective: To ensure that security is an integral part of information systems Specification: Statements of business requirements for new information systems, or enhancements to existing information systems shall specify the requirements for security controls</p>	<p>Approved Standard Under Revision Guidance Available</p>

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IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>Implementation: The organization shall develop, disseminate and review/update annually:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A formal, documented system and information integrity policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities and compliance</li> <li>• Formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information integrity policy and associated system and information integrity controls</li> </ul> <p><i>Page 160, Category 4</i></p>	
<p><a href="#">RFC 7400</a> 6LoWPAN-GHC November 2014</p>	IETF	<p><u>Security Considerations:</u> As usual in protocols with packet parsing/construction, care must be taken in implementations to avoid buffers overflows and out-of-area references during decompression.</p> <p>In a 6LoWPAN stack, sensitive information will normally be protected by transport- or application-layer (or even IP-layer) security, which are all above the adaptation layer, leaving no sensitive information to compress at the GHC level. However, a 6LoWPAN deployment that entirely depends on Media Access Control (MAC) layer security may be vulnerable to attacks that exploit redundancy information disclosed by compression to recover information about secret values. This attack is fully mitigated by not exposing secret values to the adaptation layer or by not using GHC in deployments where this is done.</p> <p><i>Page 10, Section 5</i></p>	Proposed Standard
<p><a href="#">RFC 7959</a> August 2016</p>	IETF	<p>Block-Wise Transfer in Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)</p> <p><u>Security Considerations:</u> Where access to a resource is only granted to clients making use of specific security associations, all blocks of that resource must be subject to the same security</p>	Approved Standard

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IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>checks; it must not be possible for unprotected exchanges to influence blocks of an otherwise protected resource.</p> <p><u>Mitigating Resource Exhaustion Attacks:</u> Wherever possible, servers should minimize the opportunities to create state for untrusted sources by using stateless approaches.</p> <p><u>Mitigating Amplification Attacks:</u> A CoAP server can reduce the amount of amplification it provides to an attacker by offering large resource representations only in relatively small blocks.</p> <p><i>Page 33, Section 7</i></p>	
<p><a href="#">IoT SSM</a> April 9, 2018</p>	IIC	<p>IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended Use</p> <p>the IoT Security Maturity Model (SMM) defines levels of security maturity for a company to achieve based on its security goals and objectives as well as its appetite for risk.</p> <p>A second document “IoT Security Maturity Model: Practitioners Guide” will provide the details on the SMM and will be published soon.</p>	Approved Standard
<p><a href="#">15408-1:2009</a></p>	ISO/IEC	<p>general concepts and principles of IT security evaluation</p> <p>This standard can be freely <a href="#">downloaded</a>.</p>	Approved Standard Conformity Assessment
<p><a href="#">15408-2:2008</a></p>	ISO/IEC	<p>defines the content and presentation of the security functional requirements to be assessed in a security evaluation</p>	Approved Standard

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IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		This standard can be freely <a href="#">downloaded</a> .	Conformity Assessment
<a href="#">15408-3:2008</a>	ISO/IEC	defines the assurance requirements of the evaluation criteria This standard can be freely <a href="#">downloaded</a> .	Approved Standard Conformity Assessment
<a href="#">17825:2016</a>	ISO/IEC	specifies the non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics for determining conformance to the requirements specified in ISO/IEC 19790 for Security Levels 3 and 4	Approved Standard
<a href="#">18367:2016</a>	ISO/IEC	guidelines for cryptographic algorithms and security mechanisms conformance testing methods	Approved Standard
<a href="#">19790:2012</a>	ISO/IEC	specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems	Approved Standard Testing Conformity Assessment Market Acceptance
<a href="#">20243-1:2018</a>	ISO/IEC	a set of guidelines, requirements, and recommendations that address specific threats to the integrity of hardware and software COTS ICT products throughout the product life cycle  this release of the Standard addresses threats related to maliciously tainted and counterfeit products	Approved Standard Conformity Assessment

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IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		This standard can be freely <a href="#">downloaded</a> .	
20243-2:2018	ISO/IEC	specifies the procedures to be utilized by an assessor when conducting a conformity assessment to the mandatory requirements in the Open Trusted Technology Provider Standard (O-TTPS)  This standard can be freely <a href="#">downloaded</a> .	Approved Standard Conformity Assessment
<a href="#">24759:2017</a>	ISO/IEC	test requirements for cryptographic modules	Approved Standard Testing Conformity Assessment Market Acceptance
PRF 19896-2	ISO/IEC	competence requirements for information security testers and evaluators – Part 2 Knowledge, skills, and effectiveness requirements for ISO/IEC 19790 testers	Under Development
CD 20085-1	ISO/IEC	test tool requirements and test tool calibration methods for use in testing noninvasive attack mitigation techniques in cryptographic modules – Part 1: Test tools and techniques	Under Development
CD 20085-2	ISO/IEC	test tool requirements and test tool calibration methods for use in testing noninvasive attack mitigation techniques in cryptographic modules – Part 2: Test calibration methods and apparatus	Under Development
<a href="#">19896-1:2018</a>	ISO/IEC	competence requirements for information security testers and evaluators – Part 1 Introduction, concepts and general requirements	Approved Standard

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IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">TR 30104:2015</a>	ISO/IEC	guidance on physical security attacks, mitigation techniques and security requirements	Approved Standard
<a href="#">F.748.1</a>	ITU	Describes the requirements and common characteristics of the Internet of things (IoT) identifier for the IoT service.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">2900-1</a> <a href="#">2900-2-2</a>  Feb 2016	UL	UL 2900 outlines offer testable cybersecurity criteria for network-connectable products and systems to assess software vulnerabilities and weaknesses, minimize exploitation, address known malware, review security controls and increase security awareness.  <u>Access Control, User Authentication and User Authorization:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Product operation or management services which may affect or alter the security of the product shall require user authentication prior to access</li> <li>• User authentication services to the product shall implement a session time-out or other appropriate mechanism to prevent perpetual authorization</li> <li>• Services that are accessible over a remote interface shall require user authentication prior to access</li> <li>• Services that are accessible over a remote interface shall require user authentication prior to access.</li> <li>• Once a user is authenticated and granted remote access to the product, the product shall reject and record any attempt to setup another remote connection using the same user identity.</li> <li>• The storage of the authentication credential on the product shall not be in plaintext and shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure or modification</li> </ul> <i>Doc 1, Page 8, Section 8 &amp; Doc 2, Page 6, Section 8</i>	Approved Standard Guidance Available

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**IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p><u>Risk Management:</u> When designing the product, the vendor shall establish and document a security risk analysis for the product, containing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An identification of all product functionalities and all data stored, processed or used by the product</li> <li>• A list of all threats for the product, its functionalities and data</li> <li>• An assessment of the impact of each identified threat, should it become a reality</li> <li>• An assessment of the likelihood of each identified threat</li> <li>• A determination of the resulting risk level of each threat, considering its impact and likelihood</li> <li>• Risk acceptance criteria, i.e., clear criteria to determine whether or not a given risk level is acceptable.</li> <li>• A determination of suitable risk controls to mitigate each threat with an unacceptable risk level</li> <li>• An assessment of the residual risk level for each threat after application of these risk controls.</li> <li>• The vendor shall document a risk evaluation method for the possible presence of known (types of) vulnerabilities in the product</li> <li>• If the vendor has allowed for the presence of any known vulnerabilities in the product, the vendor’s security risk analysis for the product shall contain a description of each accepted known vulnerability.</li> </ul> <p><i>Doc 1, Page 12, Section 12</i></p> <p><u>Cryptography:</u> Symmetric Algorithms: Block and Stream Ciphers</p>	

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IT System Security Evaluation: Standards that are used to provide: security assessment of operational systems; security requirements for cryptographic modules; security tests for cryptographic modules; automated security checklists; and security metrics.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>Asymmetric Algorithms and Techniques:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integer Factorization Based Mechanisms (ISO/IEC 9796-2)</li> <li>• Discrete Logarithm Based Mechanisms (ISO/IEC 9796-3)</li> <li>• Digital Signatures with Appendix (ISO/IEC 14888 all parts)</li> <li>• Cryptographic Techniques Based on Elliptic Curves (ISO/IEC 15946 all parts)</li> <li>• Encryption Algorithms – Asymmetric Ciphers (ISO/IEC 18033-2)</li> </ul> <p>Message authentication codes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Message Authentication Codes (MACs) (ISO/IEC 9797-2)</li> <li>• Hash Functions (ISO/IEC 10118-2/10118-3/10118-4)</li> </ul> <p>Authentication Encryption: Authenticated Encryption (ISO/IEC 19772 all parts)</p> <p><i>Page 8, Section 10</i></p>	

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Table 13 – Network Security Standards

Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">3GPP 5G</a>	3GPP	5th generation mobile networks/wireless systems	Under Development
<a href="#">GPRS</a>	3GPP	Link layer/Physical Layer General Packet Radio Service	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Long-Term Evolution (LTE)</a>	3GPP	standard for high-speed wireless communication for mobile phones and data terminals	Approved Standard Market Acceptance
<a href="#">80001-2-3 2012</a>	AAMI IEC	Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices — Part 2-3: Guidance for wireless networks Offers practical techniques to address the unique risk management requirements of operating wirelessly enabled medical devices in a safe, secure and effective manner.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">LIS09-A 2003</a>	CLSI	Standard Guide for Coordination of Clinical Laboratory Services Within the Electronic Health Record Environment and Networked Architectures, LIS9AE	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Security Guidance for Early Adopters of IoT - 2015</a>	CSA	security guidance for the secure implementation of IoT-based systems	Approved Standard

