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    <title>topic Re: cve-2026-35414 break down in Firewall and Security Management</title>
    <link>https://community.checkpoint.com/t5/Firewall-and-Security-Management/cve-2026-35414-break-down/m-p/276931#M105383</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;I've worked with OpenSSH for decades, including hanging out on the development list and even contributing some minor patches. I have never personally seen a single environment which uses this feature, and I've only even heard of two.&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;The short version is you set up an SSH server key for the CA, you use &lt;A href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-6.4/ssh-keygen#CERTIFICATES" target="_self"&gt;ssh-keygen(1)&lt;/A&gt; to have the CA sign itself, then use that key to sign keys generated by users. The process of signing a user key involves specifying the users for whom that user key is valid. This is shown in the ssh-keygen(1) manpage in this line:&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;LI-CODE lang="markup"&gt;ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub&lt;/LI-CODE&gt;
&lt;P&gt;Then you tell the SSH server to trust user keys signed by a particular CA key, typically with a &lt;A href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-6.4/sshd_config.5#TrustedUserCAKeys" target="_self"&gt;TrustedUserCAKeys&lt;/A&gt; entry in the&amp;nbsp;&lt;A href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-6.4/sshd_config.5" target="_self"&gt;sshd_config(5)&lt;/A&gt; file. It can be done with an&amp;nbsp;&lt;A href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-6.4/sshd.8#AUTHORIZED_KEYS_FILE_FORMAT" target="_self"&gt;AuthorizedKeysFile&lt;/A&gt; entry instead, which is required for this CVE to be an issue.&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;See the comma in the command above? That's the "more than one principal" which is required for this CVE to be an issue.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 16:24:26 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Bob_Zimmerman</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2026-05-14T16:24:26Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>cve-2026-35414 break down</title>
      <link>https://community.checkpoint.com/t5/Firewall-and-Security-Management/cve-2026-35414-break-down/m-p/276930#M105382</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;&lt;A href="https://support.checkpoint.com/results/sk/sk65269" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;sk65269 - Check Point response to OpenSSH CVEs&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;RE:&amp;nbsp;&lt;A href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-35414" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;CVE-2026-35414&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Can anyone add where and how or steps to check to this description?&amp;nbsp; I'm trying to confirm customer that has certificate authentication thru check point management ICA for VPN users if they aren't vulnerable.&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Vulnerable, Conditional. This is a combination of a very rare setup: certificate authentication configured (not regular public key auth) + t&lt;STRONG&gt;he CA key must be trusted via the cert-authority option (not via TrustedUserCAKeys) + the princip&lt;/STRONG&gt;als = option must list more than one principal + the attacker must either control or compromise the CA.&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 14:41:35 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.checkpoint.com/t5/Firewall-and-Security-Management/cve-2026-35414-break-down/m-p/276930#M105382</guid>
      <dc:creator>Daniel_Kavan</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2026-05-14T14:41:35Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: cve-2026-35414 break down</title>
      <link>https://community.checkpoint.com/t5/Firewall-and-Security-Management/cve-2026-35414-break-down/m-p/276931#M105383</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;I've worked with OpenSSH for decades, including hanging out on the development list and even contributing some minor patches. I have never personally seen a single environment which uses this feature, and I've only even heard of two.&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;The short version is you set up an SSH server key for the CA, you use &lt;A href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-6.4/ssh-keygen#CERTIFICATES" target="_self"&gt;ssh-keygen(1)&lt;/A&gt; to have the CA sign itself, then use that key to sign keys generated by users. The process of signing a user key involves specifying the users for whom that user key is valid. This is shown in the ssh-keygen(1) manpage in this line:&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;LI-CODE lang="markup"&gt;ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub&lt;/LI-CODE&gt;
&lt;P&gt;Then you tell the SSH server to trust user keys signed by a particular CA key, typically with a &lt;A href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-6.4/sshd_config.5#TrustedUserCAKeys" target="_self"&gt;TrustedUserCAKeys&lt;/A&gt; entry in the&amp;nbsp;&lt;A href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-6.4/sshd_config.5" target="_self"&gt;sshd_config(5)&lt;/A&gt; file. It can be done with an&amp;nbsp;&lt;A href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-6.4/sshd.8#AUTHORIZED_KEYS_FILE_FORMAT" target="_self"&gt;AuthorizedKeysFile&lt;/A&gt; entry instead, which is required for this CVE to be an issue.&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;See the comma in the command above? That's the "more than one principal" which is required for this CVE to be an issue.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 16:24:26 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.checkpoint.com/t5/Firewall-and-Security-Management/cve-2026-35414-break-down/m-p/276931#M105383</guid>
      <dc:creator>Bob_Zimmerman</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2026-05-14T16:24:26Z</dc:date>
    </item>
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