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">Protocol Specification v1.1</a> 24 January 2017	<b>DASH7 Alliance</b>	Wireless Sensor and Actuator Network Protocol	Approved Standard Market Acceptance
<a href="#">Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices</a>	<b>FDA</b>	security guidance for medical devices that contain software	Approved Standard
<a href="#">CLP.14 v1.1</a>	<b>GSMA</b>	<p>The GSMA IoT Security Guidelines are backed by an IoT Security Assessment scheme that enables companies to build secure IoT devices and solutions.</p> <p><u>Network Security Principles:</u> The most fundamental security mechanisms provided by a communication network are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification and authentication of the entities involved in the IoT Service</li> <li>• Access control to the different entities that need to be connected to create the IoT Service</li> <li>• Data protection in order to guarantee the security (confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity) and privacy of the information carried by the network for the IoT Service.</li> </ul> <p>Processes and mechanisms to guarantee availability of network resources and protect them against attack <i>Page 11, Section 3</i></p>	Guidance Available

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">62591:2016</a>	IEC	Wireless Highway Addressable Remote Transducer Protocol (HART); industrial wireless sensor networks)	Approved Standard
<a href="#">1609</a>	IEEE	Link layer/Physical Layer  The IEEE 1609 Family of Standards for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) define an architecture and a complementary, standardized set of services and interfaces that collectively enable secure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) wireless communications.  See <a href="#">Existing Standards Created by this Working Group</a> .	Approved Standards
<a href="#">2600.1-2009</a>	IEEE	a protection profile in operational Environment A	Approved Standard  Conformity Assessment
<a href="#">2600.2-2009</a>	IEEE	a protection profile for hardcopy devices operational Environment B	Approved Standard  Conformity Assessment
<a href="#">2600.3-2009</a>	IEEE	a protection profile for hardcopy devices in operational Environment C	Approved Standard

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
			Conformity Assessment
<a href="#">2600.4-2010</a>	IEEE	a profile for hardcopy devices operational Environment D	Approved Standard Conformity Assessment
<a href="#">2600-2008</a>	IEEE	hardcopy device and system security	Approved Standard
<a href="#">802.11-2016</a>	IEEE	(Wi-Fi™) Link Layer/Physical Layer  <u>Overview of the services:</u> There are many services specified by IEEE Std 802.11. Six of the services are used to support medium access control (MAC) service data unit (MSDU) delivery between STAs. Three of the services are used to control IEEE 802.11 LAN access and confidentiality. Two of the services are used to provide spectrum management One of the services provides support for LAN applications with QoS requirements. Another of the services provides support for higher layer timer synchronization. One of the services is used for radio measurement. <i>Page 217 Section 4.5</i>	Approved Standard Market Acceptance
<a href="#">802.11ah-2016</a>	IEEE	Link Layer/Physical Layer	Approved Standard

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		uses sub-1 GHz license-exempt bands; provide extended range Wi-Fi™ networks, compared to conventional Wi-Fi™ networks operating in the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands.	Market Acceptance
<a href="#">802.11ai-2016</a>	IEEE	Link Layer/Physical Layer This amendment defines mechanisms that provide IEEE 802.11 networks with fast initial link setup methods that do not degrade the security offered by Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) already defined in IEEE 802.11.	Approved Standard Market Acceptance
<a href="#">802.15.4-2015</a>	IEEE	Link Layer/Physical Layer Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs)  <u>Security Overview:</u> The MAC sublayer is responsible for providing security services on specified incoming and outgoing frames when requested to do so by the higher layers. This standard supports the following security services: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data confidentiality</li> <li>• Data authenticity</li> <li>• Replay protection (when not using TSCH mode)</li> </ul>	Approved Standard Market Acceptance
<a href="#">802.15.6-2012</a>	IEEE	Link Layer/Physical Layer Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN)	Approved Standard Market Acceptance

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**Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p><u>Security Services</u>: the security association protocols shall be based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange employing the elliptic curve public key cryptography.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Master key pre-shared association – a node and a hub shall each have a secret pre-shared MK prior to running the MK pre-shared association protocol to activate their pre-shared MK as their shared MK for their creation.</li> <li>• Unauthenticated association – a node and a hub shall each require no authentication credentials such as a shared secret or human intervention prior to running the unauthenticated association protocol to generate their shared MK for their Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) creation.</li> <li>• Public key hidden association – a node and a hub shall have a secured, secret transfer of the node’s public key to the hub, typically through an out-of-band channel, prior to running the public key hidden association protocol to generate their shared MK for their PTK creation.</li> <li>• Password authenticated association – a node and a hub shall each have a secret shared password prior to running the password authenticated association protocol to generate their shared MK for their PTK creation.</li> <li>• Display authenticated association – a node and a hub shall each have a display of a 5-digit decimal number prior to running the display authenticated association protocol to generate their shared MK for their PTK creation.</li> </ul>	
<p><a href="#">802.15.7-2011</a></p>	<p><b>IEEE</b></p>	<p>Link Layer/Physical Layer IEEE standard for local and metropolitan area networks – part 15.7: Short-range wireless optical communication visible light, 2011. The purpose of this standard is to provide a global standard for short-range optical wireless communication using visible light. The standard provides</p> <p>(i) access to several hundred THz of unlicensed spectrum;</p>	<p>Approved Standard</p>

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(ii) immunity to electromagnetic interference and noninterference with Radio Frequency (RF) systems;</li> <li>(iii) additional security by allowing the user to see the communication channel; and</li> <li>(iv) Communication augmenting and complementing existing services (such as illumination, display, indication, decoration, etc.) from visible-light infrastructures.</li> </ul>	
<a href="#">6LoWPAN</a>	<b>IETF</b>	<p>(IPv6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area Networks)</p> <p>A set of standards defined by the IETF and based on IEEE 802.15.4. The base standard is IETF RFC4944.</p> <p>6LoWPan standards enable the efficient use of IPv6 over low-power, low-rate wireless networks on simple embedded devices through an adaptation layer and the optimization of related protocols.</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">draft-ietf-tls-tls13-22</a>	<b>IETF</b>	<p>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</p> <p>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 Specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</p> <p>Will replace <a href="#">RFC 5246</a> August 2008.</p>	Under Development
<a href="#">RFC 2460-1998</a>	<b>IETF</b>	Network Layer core specification that enhancements IPv4.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">RFC 5246</a> August 2008	<b>IETF</b>	The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2	Approved Standard

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>Specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery.</p> <p>Will be obsoleted by <a href="#">draft-ietf-tls-tls13-22</a>.</p>	
<p><a href="#">RFC 6347</a> January 2012</p>	IETF	<p>Specifies version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol.</p> <p><u>Security Considerations:</u> The primary additional security considerations raised by DTLS is that of denial of service. DTLS includes a cookie exchange designed to protect against denial of service. However, implementation which do not use this cookie exchange are still vulnerable to DoS. In particular, DTLS servers which do not use this cookie exchange may be used as attack amplifiers even if they themselves are not experiencing DoS. Therefore, DTLS servers should use the cookie exchange unless there is good reason to believe that amplification is not a threat in their environment. Clients must be prepared to do a cookie exchange with every handshake.</p>	<p>Approved Standard Guidance Available Commercial Availability Market Acceptance</p>
<p><a href="#">RFC 7252</a> June 2014</p>	IETF	<p>Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) CoAP is a specialized web transfer protocol for use with constrained nodes and constrained networks in the Internet of Things. The protocol is designed for machine-to-machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy and building automation.</p> <p><u>Parsing the Protocol and Processing URIs:</u> CoAP attempts to narrow the opportunities for introducing network-facing application vulnerabilities by: reducing parser complexity, giving the entire range of encodable values a meaning where possible, and by aggressively reducing</p>	<p>Approved Standard Guidance Available Commercial Availability</p>

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Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>complexity that is often cause by unnecessary choice between multiple representations that mean the same thing.</p> <p><u>Risk of Amplification:</u> An attacker might use CoAP nodes to turn a small attack packet into a larger attack packet, an approach known as amplification. There is therefore a danger that CoAP nodes could become implicated in denial-of-service attacks by using the amplifying properties of the protocol. As a mitigating factor, many constrained networks will only be able to generate a small amount of traffic, which may make CoAP nodes less attractive for this attack. Therefore, large amplification factors should not be provided in the response if the request is not authenticated.</p> <p><u>IP Address Spoofing Attacks:</u> Due to the lack of handshake in UDP, a rogue endpoint that is free to read and write messages carried by the constrained network may easily attack a single endpoint, a group of endpoints, as well as a whole network. Response spoofing by off-path attackers can be detected and mitigated even without transport later security by choosing a nontrivial, randomized token in the request.</p> <p><i>Page 80, Section 11</i></p> <p><b>Note:</b> Like Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), CoAP does not provide these services but rather recommends another standard D-TLS.</p> <p><u>Securing CoAP:</u> The device will be in one of the four security modes:                  NoSec: There is no protocol-level security (DTLS is disabled)                  PreSharedKey: DTLS is enabled, there is a list of pre-shared keys, and each key includes a list of which nodes it can be used to communicate with.</p>	

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>RawPublicKey: DTLS is enabled and the device has an asymmetric key pair without a certificate (a raw public key) that is validated using an out-of-band mechanism.</p> <p>Certificate: DTLS is enabled and the device has an asymmetric key pair with an X.509 certificate that binds it to its subject and is signed by some common trust root.</p> <p><i>Page 71, Section 9.1.3.1</i></p>	
<p><a href="#">State of the Art and Challenges for the Internet of Things draft-irtf-t2trg-iot-secons-02</a></p> <p>March 31, 2017</p>	IETF	<p><u>Network Security:</u></p> <p>SecProf_1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Network key creating an industry security domain at L2 ensuring authentication and freshness of exchanged data</li> <li>• Inter-domain authentication/secure handoff</li> <li>• Secure routing needed at L3</li> <li>• Secure multicast requires origin authentication</li> <li>• 6LBR (HTTP-CoAP proxy) requires verification of forwarded messages and messages leaving or entering the 6LoWPAN/CoAP network.</li> </ul> <p>Sec_Prof_3:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Network key creating an industry security domain at L2 ensuring authentication and freshness of exchanged data</li> <li>• Secure routing needed (integrity &amp; availability) at L3 within 6LoWPAN/CoAP</li> <li>• Secure multicast requires origin authentication</li> </ul> <p>SecProf_4:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Network key creating an industry security domain at L2 ensuring authentication and freshness of exchanged data</li> <li>• Inter-domain authentication/secure handoff</li> </ul>	Under Development

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**Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Secure routing needed at L3</li> <li>• Secure multicast requires origin authentication</li> <li>• 6LBR (HTTP-CoAP proxy) requires verification of forwarded messages and messages leaving or entering the 6LoWPAN/CoAP network.</li> </ul> <p><i>Page 31 Section 6.5</i></p>	
<a href="#">19079:2016</a>	ISO	<p>Intelligent transport systems -- Communications access for land mobiles (CALM) -- 6LoWPAN networking</p> <p>6LoWPAN/IPv6 Security module: Communication security must ensure confidentiality, integrity and authentication between two peers interconnected through the Internet. The IT-S security module shall carry out the following actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communicates with the security entity through the SN-SAP interface</li> <li>• Communicates with other modules in the IoT MSE functional block</li> <li>• Enables the security protocols for the required security services</li> <li>• Reports available 6LoWPAN security capabilities to the security entity through the SN-SAP</li> </ul>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">18000-3:2010</a>	ISO/IEC	<p>Radio frequency identification for item management -- Part 3: Parameters for air interface communications at 13,56 MHz</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides a framework to define common communications protocols for internationally useable frequencies for radio frequency identification (RFID), and, where possible, to determine the use of the same protocols for all frequencies such that the problems of migrating from one to another are diminished.</li> </ul>	Approved Standard

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minimize software and implementation costs.</li> <li>Enables system management and control and information exchange to be common as far as is possible.</li> </ul>	
<a href="#">X.1362</a>	ITU	<p>Recommendation ITU-T X.1362 : Simple encryption procedure for Internet of things (IoT) environments</p> <p>Specifies encryption with associated mask data (EAMD) for the Internet of things devices. It describes EAMD and how it provides a set of security services for traffic using EADM.</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">LoRaWAN</a>	LoRa Alliance	<p>Link layer/Physical Layer</p> <p>LoRaWAN is a wireless protocol for IoT applications that is available in integrated circuits. The protocol specification is built on top of the LoRa technology developed by the LoRa Alliance. It uses unlicensed radio spectrum in the Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) bands to enable low power, wide area, bi-directionally secure communication between remote sensors and gateways connected to the network.</p>	Approved Standard Market Acceptance
<a href="#">MQTT Link</a> Dec 2015	MQTT	<p>MQTT is a machine-to-machine (M2M)/” Internet of Things” connectivity protocol.</p> <p><b>Note: References to other protocols.</b></p> <p><u>Authentication of Clients by the Server:</u> Implementations can choose how to make use of the content of these fields. They may provide their own authentication mechanism, use an external authentication such as LDAP or OAuth tokens, or leverage operating system authentication mechanisms.</p>	Guidance Available Approved Standard

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**Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>When TLS is used: SSL Certificates sent from the Client can be used by the Server to authenticate the Client.</p> <p>When VPN is used: between the Clients and Servers, VPN can provide confidence that data is only being received from authorized Clients.</p> <p><u>Authentication of the Server by the Client:</u> The MQTT protocol is not trust symmetrical; it provides no mechanism for the Client to authenticate the Server,</p> <p>When TLS is used: SSL Certificates sent from the Server can be used by the Client to authenticate the Server.</p> <p>When VPN is used: between Clients and Servers, VPN can provide confidence that Clients are connecting to the intended Server.</p> <p><i>Page 61, Sections 5.4.1 &amp; 5.4.3</i></p> <p><b>Note: MQTT does not provide any of these services. The standard recommends that other standards be applied, e.g., TLS.</b></p> <p><u>Integrity of Application Messages and Control Packets:</u>  <u>Application Messages:</u> applications can independently include hash values in the messages. This can provide integrity of the contents of Publish Control Packets across the network and at rest.</p> <p>When TLS is used: provides hash algorithms to verify the integrity of data sent over the network.</p>	

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>When VPN is used: VPNs connecting Clients and Servers can provide integrity of data across the section of the network covered by a VPN.</p> <p><u>Privacy of Application Messages and Control Packets:</u> Application Messages: an application might independently encrypt the contents of its messages. This could provide privacy of the Application Message both over the network and at rest.</p> <p>When TLS is used: can provide encryption of data sent over the network.</p> <p>When VPN is used: to connect Clients and Servers, VPNs can provide privacy of data across the section of the network covered by a VPN.</p> <p><u>Non-repudiation of message transmission:</u> Application designers might need to consider appropriate strategies to achieve to end non-repudiation.</p> <p><i>Page 62 Section 5.4.4, 5.4.5. &amp; 5.4.6</i></p>	
<p><a href="#">OCF 2.0</a> June 21, 2018</p>	<p><b>OCF</b></p>	<p>OCF SPECIFICATION 2.0</p> <p>Specifies the OCF core architecture, core features, and protocols to enable OCF profiles implementation for Internet of Things (IoT) usages and ecosystems.</p> <p>The Open Interconnect Consortium (OIC) has been re-launched in early 2016 as the Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF)</p>	<p>Approved Standard Guidance Available Reference Implementation</p>

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">OMA Device Management Security – May 2016</a>	OMA	<p>Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) specifies protocols and mechanisms to achieve the management of mobile devices, services access and software on connected devices for mobile networks and the Internet of Things (IoT).</p> <p>describes requirements in general; provides description of transport layer security</p> <p>application layer security, etc.; and describes security mechanisms for integrity, confidentiality and authentication</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">OMA M2M</a>	OMA	<p>Lightweight Machine to Machine Technical Specification Approved Version 1.0 – 08 Feb 2017</p> <p>OMA’s LightweightM2M is a device management protocol designed for sensor networks and the demands of a machine-to-machine (M2M) environment.</p> <p><u>DTLS</u>: CoAP is secured using the DTLS protocol which is based on TLS. DTLS is a communication security solution for datagram based protocols (such as UDP). It provides a secure handshake with session key generation, mutual authentication, data integrity and confidentiality. <i>Page 58, Section 7.1.2</i></p>	Approved Standard  Guidance Available
<a href="#">OpenFog RA</a>	OpenFog Consortium	<p>What is Fog? A system-level horizontal architecture that distributes resources and services of computing, storage, control and networking anywhere along the continuum from Cloud to Things.</p> <p>Network Based Security Threats and Mitigation:</p>	Guidance Available (has a few use cases)

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>The fog node needs to be protected from various network-based security threats, which may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Denial of Service attacks</li> <li>• Intrusion</li> <li>• DNS spoofing</li> <li>• ARP spoofing or poisoning</li> <li>• Buffer overflows</li> </ul> <p><i>Page 64, Section 5.5.1.4</i></p>	
<a href="#">OSDP v2.1.7</a>	<b>SIA</b>	<p>Open Supervised Device Protocol (OSDP)</p> <p>An access control communications standard developed by the Security Industry Association (SIA) to improve interoperability among access control and security products.</p>	<p>Approved Standard Technically Stable Guidance Available Reference Implementation Conformity Assessment Commercial Availability Market Acceptance</p>

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**Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<p>Doc 1: <a href="#">RFC 4919</a> August 2007</p> <p>Doc 2: <a href="#">Thread Specs</a> Feb 13 2017</p>	<p><b>Thread Group</b></p>	<p>What is Thread? Securely and reliably connects products around the home using a robust mesh network and an open IPv6 based protocol.</p> <p><u>TLS:</u> A TLS (Transport Layer Security) handshake is used for EC-JPAKE, which can be used in both TLS and DTLS. <i>Doc 2, Page 28, Section 1.3.3.1</i></p> <p><u>6LoWPAN:</u> IPv6 over LoWPAN (6LoWPAN) applications often require confidentiality and integrity protection. This can be provided at the application, transport, network, and/or at the link layer (i.e., within the 6LoWPAN set of specifications).</p> <p><u>IEEE 802.15.4:</u> Link layer security is used because most IEEE 802.15.4 devices already have support for AES link-layer security. ECB, CBC, OFB, and CFB provide only confidentiality for encrypting longer messages, CCM* mode is designed to ensure both confidentiality and message integrity. <i>Doc 1, Page 9, Section 6</i></p>	<p>Approved Standards</p> <p>Guidance Available</p> <p>Commercial Availability</p> <p>Conformity Assessment</p> <p>Market Acceptance</p>
<p><a href="#">TIA/EIA-95-B</a> (March 1999)</p>	<p><b>TIA/EIA</b></p>	<p>code division multiple access modulation for digital radio voice and data</p>	<p>Approved Standard</p>

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**Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<p><a href="#">XMPP</a></p>	<p><b>XSF</b></p>	<p><b>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)</b></p> <p>XMPP Standards Foundation</p> <p>XMPP is designed for real-time instantaneous messaging applications and uses a federated network of XMPP servers as message brokers to allow communication between clients. Servers provide each client with an authenticated identity and clients are authenticated by the servers when they connect.</p> <p>The XMPP Standards Foundation (XSF) publishes a set of extensions which are openly reviewed and discussed within the forum and free for anybody to use. These extensions are called XMPP Extension Protocols (XEPS). There are several XEPs to support XMPP’s role in IoT, e.g., XMPP-IoT.</p> <p>The core specifications for XMPP are developed at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) - see <a href="#">RFC 6120</a>, <a href="#">RFC 6121</a>, and <a href="#">RFC 7622</a> (along with a WebSocket binding defined in <a href="#">RFC 7395</a>).</p> <p><a href="#">ISO/IEC/IEEE P21451-1-4 XMPP INFC WG</a> is the IEEE initiative tying the XMPP-IoT initiative into the IEEE standards structure.</p>	<p>Approved Standards</p> <p>Guidance Available</p> <p>Under Development</p>
<p><a href="#">ZigBee Pro Link</a> March 2014</p>	<p><b>Zigbee Alliance</b></p>	<p><u>ZigBee Pro:</u> Security Architecture: the ZigBee security architecture includes security mechanisms at two layers of the protocol stack. The NWK and APS layers are responsible for the secure transport of their respective frames. Furthermore, the APS sublayer provides services for the establishment and</p>	<p>Approved Standard Guidance Available</p>

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">ZigBee IP Link</a>		<p>maintenance of security relationships. The ZigBee Device Object (ZDO) manages the security policies and the security configuration of a device. <i>Page 401, Section 4.2.1.4</i></p> <p><u>ZigBee IP:</u> ZigBee IP offers extensive security features, including PANA/EAP based network authentication and admission control, network re-keying, AES-128-CCM based layer 2 encryption, and TLS application layer authentication and encryption.</p> <p>ZigBee IP is the first open standards-based IPv6 specification for wireless sensor networks. The ZigBee alliance made a significant investment to bring IPv6 network protocols to IEEE 802.15.4 wireless mesh networks.</p> <p>The ZigBee IP specification offers a scalable architecture with end-to-end IPv6 networking based on standard Internet protocols, such as 6LowPAN, IPv6, PANA, RPL, TCP, TLS and UDP to a create cost-effective and energy-efficient wireless mesh network.</p> <p>The ZigBee specification enhances the IEEE 802.15.4 standard by adding network and security layers and an application framework. From this foundation, Alliance developed standards can be used to create a multi-vendor interoperable solutions.</p>	Commercial Availability Market Acceptance
<a href="#">ZigBee Application Standards Link</a>	<b>Zigbee Alliance</b>	<p>What is ZigBee? A specification for a suite of high-level communication protocols used to create personal area networks built from small, low-power digital radios</p>	Guidance Available Approved Standard

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p><u>Building Automation:</u> Secures Building Automation networks by the use of AES 128 encryption, keys, and device authentication. Encryption secures access to critical building management information from eavesdropping.</p> <p><u>Health Care:</u> AES 128 encryption secures personal information. Regional regulatory compliance simplifies implementation.</p> <p><u>Home Automation:</u> Easily add devices to create an integrated smart home security system. Built-in security ensures integrity of smart home.</p> <p><u>Input Light Link:</u> AES 128 encryption used to protect lighting network against unauthorized use. Device authentications secures networks from neighboring networks. Uses selected Zigbee channels to maximize performance and coexistence with other wireless devices in homes. Conformance guaranteed with Zigbee Certified testing conducted by independent test facilities.</p> <p><u>Retail Services:</u> Integrated security. AES 128 encryption secures personal information. Server-driven – no personal data on handheld employee or consumer devices.</p>	Commercial Availability

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Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p><u>Smart Energy:</u> Support for consumer-only, utility-only or shared networks. Automatic, secure network registration using either pre-installed keys or standard public-key cryptography methods. Support for ECC public key infrastructure for authentication and mobility. Data encryption.</p>	
<p><a href="#">Z-Wave Link</a> August 2016</p>	<p><b>Z-Wave</b></p>	<p>What is Z-wave? A wireless communications protocol used primarily for home automation.</p> <p><u>Tier Z-Wave security:</u></p> <p>Z-WaveSec. – Z-Wave Security Command Class v2: Target: nodes exchanging non-personal data By employing the AES128 block cipher technology, Z-Wave is protected against modification, fabrication, and replay attacks. Authentication: 128-bit authentication key with a 64-bit MAC. Confidentiality: encryption with a 128-bit encryption key. Single Network Key, In-band initial symmetrical key exchange</p> <p>Z-WaveSecIP – Hybrid Security Command Class v1 and Security Link Key Extension: Target: nodes exchanging personal data Confidentiality, Authentication, Fabrication robust – AES128 based. Asymmetric key exchange, Network + Link Keys Certifications installed in nodes.</p>	<p>Guidance Available Commercial Availability</p>

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Network Security: Standards that provide security requirements and guidelines on processes and methods for the secure management, operation and use of information, information networks, and their inter-connections.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		Z-WaveSecSmartCard – Prepayment Encapsulation Command Class Target: nodes exchanging payment data Allows Smartcard payment & Security information to be exchanged via Z-Wave  <i>Page 181, Section 7.2.3</i>	

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Table 14 – Physical Security Standards

<b>Physical Security: Standards that provide requirements and guidance to prevent unauthorized personnel, attackers or accidental intruders from physically accessing an area, building, room, computer, etc. Such standards can help to ensure that IoT components are not disabled or replaced with a component that appears to serve the same purpose but is compromised. IoT components may be distributed over a wide area, a remote location or an unattended location where physical access is difficult to restrict.</b>			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">ANSI/ASCE/EWRI 56-10 57-10</a>	ASCE	Guidelines for the Physical Security of Water Utilities (ANSI/ASCE/EWRI 56-10); Guidelines for the Physical Security of Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities (ANSI/ASCE/EWRI 57-10)  Guidelines that apply to the physical security of facilities with potable water source, treatment, and distribution systems, as well as with wastewater collection and treatment systems and stormwater systems.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ANSI/ASIS PAP.1-2012</a>	ASIS International	Security Management Standard: Physical Asset Protection  Presents a comprehensive management approach for the protection of assets by the application of security measures for physical asset protection.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">APTA SS-SIS-RP-013-13 [2013]</a>	APTA	Physical Security for Public Transit  Proposes physical security practices for transit passenger facilities to enhance the security of people, operations, assets and infrastructure.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ASIS FPSM GDL (2009)</a>	ASIS International	Facilities Physical Security Measures Guideline  This guideline assists in the identification of physical security measures that can be applied at facilities to safeguard or protect an organization's assets - people, property, and information.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">IEC 60839-11-1 Ed. 1.0 b:2013</a>	IEC	Alarm and electronic security systems - Part 11-1: Electronic access control systems - System and components requirements	Approved Standard

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<b>Physical Security: Standards that provide requirements and guidance to prevent unauthorized personnel, attackers or accidental intruders from physically accessing an area, building, room, computer, etc. Such standards can help to ensure that IoT components are not disabled or replaced it with a component that appears to serve the same purpose but is compromised. IoT components may be distributed over a wide area, a remote location or an unattended location where physical access is difficult to restrict.</b>			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		Specifies the minimum functionality, performance requirements and test methods for electronic access control systems and components used for physical access (entry and exit) in and around buildings and protected areas.	
<a href="#">IEC 60839-11-32 Ed. 1.0 b:2016</a>	IEC	Alarm and electronic security systems - Part 11-32: Electronic access control systems - Access control monitoring based on Web services  This document applies to physical security only	Approved Standard
<a href="#">IEC/TR 62541-2 Ed. 2.0 en:2016</a>	IEC	OPC unified architecture - Part 2: Security Model  The OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) is a machine to machine communication protocol for industrial automation. Includes descriptions for the security threats of the physical, hardware, and software environments in which OPC UA is expected to run.  Revises IEC/TR 62541-2 Ed. 1.0 en:2010.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">IEEE 1402-2000 (R2008) Revises 1402-2000</a>	IEEE	IEEE Guide for Electric Power Substation Physical and Electronic Security  Security issues related to human intrusion upon electric power supply substations are identified and discussed. Various methods and techniques being used to mitigate human intrusions are listed.  Reaffirmed 10 December 2008.	Approved Standard

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**Physical Security: Standards that provide requirements and guidance to prevent unauthorized personnel, attackers or accidental intruders from physically accessing an area, building, room, computer, etc. Such standards can help to ensure that IoT components are not disabled or replaced it with a component that appears to serve the same purpose but is compromised. IoT components may be distributed over a wide area, a remote location or an unattended location where physical access is difficult to restrict.**

Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">INCITS/ISO/IEC TS 30104:2015 (2017)</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Information Technology - Security Techniques - Physical Security Attacks, Mitigation Techniques and Security Requirements  Physical security mechanisms are described for cryptographic modules where the protection of the modules sensitive security parameters is desired.  Note: INCITS adopted version costs half the ISO/IEC version.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO 16425:2013</a>	<b>ISO</b>	Ships and marine technology. Guidelines for the installation of ship communication networks for shipboard equipment and systems (British Standard)  Includes physical as well as logical security.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC TS 22237-2:2018</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Information technology - Data centre facilities and infrastructures - Part 2: Building construction  Addresses the construction of buildings and other structures which provide accommodation for data centres based upon the criteria and classification for "physical security" within ISO/IEC TS 22237-1.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC TS 22237-3:2018</a>	<b>ISO/IEC</b>	Information technology - Data centre facilities and infrastructures - Part 3: Power distribution  Addresses power supplies to, and power distribution within, data centres based upon the criteria and classifications for "availability", "physical security" and "energy efficiency enablement" within ISO/IEC TS 22237-1.	Approved Standard

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Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">ISO/IEC TS 22237-4:2018</a>	ISO/IEC	Information technology - Data centre facilities and infrastructures - Part 4: Environmental control  Includes requirements and recommendations for physical security of environmental control systems.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC TS 22237-5:2018</a>	ISO/IEC	Information technology - Data centre facilities and infrastructures - Part 5: Telecommunications cabling infrastructure  Includes requirements and recommendations for telecommunications cabling to monitor and control, as appropriate, power distribution, environmental control and physical security of the data centre.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">ISO/IEC TS 22237-6:2018</a>	ISO/IEC	Information technology - Data centre facilities and infrastructures - Part 6: Security systems  Addresses the physical security of data centres based upon the criteria and classifications for "availability", "security" and "energy efficiency enablement" within ISO/IEC TS 22237-1.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">NEMA TS 8-2018</a>	NEMA	Cyber and Physical Security for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)  Provides requirements and guidance for transportation infrastructure owners to implement security of the surface transportation electronic systems.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">OSDP v2.1.7</a>	SIA	Open Supervised Device Protocol (OSDP)  An access control communications standard developed by the Security Industry Association (SIA) to improve interoperability among access control and security products.	Approved Standard Technically Stable

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<b>Physical Security: Standards that provide requirements and guidance to prevent unauthorized personnel, attackers or accidental intruders from physically accessing an area, building, room, computer, etc. Such standards can help to ensure that IoT components are not disabled or replaced it with a component that appears to serve the same purpose but is compromised. IoT components may be distributed over a wide area, a remote location or an unattended location where physical access is difficult to restrict.</b>			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
			Guidance Available Reference Implementation Conformity Assessment Commercial Availability Market Acceptance

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Table 15 – Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Standards

Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM): Standards that describe protocols and data formats that enable the ongoing, automated collection, monitoring, verification, and maintenance of software, system, and network security configurations, and provide greater awareness of vulnerabilities and threats to support organizational risk management decisions.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">Remote Provisioning Architecture for Embedded UICC Technical Specification – 2016</a>	GSMA	provides a technical description of the GSMA’s ‘Remote Provisioning Architecture for Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card’	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Remote Provisioning Architecture for Embedded UICC Test Specification - 2015</a>	GSMA	provides a technical description of the ‘over the air’ remote provisioning mechanism for machine-to-machine devices	Approved Standard
<a href="#">HITRUST CSF v9 10 September 2017</a>	HITRUST Alliance	<p><u>Monitoring:</u> Objective: ensure information security events are monitored and recorded to detect unauthorized information processing activities in compliance with relevant legal requirements.</p> <p><u>Audit Logging:</u> Specification: Audit logs recording user activities, exceptions, and information security events shall be produced and kept for an agreed period to assist in future investigations and access control monitoring. Implementation: audit logs shall include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A unique user identifier</li> <li>• A unique data subject identifier</li> </ul>	Approved Standard Under Revision Guidance Available

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Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM): Standards that describe protocols and data formats that enable the ongoing, automated collection, monitoring, verification, and maintenance of software, system, and network security configurations, and provide greater awareness of vulnerabilities and threats to support organizational risk management decisions.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The function performed by the user</li> <li>The time and date that the function was performed.</li> </ul> <p><u>Monitoring System Use:</u> Specifications: procedures for monitoring use of information processing systems and facilities shall be established to check for use and effectiveness of implemented controls. The results of the monitoring activities shall be reviewed regularly. Implementation: items that shall be monitored include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Authorized access</li> <li>Unauthorized access attempts</li> </ul> <p><u>Administrator and Operator Logs:</u> Specification: System administrator and system operator activities shall be logged and regularly reviewed.</p> <p><u>Clock Synchronization:</u> Specification: The clocks of all relevant information processing systems within the organization or security domain shall be synchronized with an agreed accurate time source to support tracing and reconstitution of activity timelines.</p> <p><i>Page 414, Section 9.10</i></p>	
<a href="#">TR 62443-2-3:2015</a>	IEC	describes requirements for asset owners and industrial automation and control system (IACS) product suppliers that have established and are now maintaining an IACS patch management program	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Definition of the ROLIE</a>	IETF	This document extends the Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE) core to add the information type category and related requirements needed to support Software Record	Under Development

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<b>Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM): Standards that describe protocols and data formats that enable the ongoing, automated collection, monitoring, verification, and maintenance of software, system, and network security configurations, and provide greater awareness of vulnerabilities and threats to support organizational risk management decisions.</b>			
<b>Documents</b>	<b>SDO</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Maturity Level (Table 6)</b>
<a href="#">Software Descriptor Extension</a>		and Software Inventory use cases. The 'software-descriptor' information type is defined as a ROLIE extension. Additional supporting requirements are also defined that describe the use of specific formats and link relations pertaining to the new information type.	
<a href="#">IETF RFC 7632</a>	<b>IETF</b>	Endpoint Security Posture Assessment: Enterprise Use Cases  his memo documents a sampling of use cases for securely aggregating configuration and operational data and evaluating that data to determine an organization's security posture. From these operational use cases, we can derive common functional capabilities and requirements to guide development of vendor-neutral, interoperable standards for aggregating and evaluating data relevant to security posture.	Under Development  Submitted to IESG for Publication
<a href="#">Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Documents</a>	<b>IETF</b>	A set of standards to enable assessment of endpoint posture. A set of standards for interacting with repositories of content related to assessment of endpoint posture. Includes: RFC 7632, Endpoint Security Posture Assessment: Enterprise Use Cases 2015-09 RFC 8248 Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Requirements 2017-09	Under Development  Approved Standard
<a href="#">IIC Industrial Internet of Things, Volume G4: Security Framework - 2016</a>	<b>IIC</b>	security framework identifies and explains how risks associated with security and privacy threats may be identified, evaluated and mitigated using technologies and processes	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Dependability Assurance Framework for Safety-Sensitive Consumer</a>	<b>OMG</b>	Defines a metamodel for representing structured assurance cases. An Assurance Case is a set of auditable claims, arguments, and evidence created to support the claim that a defined system/service will satisfy the particular requirements. An Assurance Case is a document that facilitates information exchange between various system stakeholder such as suppliers and acquirers, and between the operator and regulator, where the knowledge related to the safety and	Approved Standard

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<b>Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM): Standards that describe protocols and data formats that enable the ongoing, automated collection, monitoring, verification, and maintenance of software, system, and network security configurations, and provide greater awareness of vulnerabilities and threats to support organizational risk management decisions.</b>			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">Devices Specification Version 1.0</a> February 2016		security of the system is communicated in a clear and defensible way. Each assurance case should communicate the scope of the system, the operational context, the claims, the safety and/or security arguments, along with the corresponding evidence.	

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Table 16 – Software Assurance Standards

<b>Software Assurance: Standards that describe requirements and guidance for significantly decreasing the likelihood of software having vulnerabilities, either intentionally designed into the software or accidentally inserted at any time during its life cycle, and that the software functions in the intended manner.</b>			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">TIR 80001-2-4 2012</a>	AAMI IEC	Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices -- Part 2-4: General implementation guidance for Healthcare Delivery Organizations	Approved Standard
<a href="#">TIR36:2007</a>	AAMI	Validation of software for regulated processes Applies to any software used to automate device design, testing, component acceptance, manufacturing, labeling, packaging, distribution, and complaint handling or to automate any other aspect of the quality system as defined by the Quality System Regulation (21 CFR 820). In addition, it applies to software used to create, modify, and maintain electronic records and to manage electronic signatures that are subject to the validation requirements (21 CFR 11).	Approved Standard
<a href="#">TIR45:2012</a>	AAMI	Guidance on the use of agile practices in the development of medical device software Provides recommendations for complying with international standards and U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance documents when using agile practices to develop medical device software.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">TIR80001-2-5 2014</a>	AAMI IEC	Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices - Part 2-5: Application guidance - Guidance on distributed alarm systems	Approved Standard
<a href="#">TR 80001-2-6 2014</a>	AAMI ISO	Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices -- Part 2-6: Application guidance -- Guidance for responsibility agreements Provides guidance on implementing RESPONSIBILITY AGREEMENTS, which are described in IEC 80001-1 as used to establish the roles and responsibilities among the stakeholders engaged in the incorporation of a MEDICAL DEVICE into an IT-NETWORK in order to support compliance to IEC 80001-1.	Approved Standard

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<b>Software Assurance: Standards that describe requirements and guidance for significantly decreasing the likelihood of software having vulnerabilities, either intentionally designed into the software or accidentally inserted at any time during its life cycle, and that the software functions in the intended manner.</b>			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">AUTO13</a> February 18, 2003	CLSI	Identifies important factors that designers and laboratory managers should consider when developing new software-driven systems and selecting software user interfaces. Also included are simple rules to help prepare validation protocols for assessing the functionality and dependability of software.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">62304: 2006</a>	IEC	medical device software – software life cycle process, including Software Risk Management Process  This standard defines the life cycle requirements for medical device software. The set of processes, activities, and tasks described in this standard establishes a common framework for medical device software life cycle processes <i>Section 1.1</i>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">82304-1:2016</a>	IEC	the safety and security of health software products designed to operate on general computing platforms and intended to be placed on the market without dedicated hardware  Uses the life cycle of IEC 62304 while giving eases in verification activities. This standard is for health software that runs on general purpose hardware that may be acquired and controlled by the customer	Approved Standard
<a href="#">TR 80002-1:2009</a>	IEC	Guidance on the application of ISO 14971 to medical device software Aimed at risk management practitioners who need to perform risk management when software is included in the medical device/system, and at software engineers who need to understand how to fulfil the requirements for risk management addressed in ISO 14971.	Approved Standard

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<b>Software Assurance: Standards that describe requirements and guidance for significantly decreasing the likelihood of software having vulnerabilities, either intentionally designed into the software or accidentally inserted at any time during its life cycle, and that the software functions in the intended manner.</b>			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">SUIT</a>	IETF	<p>Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT)</p> <p>Vulnerabilities in Internet of Things (IoT) devices have raised the need for a secure firmware update mechanism that is also suitable for constrained devices. Security experts, researchers, and regulators recommend that all IoT devices be equipped with such a mechanism. While there are many proprietary firmware update mechanisms in use today, there is no modern interoperable approach allowing secure updates to firmware in IoT devices.</p> <p>This group will focus on defining a firmware update solution (taking into account past learnings from RFC 4108 and other firmware update solutions) that will be usable on Class 1 (as defined in RFC 7228) devices, i.e., devices with ~10 KiB RAM and ~100 KiB flash. The solution may apply to more capable devices as well.</p>	Under Development
<a href="#">TEEP</a>	IETF	<p>Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)</p> <p>The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a secure area of a processor. The TEE provides security features such as isolated execution and integrity of Trusted Applications, along with provisions for maintaining the confidentiality of their assets. In general terms, the TEE offers an execution space that provides a higher level of security than a "rich" operating system and more functionality than a secure element.</p>	Under Development
<a href="#">27036-1:2014</a>	ISO/ IEC	<p>information security for supplier relationships (Part 1: Overview and concepts)</p> <p>This standard can be freely <a href="#">downloaded</a>.</p>	Approved Standard

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<b>Software Assurance: Standards that describe requirements and guidance for significantly decreasing the likelihood of software having vulnerabilities, either intentionally designed into the software or accidentally inserted at any time during its life cycle, and that the software functions in the intended manner.</b>			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">27036-2:2014</a>	ISO/IEC	information security for supplier relationships (Part 2: Common requirements);	Approved Standard
<a href="#">27036-3: 2013</a>	ISO/IEC	information security for supplier relationships (Part 3: Guidelines for ICT supply chain security)	Approved Standard
<a href="#">19770-2:2015</a>	ISO/IEC	software identification (SWID) tagging	Approved Standard
<a href="#">20243:2015</a>	ISO/IEC	identifies secure engineering best practices, including secure management of the IT products, components, and their supply chains	Approved Standard Conformity Assessment
<a href="#">27035-1:2016</a>	ISO/IEC	guidance on information security incident management for large and medium-sized organizations	Approved Standard
<a href="#">29147:2014</a>	ISO/IEC	Information technology – Security techniques – Vulnerability disclosure.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">30111:2013</a>	ISO/IEC	guidelines for how to process and resolve potential vulnerability information in a product or online service	Approved Standard
<a href="#">90003:2014</a>	ISO/IEC	Provides guidance for organizations in the application of ISO 9001:2008 to the acquisition, supply, development, operation and maintenance of computer software and related support services.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Dependability Assurance</a>	OMG	Provides a new system assurance methodology for the dependability argumentation for consumer devices, which is achieved by integrating conventional system assurance approaches	Approved Standard

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Software Assurance: Standards that describe requirements and guidance for significantly decreasing the likelihood of software having vulnerabilities, either intentionally designed into the software or accidentally inserted at any time during its life cycle, and that the software functions in the intended manner.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">Framework for Safety-Sensitive Consumer Devices Specification Version 1.0</a> February 2016		such as risk analysis and assessments with a new way of approaching unique characteristics of consumer devices. The scope of this specification supports the objectives of the integration, and includes the dependability case for argumentation, as well as the dependability development process to be newly defined. The focus is to include the dependability argumentation particularly for consumer devices. In the future, it may be desirable to introduce additional argumentation methodology for other systems such as avionics or railways. However, they are outside of the scope for the current effort as the authors are not experts in other systems rather than consumer devices.	
<a href="#">AS5553B - 2016</a>	SAE International	counterfeit electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts; avoidance, detection, mitigation, and disposition	Approved Standard
<a href="#">AS6462A - 2014</a>	SAE International	verification criteria for fraudulent/counterfeit electronic parts; avoidance, detection, mitigation, and disposition	Approved Standard
<a href="#">UL 2900-1</a> 2017-07-05	UL	The 2900 series provides testable cybersecurity criteria for network-connectable products and systems to assess software vulnerabilities and weaknesses, minimize exploitation, address known malware, review security controls and increase security awareness.  <u>Product Management:</u> The product shall be designed and implemented such that it is possible to perform an update of the product’s software, and to roll back an update <i>Page 11, Section 11</i>	Approved Standard Guidance Available

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Software Assurance: Standards that describe requirements and guidance for significantly decreasing the likelihood of software having vulnerabilities, either intentionally designed into the software or accidentally inserted at any time during its life cycle, and that the software functions in the intended manner.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">UL 2900-2-1</a>	UL	<p>Security evaluation standard applies to the testing of network connected components of healthcare systems. It applies to, but is not limited to, the following key components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) <u>Medical devices;</u></li> <li>b) <u>Accessories to medical devices;</u></li> <li>c) <u>Medical device data systems;</u></li> <li>d) <u>In vitro diagnostic devices;</u></li> <li>e) <u>Health information technology; and</u></li> <li>f) <u>Wellness devices.</u></li> </ul>	Approved Standard Guidance Available

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Table 17 – Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Standards

Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM): Standards that provide the confidence that organizations will produce and deliver information technology products or services that perform as required and mitigate supply chain-related risks, such as the insertion of counterfeits and malicious software, unauthorized production, tampering, theft, and poor quality products and services.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">TIR57:2016</a>	AAMI	<p>Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI)</p> <p>This TIR provides guidance for addressing information security within the risk management framework defined by ANSI/AAMI/ISO 14971.</p> <p>This guidance is intended to assist manufacturers and other users of the standard in the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identifying threats, vulnerabilities, and assets associated with medical devices</li> <li>• Estimating and evaluating associated security risks</li> <li>• Controlling security risks</li> <li>• Monitoring effectiveness of the risk controls</li> </ul>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">28000:2007</a>	ISO	<p>Specification for security management systems for the supply chain</p> <p>Specifies the requirements for a security management system, including those aspects critical to security assurance of the supply chain. Security management is linked to many other aspects of business management. Aspects include all activities controlled or influenced by organizations that affect supply chain security. These other aspects should be considered directly, where and when they have an impact on security management, including transporting these goods along the supply chain.</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">20243-1:2018</a>	ISO/IEC	<p>Information Technology -- Open Trusted Technology Provider Standard (O-TTPS)</p> <p>Identifies secure engineering best practices, including secure management of the IT products, components, and their supply chains</p>	Approved Standard Conformity Assessment
<a href="#">27036-1:2014</a>	ISO/IEC	<p>Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 1: Overview and concepts</p>	Approved Standard

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<b>Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM): Standards that provide the confidence that organizations will produce and deliver information technology products or services that perform as required and mitigate supply chain-related risks, such as the insertion of counterfeits and malicious software, unauthorized production, tampering, theft, and poor quality products and services.</b>			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>Provides an overview of the guidance intended to assist organizations in securing their information and information systems within the context of supplier relationships. It also introduces concepts that are described in detail in the other parts of ISO/IEC 27036. ISO/IEC 27036-1:2014 addresses perspectives of both acquirers and suppliers.</p> <p>This standard can be freely <a href="#">downloaded</a>.</p>	
<a href="#">27036-2:2014</a>	ISO/IEC	<p>Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 2: Requirements</p> <p>Specifies fundamental information security requirements for defining, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving supplier and acquirer relationships.</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">27036-3:2013</a>	ISO/IEC	<p>Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 3: Guidelines for information and communication technology supply chain security</p> <p>Provides product and service acquirers and suppliers in the information and communication technology (ICT) supply chain with guidance.</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">27036-4:2016</a>	ISO/IEC	<p>Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 4: Guidelines for security of cloud services</p> <p>Provides cloud service customers and cloud service providers with guidance.</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">UL 2900-1</a> Feb 2016	UL	<p>The 2900 series provides testable cybersecurity criteria for network-connectable products and systems to assess software vulnerabilities and weaknesses, minimize exploitation, address known malware, review security controls and increase security awareness.</p>	Approved Standard Guidance Available

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Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM): Standards that provide the confidence that organizations will produce and deliver information technology products or services that perform as required and mitigate supply chain-related risks, such as the insertion of counterfeits and malicious software, unauthorized production, tampering, theft, and poor quality products and services.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<p>Prior to its initial operation in production, the product shall require changes of any system defaults that play a role in product security, such as passwords and keys. The product shall have an indicator when still operating with any system default of passwords, keys, certifications, etc., that would be considered sensitive security parameters.</p> <p><i>Page 11, Section 11</i></p>	

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Table 18 – System Security Engineering Standards

System Security Engineering: Standards that describe planning and design activities to meet security specifications or requirements for the purpose of reducing system susceptibility to threats, increasing system resilience, and enforcing organizational security policy.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<p><a href="#">Common Criteria Link</a> April 2017</p>	<p><b>Common Criteria</b></p>	<p>What is Common Criteria? Provides a common set of requirements for the security functionality of IT products and for assurance measures applied to these IT products during a security evaluation.</p> <p><u>Class FDP: User Data Protection:</u> User data protection is split into four groups of families that address user data within a TOE, during import, export, and storage as well as security attributes directly related to user data.</p> <p>User Data Protection security function policies: Access control policy and Information flow control policy</p> <p>Forms of user data protection: Access control functions, Informational flow control functions, Internal TOE transfer, Residual information protection, Rollback and Stored data integrity. Off-line storage, import and export: Data authentication, Export from the TOE, Import from outside of the TOE</p> <p>Inter-TSF communication: Inter-TSF user data confidentiality transfer protection and Inter-TSF user data integrity transfer protection. <i>Page 54, Section 11</i></p> <p><u>Definitions:</u> <b>TOE:</b> a set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by user and administrator guidance documentation.</p>	<p>Guidance Available</p>

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System Security Engineering: Standards that describe planning and design activities to meet security specifications or requirements for the purpose of reducing system susceptibility to threats, increasing system resilience, and enforcing organizational security policy.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<b>TSF:</b> consists of all hardware, software and firmware of a TOE that is either directly or indirectly relied upon for security enforcements.	
<a href="#">HITRUST CSF v9 10 September 2017</a>	<b>HITRUST Alliance</b>	security framework in the U.S. healthcare industry	Approved Standard Under Revision Guidance Available
<a href="#">15288:2015</a>	<b>IEEE ISO/IEC</b>	Defines a set of processes and associated terminology from an engineering viewpoint. These processes can be applied at any level in the hierarchy of a system's structure.  There are hooks to cybersecurity in the processes.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">P2413</a>	<b>IEEE</b>	Standard for an Architectural Framework for the Internet of Things (IoT)	Under Development
<a href="#">P2418.1</a>	<b>IEEE</b>	Standard for the Framework of Blockchain Use in Internet of Things (IoT)  The purpose of this project is to develop definitions and a protocol for blockchain implementations within an IoT architectural framework.	Under Development

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System Security Engineering: Standards that describe planning and design activities to meet security specifications or requirements for the purpose of reducing system susceptibility to threats, increasing system resilience, and enforcing organizational security policy.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">P360</a>	IEEE	Provides an overview and architecture for a series of standards that define technical requirements and testing methods for wearable devices and their functions. Gives overview, terminology and categorization for Wearable Consumer Electronic Devices (or Wearables in short). It further outlines an architecture for a series of standard specifications that define technical requirements and testing methods for different aspects of Wearables, from basic security and suitability of wear, to various functional areas like health, fitness and infotainment etc.	Under Development
<a href="#">RFC 7641</a>	IETF	Observing resources can dramatically increase the negative effects of amplification attacks. That is, not only can notifications messages be much larger than the request message, but the nature of the protocol can cause a significant number of notifications to be generated. Without client authentication, a server therefore MUST strictly limit the number of notifications that it sends between receiving acknowledgements that confirm the actual interest of the client in the data; i.e., any notifications sent in non-confirmable messages MUST be interspersed with confirmable messages. Note that an attacker may still spoof the acknowledgements if the confirmable messages are sufficiently predictable. <i>Page 21, Section 7</i>	Proposed Standard
<a href="#">State of the Art and Challenges for the Internet of Things</a>	IETF	Reviews security building blocks available for securing the different layers of the Internet protocol suite; documents IoT security threats and the challenges to protect against these threats; and discuss the next steps needed to ensure roll out of secure IoT services	Under Development
<a href="#">62443</a>	ISA/IEC	See: <a href="#">The 62443 series of standards Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security.</a>	<a href="#">Status for Each Part</a>

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System Security Engineering: Standards that describe planning and design activities to meet security specifications or requirements for the purpose of reducing system susceptibility to threats, increasing system resilience, and enforcing organizational security policy.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">13485:2016</a>	ISO	requirements for a quality management system where an organization needs to demonstrate its ability to provide medical devices and related services that consistently meet customer and applicable regulatory requirements	Approved Standard
<a href="#">12207:2008</a>	ISO/IEC	Systems and software engineering – Software life cycle processes  Contains processes, activities, and tasks that are to be applied during the acquisition of a software product or service and during the supply, development, operation, maintenance and disposal of software products. Software includes the software portion of firmware.  There are hooks to cybersecurity in the processes and the current FDIS has a SwA Process View.	Approved Standard  Under Revision
<a href="#">15026-1:2013</a>	ISO/IEC	defines assurance-related terms and establishes an organized set of concepts and their relationships, thereby establishing a basis for shared understanding of the concepts and principles central to all parts of ISO/IEC 15026 across its user communities.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">15026-2:2011</a>	ISO/IEC	systems and software engineering – systems and software assurance (Part 2: Assurance Case)	Approved Standard
<a href="#">15026-4:2012</a>	ISO/IEC	systems and software assurance (Part 4: Assurance in the life cycle)	Approved Standard
<a href="#">20243:2015</a>	ISO/IEC	Information Technology -- Open Trusted Technology Provider Standard (O-TTPS) -- Mitigating maliciously tainted and counterfeit products  identifies secure engineering best practices, including secure management of the IT products, components, and their supply chains	Approved Standard Conformity Assessment

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System Security Engineering: Standards that describe planning and design activities to meet security specifications or requirements for the purpose of reducing system susceptibility to threats, increasing system resilience, and enforcing organizational security policy.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">27036-1:2014</a>	ISO/IEC	<p>Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 1: Overview and concepts</p> <p>Provides an overview of the guidance intended to assist organizations in securing their information and information systems within the context of supplier relationships. It also introduces concepts that are described in detail in the other parts of ISO/IEC 27036. ISO/IEC 27036-1:2014 addresses perspectives of both acquirers and suppliers.</p> <p>This standard can be freely <a href="#">downloaded</a>.</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">27036-2:2014</a>	ISO/IEC	<p>Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 2: Requirements</p> <p>Specifies fundamental information security requirements for defining, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving supplier and acquirer relationships.</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">27036-3:2013</a>	ISO/IEC	<p>Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 3: Guidelines for information and communication technology supply chain security</p> <p>Provides product and service acquirers and suppliers in the information and communication technology (ICT) supply chain with guidance.</p>	Approved Standard
<a href="#">27036-4:2016</a>	ISO/IEC	<p>Information technology – Security techniques – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 4: Guidelines for security of cloud services</p> <p>Provides cloud service customers and cloud service providers with guidance.</p>	Approved Standard

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System Security Engineering: Standards that describe planning and design activities to meet security specifications or requirements for the purpose of reducing system susceptibility to threats, increasing system resilience, and enforcing organizational security policy.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
<a href="#">oneM2M Specifications</a>	<b>M2M</b>	oneM2M is a worldwide standards initiative that covers requirements, architecture, API specifications, security solutions, and interoperability for Machine-to-Machine and IoT technologies. oneM2M aims to define a comprehensive IoT service layer solution to enable scalable and economic IoT solutions. The oneM2M consolidates its IoT service layer platform into a three layer model. The oneM2M horizontal platform architecture has a middleware layer where capabilities such as security are common across all verticals and is designed to support resource sharing and interoperability. oneM2M was formed in 2012. The main partners include eight of the world’s preeminent standards development organizations (ARIB-Japan, ATIS-N. America, CCSA-China, ETSI-Europe, TIA-America, TSDSI-India, TTA-Korea, TTC-Japan.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">AEP-67</a> 2010-02-04	<b>NATO</b>	engineering for system assurance in NATO programs; guidance in how to build assurance into a system throughout its life cycle	Approved Standard
<a href="#">Structured Assurance Case Metamodel</a>	<b>OMG</b>	Documents Associated with Dependability Assurance Framework for Safety-Sensitive Consumer Devices (DAF), version 1.0 Defines a metamodel for representing structured assurance cases. An Assurance Case is a set of auditable claims, arguments, and evidence created to support the claim that a defined system/service will satisfy the particular requirements.	Approved Standard
<a href="#">UL 2900-1</a> Feb 2016	<b>UL</b>	The 2900 series provides testable cybersecurity criteria for network-connectable products and systems to assess software vulnerabilities and weaknesses, minimize exploitation, address known malware, review security controls and increase security awareness.  Prior to its initial operation in production, the product shall require changes of any system defaults that play a role in product security, such as passwords and keys. The product shall have an indicator when still operating with any system default of passwords, keys, certifications, etc., that would be considered sensitive security parameters.	Approved Standard Guidance Available

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System Security Engineering: Standards that describe planning and design activities to meet security specifications or requirements for the purpose of reducing system susceptibility to threats, increasing system resilience, and enforcing organizational security policy.			
Documents	SDO	Description	Maturity Level (Table 6)
		<i>Page 11, Section 11</i>	
<a href="#">UL 2900-2-1</a>	UL	<p>This security evaluation standard applies to the testing of network connected components of healthcare systems. It applies to, but is not limited to, the following key components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Medical devices;</li> <li>b) Accessories to medical devices;</li> <li>c) Medical device data systems;</li> <li>d) In vitro diagnostic devices;</li> <li>e) Health information technology; and</li> <li>f) Wellness devices.</li> </ul>	<p>Approved Standard</p> <p>Guidance Available</p>

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## Annex E—NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), NIST Internal Report (NISTIR), and NIST Special Publication 800 Series Relevant to IoT

The applicability sections of each FIPS publication should be reviewed to determine if the publication is mandatory for federal agency use. FIPS publications do not apply to national security systems (as defined in Title III, Information Security, of FISMA). Federal government statutes (e.g., FISMA 2014), regulations, and policies (e.g., Office of Management and Budget [OMB] Circular A-130) may specify whether federal agencies are required, or encouraged, to comply with NIST’s SP 800-series publications. NIST’s SP 800 series publications shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems.

[Federal Information Processing Standards Publication \(FIPS\) 202](#), SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions

[Federal Information Processing Standards Publication \(FIPS\) 200](#), Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems

[Federal Information Process Standards Publication \(FIPS\) 199](#), Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems

[Federal Information Process Standards Publication \(FIPS\) 186-4](#), Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

[Federal Information Process Standards Publication \(FIPS\) 180-4](#), Secure Hash Standard (SHS)

[Federal Information Process Standards Publication \(FIPS\) 140-2](#), Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

[NIST Internal Report \(NISTIR\) 8228 \(Draft\)](#), Considerations for Managing Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks

[NIST Internal Report \(NISTIR\) 8114](#), Report on Lightweight Cryptography

[NIST Internal Report \(NISTIR\) 7298 Revision 2](#), Glossary of Key Information Security Terms

[NIST Special Publication 800-193](#), Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines

[NIST Special Publication 800-184](#), Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery

[NIST Special Publication 800-183](#), Networks of ‘Things’

[NIST Special Publication 800-177](#), Trustworthy Email

[NIST Special Publication 800-175A](#), Guideline for Using Cryptographic Standards in the Federal Government: Directives, Mandates and Policies

[NIST Special Publication 800-175B](#), Guideline for Using Cryptographic Standards in the Federal Government: Cryptographic Mechanisms

[NIST Special Publication 800-171 Revision 1](#), Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and Organizations

[NIST Special Publication 800-163](#), Vetting the Security of Mobile Applications

[NIST Special Publication 800-161](#), Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

[NIST Special Publication 800-160 Volume 1](#), Systems Security Engineering, Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems

[NIST Special Publication 800-153](#), Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Networks (WLANs)

[NIST Special Publication 800-152](#), A Profile for U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems (CKMS)

[NIST Special Publication 800-150](#), Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing

[NIST Special Publication 800-146](#), Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations  
[NIST Special Publication 800-145](#), The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing  
[NIST Special Publication 800-144](#), Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing  
[NIST Special Publication 800-137](#), Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) for Federal Information Systems and Organizations  
[NIST Special Publication 800-128](#), Guide for Security-Focused Configuration Management of Information Systems  
[NIST Special Publication 800-125](#), Guide to Security for Full Virtualization Technologies  
[NIST Special Publication 800-124 Rev. 1](#), Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise  
[NIST Special Publication 800-123](#), Guide to General Server Security  
[NIST Special Publication 800-121 Rev. 2](#), Guide to Bluetooth Security  
[NIST Special Publication 800-119](#), Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6  
[NIST Special Publication 800-115](#), Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment  
[NIST Special Publication 800-111](#), Guide to Storage Encryption Technologies for End User Devices  
[NIST Special Publication 800-101 Rev. 1](#), Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics  
[NIST Special Publication 800-98](#), Guidelines for Securing Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Systems  
[NIST Special Publication 800-97](#), Establishing Wireless Robust Security Networks: A Guide to IEEE 802.11i  
[NIST Special Publication 800-95](#), Guide to Secure Web Services  
[NIST Special Publication 800-94](#), Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS)  
[NIST Special Publication 800-92](#), Guide to Computer Security Log Management  
[NIST Special Publication 800-83 Rev.1](#), Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling for Desktops and Laptops  
[NIST Special Publication 800-82 Rev. 2](#), Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security  
[NIST Special Publication 800-81-2](#), Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide  
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**Annex F—Acronyms**

3GPP	3 <sup>rd</sup> Generation Partnership Project
AAMI	Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
BIP	Broadcast Integrity Protocol
BR/EDR	Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CD	Committee Draft
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CLSI	Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute
CCMP	Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol
CoAP	Constrained Application Protocol
COSO	Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
CPS	Cyber Physical Systems
CSA	Canadian Standards Association
DASH7	Developers Alliance for Standards Harmonization
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DIS	Draft International Standard
DOT	Department of Transportation
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
DSS	Data Security Standard
DTS	Diabetes Technology Social
EAP	Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAPOL	Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ETSI	European Telecommunications Standards Institute
FDA	U.S. Food and Drug Administration
FDIS	Final Draft International Standard
FIDO	Fast Identity Online
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
GCMP	Galois/Counter Mode Protocol
GSMA	Groupe Speciale Mobile Association
GW	Gateway
EHR	Electronic Health Records
HIPAA	Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
HIT	Health Information Technology
HITRUST	Health Information Trust Alliance
HL7	Health Level 7
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HVAC	Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
IACS	Industrial Automation and Control Systems
ICS	Industrial Control Systems

ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDMEF	Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IICSWG	Interagency International Cybersecurity Standardization Working Group
IIC	Industrial Internet Consortium
IODEF	Incident Object Description Exchange Format
IoT	Internet of Things
IPv6	Internet Protocol version 6
ISA	International Society of Automation
ISMS	Information Security Management Systems
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IT	Information Technology
ITS JPO	Intelligent Transportation System Joint Program Office
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
ITU-T	International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication
JTC	Joint Technical Committee
LAN	Local Area Network
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LES	Lean Execution System
LoRa Alliance	Long Range Alliance
LTE	Long Term Evolution
M2M	Machine to Machine
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MES	Manufacturing Execution System
MLE	Mesh Link Establishment
MQTT	Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NHTSA	National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NS/EP	National Security and Emergency Preparedness
NSC's Cyber IPC	National Security Council's Cyber Interagency Policy Committee
NSTAC	President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
OASIS	Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
OCF	Open Connectivity Foundation
OFB	Output Feedback Block
OMA	Open Mobile Alliance

OMG	Object Management Group
OpenFog RA	OpenFog Reference Architecture
OSDP	Open Supervised Device Protocol
OTA	Open Travel Alliance
O-TTPS	Open Trusted Technology Provider Standard
PCI	Payment Card Industry
PHR	Personal Health Records
PID	Proportional Integral Derivative
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PKCS	Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PLC	Programmable Logic Controllers
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme
PTK	Pairwise Transient Key
QMS	Quality Management Systems
RA	Reference Architecture
RADIUS	Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RFC	Request for Comments
RFID	Radio Frequency Identification
RID	Real-time Inter-network Defense
RSNA	Robust Security Network Association
SACM	Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring
SAE	SAE International
SAML	Security Assertion Markup Language
SCADS	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SCMS	Security Credential Management System
SCRM	Supply Chain Risk Management
SDO	Standards Developing Organizations
SIA	Security Industry Association
STIX	OASIS Structured Threat Information Expression
SWID	Software Identification
TAXII	OASIS Trusted Automated Exchange of Indicator Information
TC	Technical Committee
TCG	Trusted Computing Group
TCP/IP	Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TIA/EIA	Telecommunications Industry Association. Electronic Industries Alliance
TIR	Technical Information Report
TKIP	Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TR	Technical Report
TSCH	Time Slotted Channel Hopping

TSF	TOE Security Functions
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UICC	Universal Integrated Circuit Card
UI	User Interface
UL	Underwriters Laboratories
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
WD	Working Draft
XSF	XMPP Standards Foundation

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